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ABSTRACT 
One of the aims of this study is to describe and where possible 
to explain the policies of Leicester as governor of the Netherlands; 
another to analyze the political situation in the provinces under his 
government. 
Among the factors which influenced the governor's career and 
which have been described in some detail are, (1) the financial and 
military emergency which the northern provinces faced after the 
Subjugation of the South, and (2) the political duties imposed upon 
Leicester by the treaty of alliance. In connection with the second 
point the question has been discussed why not only the States, but some 
members of the Privy Council as well, preferred a semi-official 
political union between England and the Netherlands over a mere 
military alliance. Consideration has been given in this respect to 
the records of the Privy Council's debates on the question of intervention, 
to those of the treaty discussions, and to the political terms of the 
treaty itself. 
In the description of the Dutch political scene considerable 
attention has been given to the diVisions between the States and those 
OPpOsition groups that were to form the Leicesterian faction. An 
attempt has been made to trace what seemed to be the main causes of 
the domestic factionism, to define the political and constitutional 
3 
aims of the oPposition, and to show in what manner the partisan 
situation was affected by Leicester's government and by the military 
and political problems of the period. Other factors demanding a more 
or less detailed discussion were the interprovincial relationships, 
and the effect Which the split between North and South had upon the 
general political situation and upon Leicester's government. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The classic and still the most influential work on the Earl of 
Leicester's administration in the Netherlands is Professor Fruin's essay 
of 1862, an essay that was conceived as a review and criticism of the 
first two volumes of Motley's History of the United Netherlands, but 
I that developed into a study covering the entire period. Since the 
publication of this essay other contributions have been made to the 
Leicester historiography in the Netherlands. The episode was treated 
in general histories of the Revolt; a number of monographs have appeared 
on isolated aspects of the era; and a recently published biography of 
Johan van Oldenbarnevelt gave a detailed account of Leicester's 
relations with the Advocate and States of Holland. 2 These later works 
have added to the information given by Fruin, and modified or corrected 
a number of his conclusions. As a comprehensive study on the period his 
work has not been superseded however, and in major outlines his 
interpretation still stands. 
The present study does intend to give a survey of the period as 
a whole. The time that has elapsed since Fruin wrote his essay was one 
1 
R. Fruin, "Motley's Geschiedenis der Vereenigde Nederlanden", first 
Published in De Gids, 1862; reprinted in the author's Verspreide 
Geschriften (The Hague, 1901), Ill, 118-224. References in the text are 
to the latter edition. 
2Jan de Tex, Oldenbarnevelt (Haarlern, 1960), I. 
of the considerations inspiring this attempt. Another was the 
interpretative aspect of his work. In many ways Fruin's essay added 
significantly to an understanding of the period. He wrote it, as 
mentioned, as a corrective to Motley's history. His criticism of the 
latter work was directed mainly at the following two points: Motley's 
tendency to overstress the dramatic and picturesque at the expense of 
the more relevant political and constitutional issues, and the 
inaccuracies in his account of the political scene in the Netherlands. 
It was especially the latter inadequacy which Fruin set out to correct, 
and his Signal contribution to the hlstorlography of the period is his 
attempt to place the story of Leicester's rule against the background 
of the internal political situation. By analyzing such factors as the 
domestic divisions and rivalries, and by showing how these affected 
Leicester's position, he elucidated aspects that had so far been left 
untouched or largely unexplored. 
It is nevertheless true that not all his interpretations in 
this respect are tenable. Motley had been vague about the origins of 
the divisions and had left the impression that they were characteristic 
of Leicester's rule only. Objecting to this presentation, Fruin made it 
his point to show that the issues dated from earlier years, and that they 
continued to be present throughout the time of the Republic. On the 
whole the correction was a valid one, but by streSSing this historical 
continuity Fruin fell into the danger of ignoring factors that were 
indeed typical of the period, such as the strength of the centralist 
15 
movement, or the effect which the mil i tary threat and the recent loss 
of the southern provinces had upon the partisan situation. His failure 
to take account of these and similar factors was shared by subsequent 
authors. An attempt will be made later in this study to show that it 
led to an oversimplified, and in some instances an anachronistic, 
explanation of the political and constitutional issues between States 
and opposition. 
Another point that must be mentioned concerns Fruin's treatment 
of Leicester's career. The author considered the Leicester-experiment 
as a costly failure, which in many respects it was, but he attributed 
the failure too exclusively to the impracticability and unwisdom of the 
governor's ideas. This factor did of course assert its influence. 
Leicester obviously was no politician, and it is probable that even under 
optimum conditions his achievements would have been small. He was not 
working under optimum conditions, however, and for a balanced 
interpretation this fact has to be taken into account. Fruin did this 
only to a limited extent. He showed how the domestic rivalries 
complicated matters for Leicester but gave insufficient weight to other 
Circumstances which were no less decisive in prescribing his policies. 
He ignored, in other wordS, the emergency character of many of the 
measures taken, and as a result his explanation of the governor's 
approach and failure remained inadequate. 
In his evaluation of Leicester's career, and in his general 
presentation of the period, Fruin adhered closely to what has been called 
16 
I 
the Holland or States tradition in the Leicester.historiography. That 
tradition is characterized by a tendency to underestimate the political 
and military problems encountered by the governor, and by an 
uncompromisingly negative verdict upon the policies of Leicester and 
the Leicesterians. Although one recent historian, Mr. A. M. van der 
Woude, has attacked a number of the assumptions on which the tradition 
was based, it is still the dominant one. It had already had a long, 
but again not entirely unchallenged, history when Fruin wrote his essay, 
and in order to place his work in its proper context some attention must 
I be given to the views held by the most prominent of his predecessors. 
The tradition dominated the historiography of the Republican era. 
The pattern was set by the contemporary authors, although on the whole 
their accounts were more balanced than those given by 17th and 18th 
century historians. An inclination to consider the arguments of the 
opposing side characterizes, for example, the approach of the 16th century 
chronicler Bor, whose highly comprehensive and well-documented account 
2 
still forms one of the main sources of information on the period. Bor 
left no doubt that in the controversies his sympathies were wholly with 
1 
t-10st of the following works have been printed more than once. In so 
far as they have been cited in the text, they will be listed here 
according to the edition (usually a later one) that has actually been 
used; otherwise the date of the first edition will be given. 
~. C.- Bor, Nederlandsche Oorlol3en «(2nd complete ed.]; Amsterdam, 
1680-81), 11, Ill. 
17 
the States, but neither did he suppress evidence explaining the position 
of Leicester and his followers. This applies both to his narrative 
account and to his selection of documents. As official historiographer 
to the States of Holland and those of Utrecht he probably received a 
large part of his documentary material through official channels, but 
he evidently did not restrict himself to the publication of government-
supplied information. A liberal amount of space was given to the 
pamphlets, remonstrances and apologies of the opposition. Not all of 
these have survived in other forms, and Bor's work is therefore 
indispensable for any study that is concerned with the background of 
the political divisions in the Netherlands during the revolutionary 
period. 
The other contemporary historians of note are Van Reyd,l who 
2 
served as secretary to the stadholder of Friesland, and Van Heteren. 
The work of the former is strongly affected by his pro-States attitude, 
but the spirit of objectivity that influenced Bor's account is again 
noticeable in Van Heteren's. Like Bor and Van Reyd, Van Neteren was a 
defender of the States' position. He was also a native of the southern 
Netherlands and he had spent several years in England; two factors that 
may account for his comparatively lenient attitude towards Leicester and 
the opposition. 
1 . 
Everhart van Reyd, Oorspronck ende Voortganck vande Nederlantsche 
Oorlo~hen (3rd ed.; knsterdam, 1644). 
2Emanuel van Meteren, Nederlantsche Historien ofte Geschledenissen 
([3rd ed.]; n. P., 1611). 
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The most influential exposition of Leicester's Dutch career 
written in the 17th century is that given in Hooft's Historien. l Hooft's 
version, which shows a more pronounced anti-Leicesterian bias than that 
of any of his predecessors, was not based upon a great amount of 
independent research. For most of his factual information he depended 
on the work of earlier authors, and such originality as his story of 
the Leicester era possesses derives from the inclusion of hearsay and 
anecdotes. The author's family background (his father had been a member 
of Amsterdam's magistrate when Leicester was governing the Netherlands) 
may be one of the factors responsible for his partisan approach. Others 
are, no doubt, the Republic's increased national consciousness and its 
deteriorating relations with the former English ally. The account is 
of interest because it gives an indication of the manner in which 
Leicester's career and English political intervention were regarded in 
the 17th century. 
Hooft's account had a strong influence upon later histories. 
There is no need to trace that influence in any detail, but mention must 
be made of Wagenaar, whose voluminous general history of the Netherlands 
2 dominated the 18th century historiographical scene. Wagenaar was a 
serious historian, who made diligent use of archival sources, but his 
1 ' 
p. C. Hooft, Nederlandsche Historien (3rd ed.; Amsterdam, 1677). 
2 [Jan Wagenaar], Vaderlandsche Historie (2nd ed.; Amsterdam, 1770), 
VIII. 
researches did not result in a drastically different picture of 
Leicester's government. His presentation of this episode is little 
more than a recapitulation, and in some instances a verbal repetition, 
of Hooft's story. 
Around the beginning of the 19th century a re-evaluation of the 
events of the period was attempted. Foremost among the historians who 
in certain respects departed from the traditional view was Adriaan Kluit, 
1 
author of a five-volume history on the government of Holland. Kluit's 
work, which is still one of the authoritative introductions to Dutch 
constitutional history, was inspired by the 18th century democratic 
attack upon the established government. As a conservative, he joined 
the struggle on the side of the States. By analyzing in his history 
the development of States power through the centuries, and by showing 
that this power had been based on their function as representatives of 
the people, he tried to refute the democrats' contention that the 
oligarchies had usurped the people's political rights. 
Kluit's concern was with constitutional issues, and he considered 
the Leicester period also primarily from this angle. One of his most 
important contributions lies in his careful analysis of the constitutional 
controversies between States and opposition. In his presentation of the 
conflicts between States and governor his particular approach led, in a 
few instances, to a somewhat oversimplified picture however. From a 
1·· . 
Historie der Hollandsche Staatsregering (Amsterdam, 1803), 11. 
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purely constitutional point of view the right was usually on Leicester's 
side, but from a practical-political one it was quite as often on that 
of the States, and Kluit did not always escape the danger of overstressing 
the legalistic aspect. By drawing attention to the political arrangements 
inaugurating the Leicester period he nevertheless provided a much needed 
corrective to some of the earlier accounts, which had presented the 
governor in the role of usurper of the States' prerogatives. 
The revisionist trend was continued by the Calvinist or Anti-
Revolutionary school of historiography, which sprang up in the course 
of the 19th century. Among its earlier members who tried to arrive at 
a more positive evaluation of Leicester's government, no doubt largely 
because of the legalistic principle involved, are authors like Bilderdijk 
and Van der Kemp.l Their attempts are interesting primarily from a 
hlstoriographical point of view. Neither account adds Significantly to 
the arguments given by Klult, and because of their pronounced anti-States 
bias they fall considerably below his standard of objectivity. This 
objection does not apply to the brief but balanced exposition of the 
Leicester era given by the most prominent 19th century member of this 
school, Guillaume Groan van Prinsterer. 2 
The best-known 19th century work on the period and the immediate 
1 
W. Bilderdljk, Geschledenls des Vaderlands (Amsterdam, 1835), VII; 
C. M. van der Kemp, Maurits van Nassau (Rotterdam, 1843), I. 
2 .... , .. -----
[G.] Groen van Prinsterer, Handboek der Geschiedenis ~an het Vaderland 
(Amsterdam, 1846). 
21 
forerunner of Fruin's study, John Lothrop Motley's History of the United 
1 Netherlands, does not entirely belong to the traditional stream, but 
it falls also largely outside the revisionist one. It was noticeably 
influenced by the versions given in the 16th and 17th century histories, 
and Motley's own inclination made him the whole-hearted champion of the 
States in their opposition to a governor with absolutist tendencies. 
His account is nevertheless considerably less onesided than those of 
Van Reyd, Hooft and Wagenaar. As a result of his wider scope, and 
also as a result of his fuller acquaintance with Dutch and English 
archival sources, he pointed to at least some of the practical and 
political problems that confronted Leicester, even if he did not always 
notice the extent to which they influenced his policies. 
Fruin himself was no more than Motley an uncritical follower of 
the earlier authors, yet in one significant respect, the general scope 
of his history, he came closer to them than the American historian did. 
Motley had treated the Leicester period not only as a political, but 
also as a military episode, more particularly as an aspect of the 
combined Anglo-Dutch war effort against Spain. In accordance with the 
old tradition Fruin underemphasized both its international and its 
military implications and considered it primarily as an internal-political 
phenomenon. This had its effect on his interpretation. Attention has 
already been drawn to the fact that in explaining Leicester's career he 
1 References in the text are to the edition printed in London, by John 
Murray, 1860-67. 
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failed to show the full relevance of other than party-political factors. 
I t was to a number of these neglected factors that Hr. van der Woude drew 
attention when he suggested that the events of Leicester's government be 
explained with reference to the critical military, financial and 
political situation in which the provinces found themselves in the 
I period immediately following the loss of Brabant and Flanders. 
The impression is unavoidable that Fruin was too often tempted 
to consider the situation of the years between Antwerp's surrender and 
the defeat of the Armada (or Farma's participation in the French civil 
wars) in the light of the militarily and economically more prosperous 
and politically more settled decades following that period. As Mr. van 
der Woude has pointed out, Fruin's too optimistic view is expressed early 
in his essay, where he ruled out the possibility that Holland could have 
been desperate enough to consider surrendering its independence in return 
for English military and political support. It is noticeable throughout 
his study, and most strikingly so in his treatment of such major sources 
of controversy as Leicester's commercial and some of his financial 
measures; policies for which he found no other than party-political 
explanations. 
1 See his articles "De Goudse Magistraat en de strijd tegen de koning", 
~, XIII (1958-9), 101.107, and especially "De crisis In de opstand 
na de val van Antwerpen", ~, XIV (1960), 38-56 and 81-103. His study 
on the financial aspects of the alliance, "De Staten, Leicester en 
Elizabeth in financiele verwikkelingenll , ~, LXXIV (1961), 64-82, Is 
in some ways a sequel to the second article. 
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The influence of the English demands upon Leicester is another 
factor that has received insufficient attention from Fruin. Here again 
his interpretation has remained largely uncorrected, both by Dutch and 
by English authors. It is nevertheless true that Leicester was sent to 
the Netherlands with not only a military, but also a political task. At 
least some indication why the English government had considered this 
arrangement necessary was given in the report of the treaty negotiations 
drawn up by the Dutch legation, while some of the actual duties were 
listed in the treaty itself. Fruin's dominant concern with the aspects 
of Leicester's rule proper caused him to pass lightly over the 
negotiations leading up to the alliance, and he gave equally little 
attention to the political terms of the treaty. As a result the only 
standard used by him to determine the legality of Leicester's actions 
was the commission given him in the Netherlands, and the only touchstone 
for their acceptability was again that which the States supplied. 
Other points might be mentioned, but the foregoing remarks have 
sufficiently indicated the main trend of his interpretation, together 
with the views underlying it. These remarks were not intended as a 
criticism of his exposition as a whole. Fruin gave a valuable analysis 
of the political aspects of Leicester's rule, and a highly satisfactory 
account of the States' plight in the face of the English and the 
Leicesterian threat. His limited scope prevented him from giving an 
equally adequate explanation of the circumstances which determined the 
position of Leicester and those which insplred the policles of the 
I 
opposition. It was on these points that a re-evaluation seemed I 
possible, and these are among the factors that will be given special 
consideration in the present work. 
NOTE ON THE SOURCES 
Although especially in recent decades a large amount of 
documentary material relevant to the Leicester period has appeared in 
print, it is still possible to supplement these printed sources with 
unpublished material. The Algemeen Rljksarchief in The Hague, where 
the records of the States of Holland, the States General, the Council 
of State and other central government departments are deposited, and 
the Manuscript Department of the Eritish Museum proved to be the richest 
fields. The relevant collections in the British Museum, which contain 
documents of both English and Dutch ortgin, were found to be of special 
importance for the period of Leicester's temporary absence in the winter 
and spring of 1587 and for the second phase of his governorship. 
A third archive containing unpublished material that throws 
additional light on the Leicester pertod is the Public Record Office. 
Some of these documents can be found among the State Papers Holland and 
the Treaty Papers, another group occurs among the Domestic ones, which 
have been only briefly calendared for these years and which in a number 
of instances deal with foreign affairs. Less rewarding was a search 
for material in a number of other British archives. The Libraries of 
Lambeth Palace and of the University of Cambridge do not appear to have 
a great deal of material that is of value for our topic. The Bodleian 
Library in Oxford has an extensive collection of papers relating to 
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Anglo-Dutch affairs in the late 16th century, but the larger part of 
it Concerns the period immediately following the year 1587. A check 
of the indexes kept by the National Register of Archives showed that 
the unpublished collections listed here contain little that is of 
relevance for the first years of the alliance and for the events of 
Leicester's government. With the exception of the Hatfield Manuscripts 
this is also true for those private archives that have been calendared 
by the Historical Manuscripts Commission. 
Of the many collections of printed documents only those can be 
mentioned here that were of special importance for this study. The most 
important of the published governmental records are the fourth and fifth 
volumes of the Resolutions of the States General (edited by N. Japikse 
and published in 1919 and 1921) and those of the States of Holland. The 
publication of the latter series was begun in the 17th century; a second 
edition was issued between 1772 and 1798. On the English side there 
are the Acts of the Privy Council, edited by Sir J. R. Dasent, which 
are, however, incomplete for this period. Among the collections of 
official correspondence and other State Papers the Calendars of State 
Paners Foreign Series, and the volume of Leicester-correspondence edited 
by John Bruce and published in 1844, are indispensable. The second 
publication, which contains a large amount of material from the British 
Museum, deals with the first year of the Leicester period only. A 
valuable supplement is the second part of the Cabala, sive Scrinia Sacrs, 
published in London in 1691, which is of importance for the period of 
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Lord Buckhurst's embassy in the Netherlands and for the concluding 
months of Leicester's government. The Cabala also gives many documents 
preserved in the British Museum, particularly from among the papers of 
Robert Beale (formerly the Yelverton or Cal thorpe 11ss., now Addi tional 
1'1ss. 48,000 _ 48,196). Other major collections are the carelessly 
edited but otherwise excellent volumes of Leicester-correspondence 
collected by R. Brugmans from various Dutch and English archives 
(3 vols., 1931), and the extensive Hotman-correspondence from the 
Archives des Affaires Entrang"eres in PariS, edited by R. Broersma and 
G. Busken Ruet (~, XXXIV, 1913). The first of these deals with the 
entire Leicester period; the second mainly, although not exclusively, 
with the months of Leicester's temporary absence when Jean Rotman, his 
French secretary, remained in the Netherlands as one of his confidential 
agents. Of importance are further Groen Van Prinsterer's Archives ou 
Correspondance Ine'dite de la Malson D'Orange-Nassau (lI, i, 1857), the 
first volumes of M. L. Van Deventer's and S. p. Haak's editions of 
Oldenbarnevelt's correspondence (published in 1860 and 1934 respectively) 
and, on the English side, the Historical Manuscripts CommiSsion's 
Calendars of the Burghley papers in Hatfield House. 
The number of Dutch and English historical studies that have been 
devoted, in whole or in part, to the period under discuss ion Is again so large 
that no attempt could be made to list them all. Because several of those 
that have been used in preparing the present work have been discussed in the 
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Introduction or will be mentioned in later chapters, it is perhaps 
unnecessary to review them here. The titles of these works occur among 
the sources listed at the back of this study. A more complete survey 
of relevant literary and other printed sources may be had from the 
published bibliographies on the period. In addition to Conyers Read's 
El blioptraphy of English History. Tudor Period (2nd ed.; 1959), attention 
might be given to the extensive and excellent bibliographical notes in 
the third volume of the same author's Mr. Secretary Walsingham (Oxford, 
1925) and in J. H. Black's The Rei~n of Elizabeth (2nd ed.; Oxford, 1965). 
Also useful are the bibliographies in a number of Dutch historical 
works, such as p. J. Blok, Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Volk 
(3rd ed.; Leiden, 1924), vol. 11; I. H. Gosses and N. Japikse, Handboek 
tot de Staatkundige Geschiedenis van Nederland (3rd ed.; The Hague, 1949); 
and J. A. van Houtte a. 0., eds., Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 
(Utrecht, 1952), vol. V. 
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CHAPTER I 
CONCLUSION OF THE ANGLO-DUTCH TREATY 
I 
In the early part of July 1585, one year after the death of the 
Duke of Anjou and the Prince of Orange, six months after the conclusion 
of the Holy League, and four months after Henry III of France had 
declined the States' offer of sovereignty and their request for military 
aid against Spain, a Dutch legation arrived in London to solicit English 
support. By the middle of August a preliminary treaty had been 
concluded, inaugurating the two years of the Low Countries' semi-
protectorate relationship with England under the Earl of Leicester's 
governorship. 
The present chapter is concerned with the negotiations leading 
up to this agreement. After Motley's detailed description of the treaty 
discussions, and after Dr. Conyers Read's painstaking analysis of the 
Queen's and the Frivy Council's views on the question of aid to the 
Netherlands, this topiC is a familiar one. A brief recapitulation of 
the ideas held by the two partners regarding the scope and ultimate 
goal of their cooperation is nevertheless necessary, both to explain 
the character of the treaty and to provide an introduction to the 
Lelcester period. 
The aims and intentions of the States appear from the three 
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sets of instructions with which they had provided their commissioners. 
In the first of these the legation was ordered to offer Elizabeth the 
sovereignty of the countries on conditions similar to those that had 
been drawn up for Henry Ill. If she should decline the deputies were 
to ask that she take the countries into "everlasting protection", and 
if that were also refused a request for mere military assistance was 
1 to be made, for the duration of the war. The States wished, in other 
words, to acquire English aid until Philip had acknowledged their 
independence or right of self-determination for at least since 1581 
they had been unable to conceive of a peace on any other terms and 
they intended to suggest to Elizabeth that she anticipate such an 
acknowledgement by annexing the provinces to the English crown. 
The hope that she could be induced to take this step undoubtedly 
eXisted. In his review of }.lotley's study on the Leicester period 
Professor Fruin, as was mentioned, questioned Holland's sincerity in 
this respect. He explained the offer as a mere civility, made 
necessary because of the French precedent but extended in the confidence 
that Elizabeth, in accordance with her repeated assurances that she 
2 
would not "enter as a possessioner", would reject it. In view of the 
strong particularism of the provinces and the reluctance of the States 
to share their powers with any executive that was not controlled by 
lResolutien der Staten-Generaal, ed. N. Japikse (The Hague, 1921), V, 
56, 57-61. 
2 Verspr. Geschriften, Ill, 135f. 
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them, whether provincial or central and whether native or foreign, 
this conclusion might seem logical. It is not however supported by 
the available evidence. The legation, which counted among its members 
Some of the most influential statesmen of Holland and the other 
provinces, made more attempts and used more arguments to convince 
Elizabeth of the wisdom of annexation than would appear to have been 
either necessary or prudent if the offer were meant as a polite gesture 
I 
only. 
It should be said that Motley's oft-repeated suggestion that 
the States' desire for a union with England was inspired as much by 
2 
natural inclination as by the necessity of the moment, is probably 
equally incorrect. The States may by this time not yet have considered 
it adVisable to dispense with a sovereign head altogether, but it was 
not absolutely necessary that such a sovereign were a foreign prince. 
Holland's and Zeeland's intention to bestow the honour upon their own 
stadholder, the Prince of Orange, suggests that they had considered 
the possibility of establishing their independence. It is probable 
that the majority of the States agreed with Christopher Reels, the 
pensionary of Zeeland, who confessed to Walsingham that only the present 
emergency constrained them to seek foreign overlordship, but that by 
I According to the report of the negotiations which the Dutch legation 
Submitted to the States General. This report has been printed in part 
by Bor, 11, 635-646, and almost in full by KHG, V, ii (1866), 215-277. 
For the discussions on the sovereignty see Bor, PP. 635f and ~, PP. 216-222. 
2 Motley, United Netherlands, 1,.286, 304, 323; 11, 61-64, 127, 134. 
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1 inclination the provinces were "neither French nor English". It was 
of course true that a union with a larger power would not only help the 
provinces solve some of their immediate problems, but might bring them 
a number of long-term benefits as well. The connections with Spain 
had never been an unmitigated evil; the political, diplomatic and 
commercial advantages were still recognized. Some benefits.of a similar 
nature might be derived from England. Commercial privileges were in 
2 fact expressly demanded at the time of the negotiations, and during 
the first year of Leicester's government various attempts were made to 
3 draw a larger part of the EngliSh cloth trade to the maritime provinces. 
The chief benefits to be expected were of a political rather than an 
economic nature however. On the whole Dutch and English commercial 
interests were competitive, and no such striking economic profits were 
likely to be derived from a union wi th England as from the one wi th 
Spain. 
Although there would be long-term gains, it is.questionable 
whether in the States' opinion these outbalanced the risks involved in 
a policy of annexation. These risks included the possibility of a 
Roman Catholic succeeding to the English throne, the anti-Calvinist 
1 Calendar of State Papers Foreign Series, ed. Sophie Crawford Lomas 
(London, 1916), XIX, 586. 
2 See the States' Articles of the Sovereignty, no. 14; ARA, Loketkas 
Enge1and 2. 
3Resolutien van Hol1andt, 1586, p. 62; Res. St. Gen., V, 324, 375; John 
Bruce, ed., Correspondence of Robert DUd1ey (London, 1844), pp. 126-128; 
Cal. For., ed. Sophie Crawford Lomas (London, 1921), XX, 385, 502f. 
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sympathies of Elizabeth herself, and her disinclination to allow 
"popular" influence upon the government. By means of the articles 
accompanying the offer of sovereignty they attempted, it is true, to 
guard against the dangers threatening the provinces' political and 
religious establishment. According to these articles the States 
envisaged little more than a loose personal union Wherein not only the 
principle of self-government but also the general political status quo 
would as far as possible be preserved. It was requested, among other 
things, that the Council of State consist of natives, and that its 
instructions, to which the Queen's governor would also be bound, be 
drawn up wi th "the States General's advice. All those officers whom 
formerly the sovereign used to choose and appoint were to be nominated 
by the prOVincial States. The prOVincial stadholders were to retain 
their authority, and the Colleges of Deputies of the provincial States, 
which formed with the stadholder the dally government in most of the 
prOVinces, their present function. It was further requested that the 
prOVincial States be allowed to assemble whenever they thought it 
necessary, and that the States General be called at least once a year 
"to resolve about matters concerning the Queen's and the country's 
service". No changes were to be made in the existing laws, no new 
taxes imposed, no innovations made in religioUS matters, no foreign 
garrisons introduced and no peace or armistice concluded except with 
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1 the consent of either the States provincial or general. Although the 
legation was allowed to meet the Queen's possible objections to some 
2 
extent, the principle of national and provincial self-government was 
to be retained. If there had been guarantees that these conditions 
would be accepted and kept inviolate by the Queen and her successors 
little harm could be done, but any such guarantees were obviously lacking. 
The reasons why the States nevertheless preferred annexation 
over a military alliance must therefore be sought in the special problems 
confronting them at this time. The most pressing of these was the 
apparent difficulty of tying England securely to the defence of the 
Netherlands. The need to retain English aid was greater than it had 
been before, because the pos$ibility of even limited French help had 
disappeared, and the chance that that country's government would fall 
under Spanish control was increasing. Hopes that effective military 
aid would be given by the protestant princes of Germany were as small 
as ever, and the King of Denmark also appeared determined to persevere 
in his attitude of neutrality. England alone was left, and its loyalty 
1 See the Articles of the Sovereignty, ARA, Loketkas Engeland 2, and the 
legation's Secret Instructions, ARA, Loketkas Loopende Engeland 2. 
2 Mainly with respect to the right of appointment. On condition that 
she chose natives the Queen would be allowed to appoint the chief 
officers without nomination, although in the case of prOVincial 
stadholders she was bound to follow the States' advice. The deputies 
were further allowed to agree to the appointment of two English members 
to the Council of State. Secret Instructions, arts. 8 and 5; ARA, 
Loketkas Loopende Engeland 2. 
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was to be secured at any price. Only if Elizabeth made the cause of 
the Low Countries her own by accepting them in ownership could there 
be a firm assurance of her full and permanent support. 
Other difficulties were of an internal nature and concerned 
the country's political problems, such as the prevailing discontent 
with the States'government, the particularism of the provinces, and 
the related difficulty of establishing an effective central government. 
In arguing the advisability of annexation the deputies emphasized these 
governmental problems. The need for reform had long been acknowledged, 
but the drawbacks of the existing system were realized more clearly 
than ever since the Prince of Orange's death. Although he also had 
been constantly hampered by the provinces' particularism, he had at 
least been able to bring about some measure of cooperation. The Council 
of State, established after his death under the nominal headship of his 
sixteen-year old son Count Maurice failed to provide similar leadership. 
Its formal authority was not inconsiderable, but it was unable to 
enforce its measures and decrees. The need then for effective leadership 
to counter the disadvantages of the confederate nature of their government 
was stressed by the deputies, and the fact of prOVincial sovereignty was 
mentioned as the root cause of the difficulties. Only if this sovereignty 
were surrendered to a common head, something which, according to the 
legation, all the provinces were willing to do in the Queen's case, 
I 
would effective government be possible. 
Il 
Elizabeth's views on the issue were, as is well-known, less far-
reaching than those of the States. The Queen thought of a solution to 
the Dutch problem not in terms of an Anglo-Dutch union or even of Dutch 
independence, but in those of the pre-war situation. Spanish armies 
were to be wi thdrawn from the Netherlands and the Dutch granted their 
autonomy, but they were to remain under Spanish over1ordship. Her views 
and poliCies precluded smooth cooperation between the future allies and 
greatly complicated matters for the English governor. By stating this 
it is not implied that her goal in itself was indefensible. It turned 
out to be an unrealistic one, but, as recent historians have shown, she 
had good reasons for her belief that the course contemplated by her was 
2 the safest and the only possible one for England. The problem was not 
only that either of the approaches suggested by the States would mean 
an endless war with Spain and that England seemed ill-equipped to wage 
such a war with any hope of success, but also that a formal conflict 
lKHG 
___ , V, ii, 220-222. 
2 See for example the following works by R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada 
(London, 1966), ''English Policy and the Revolt of the Netherlands", in 
J. S. Bromley and E. H. Kossmann, eds., Britain and the Netherlands 
(London, 1960), PP. 29.40, and ''Elizabethan War Aims and Strategy", in 
S. T. Bindoff, J. Hurstfield and C. H. Wil1iams, eds., Elizabethan 
Government and Society (London, 1961), pp.340-68; as well as J. E. Neale, 
.Q.ueen Elizabeth (London, 1934), and the same author's "Elizabeth and 
the Netherlands, 1586_7", in his Essays in Elizabethan History (London, 
1958), PP. 170-201. 
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with Spain would too drastically disturb England's system of continental 
alliances. Traditionally England had depended on alliances with Spain 
against the mutual rival France, and Elizabeth considered it essential 
for England's future peace and quiet that this old system be restored. 
All she wished to achieve was to stem the present agression of Spain 
and to provide safeguards to prevent a recurrence of such agression in 
the Low Countries. 
The alliance might nevertheless have had a better start if 
Elizabetll had accepted the fact that the conditions needed for such a 
composition still had to be created. Spain had failed to honour a 
similar agreement at a time when the provinces were in a strong 
bargaining position; the settlement concluded after the Pacification 
of Ghent had been violated shortly after it had been made. After the 
fall of Antwerp the Revolt seemed near collapse and Philip could not 
be expected to accept and execute England's terms unless he was once 
more driven into the defensive. Under Leicester's government this was 
never achieved, and England's premature peace negotiations needlessly 
aggravated the inter-allied disagreements during these years. 
The Queen's views on the matter of war and peace were no 
different after the conclusion of the treaty than they had been before 
that time. Personally she would have preferred to dispense with a 
permanent military alliance and to limit herself to informal or 
temporary aid; the Dutch appear to have owed it to the Privy Council's 
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1 intervention that a more comprehensive treaty was concluded. Perhaps 
they owed it also to the Council, or at least to the interventionists 
among its members, that help was promised at all. On this point there 
had been no unanimity among the CounCillors, but the weight of conciliar 
opinion appears to have been in favour of supporting the Dutch. In 
2 October 1584 a positive decision was given, and there is no indication 
that it was ever reversed. In conformity with that decision the Queen 
had, through the ambassador William Davison, promised the States that 
English help would be given if they failed to obtain support elsewhere. 3 
No further steps had been necessary at this time, because the States 
were still negotiating in France regarding a transfer of sovereignty 
to Henry Ill. It was not until the following March, when Henry refused 
the Dutch offer and requests, that England was forced into action. 
Henry's decision caused more discomfort than relief in England. 
There had of course been concern about the possibility that a union 
between France and the Netherlands might become a fact. France was the 
arch-rival, and one of the reasons why Elizabeth clung to the idea that 
Spain and the Netherlands were to be reunited was her belief that Spanish 
help might again be needed to prevent France from acquiring the Dutch 
provlnces. 4 But although France was considered to be potentially a more 
1£a1. For., XIX, 618. 
2 -
!..bid., PP. 97f. 
3!Eld., PP. 149-151; Res. St. Gen., IV, 515. 
4The extent to which fear of Franc. dominated Elizabeth's foreign policy 
has been clearly shown in the previously cited articles by Professor Wernham. 
dangerous enemy than Spain, it was also England's potential ally So 
long as Anglo-Spanish hostility lasted. Elizabeth had taken that fact 
into account. She had done so increasingly when the Spanish threat 
grew more and more formidable and when the situation in the Netherlands 
began to make large-scale foreign intervention essential. If France 
took the lion's share of this duty a Franco-Spanish war might ensue, 
in which case England could reserve to itself the function of arbitrator. 
Elizabeth had therefore not objected too strenuously when in 
the summer of 1584 the Dutch had prepared to offer the sovereignty to 
Henry. She had tried to gain some influence for England, both by 
Suggestions of joint-intervention to Henry, and by promises of English 
aid to the Dutch. l That aid was offered on condition of territorial 
cautions, the grant of which would have removed the danger of Henry's 
becoming "absolute" master of the provinces. The intention had not been 
to discourage him from espousing the Dutch cause, although this danger 
was of course inherent in English interference. If no joint-intervention 
were pOSSible, and if the choice were between Henry's accepting the 
Sovereignty and his total withdrawal, Elizabeth preferred the first 
alternative. "For although it may be greatly misUked", as in January 
1585 one of the Queen's Councillors wrote to the English ambassador in 
PariS, "to have the French King become an absolute lord of the country, 
1 Cal. For" ed. Sophie Crawford Lomas (London, 1914), XVIII, 598f, 601f. 
yet rather than he should now reject them, and so give courage to the 
Spaniard, it were better that he should accept of the offers and enter 
into war with the King of Spain for the Low Countries, wherein he must 
have a long time before he can achieve such an enterprise as to be 
absolute lord of all the Low Countries, during which time many 
III If opportunities may fallout to stop his greatness that way... Henry 
only kept Antwerp and the Flemish coast from falling to Spain a 
multitude of sins would be covered. Once he was engaged in war he 
would probably be forced to accept English cooperation, and on England's 
terms. 2 
Henry refused to accept the sovereignty, and the negotiations 
about jOint-intervention by England and France also had negative results. 
In this Situation the question was asked in the Privy Council whether 
England should not follow the French example and maintain an attitude 
of neutrality. The proposal occurs in an anonymous document that was 
discussed during a Council meeting held at Lord-Treasurer Burghley's 
house on March 28th. 3 Among the arguments used against intervention 
was what Queen and Council had always considered to be a problem, 
1 . 
Cat. For., XIX, 236. 
2 For a more detailed account of England's attitude .towards the Franco-
Dutch negotiations see Conyers Read, Mr. Secretary Walsingharn (Oxford, 
1925), Ill, 75.100, and his Lord F,urghley (London, 1960), PP. 306-314. 
3 
BM, Harleian Mss. 168, fos. 102-105. This document has been given in 
extenso in the Appendix, no. I. 
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na~ely the political disabilities of the Dutch. These were now painted 
in darker colours than ever. Special em?hasis was placed on the 
disadvantages of the "popular" system of government. the States' 
habitual failure in fulfilling their financial obligations. the 
inconstancy and "mutinousness" of and the divisions among the people, 
and the disinclination of States, people and military leaders to 
cooperate with foreigners. These factors alone, it was implied. might 
make all English endeavours to help the States fight their war 
ineffective. An additional argument against a belligerent course was 
that an Anglo-Spanish war could never solve the problem for the Dutch. 
The most probable thing to happen was that England would have to sue 
for peace and leave the provinces again at the mercy of Spain. Even 
1f Philip could be forced to grant them independence their difficulties 
would continue. Unwilling to annex them, the Queen would have to leave 
them to their own resources and it was obvious that they were incapable 
of maintaining and governing themselves. These matters being so, it 
was to be considered whether the Queen should not be advised to use all 
her resources for the strengthening of England's home defences, and to 
let events on the continent run their course. Once Phillp was repossessed 
of his Burgundian heritage he would probably realize the need of English 
friendship and refrain from acts of aggression against the former ally. 
In the absence of complete records of the Council's resolutions 
it Is not clear how strong anti-interventionist opinion was at this 
time. Or; Conyers Read has shown that there was a division in matters 
of foreign policy between Walsingham's and Leicester's Puritan party, 
to which most of the younger Councillors belonged, and the majority of 
I the older members, including Lord-Treasurer Burghley. The former 
group had advocated intervention for many years. It was convinced that 
the threat to England and to protestantism in general could only be met 
by an all-out war against Spain and aggressive Roman Catholicism, and 
it favoured a close political union between England and the Netherlands, 
a union that might become the nucleus of a wider protestant confederacy. 
The other group consisted mainly of men who had served under Queen 
Mary, at a time therefore when England was at war with France and still 
allied to Spain. As a result they were less inclined to see Spain as 
England's implacable enemy, and they were more in agreement with the 
views underlying the Queen's policy than the younger Councillors. 
This remained true for Lord Burghley. It is not certain 
however that Burghley, as Dr. Read assumed, had in fact been opposed 
2 to the conclusion of the alliance. The increased Spanish threat in 
recent years had forced him to qualify his views and to consider the 
need of military intervention in the Netherlands. In a memorandum that 
seems to have been written not long before the Prince of Orange's death 
he had warned Elizabeth that suspicions of France should not blind her 
1 Conyers Read, "Walsingham and Burgh1ey in Queen Elizabeth's Privy 
Council", ![!, XXVIII (1913), 34.58. 
2 Idem, Lord Burghley, PP. 308f, 311. 
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to the danger posed by Spain. An Anglo-French alliance might be 
Possible, and if not, France, which was weak and divided, could for the 
time being be discounted as a serious enemy. Spain posed a more immediate 
danger, also because of the goodwill its King enjoyed among his co-
religionists in England. If a composition with Spain were attempted, 
Philip might use the opportunity provided by the negotiations to 
complete the overthrow of the Low Countries, and so deprive England 
of its "counterscarp". It therefore seemed to Burghley that the Queen 
would be best advised "thoroughly and manifestly to make war upon him", 
1 both in the Indies and in the Low Countries. 
It is true that Burghley became more hesitant when the time 
for action came nearer. In the advice submitted to the Council meeting 
of October 1584 he had strongly emphasized tl1e dangers of intervention 
2 
and of war with Spain, but it does not appear that at this time he had 
counselled against intervention. Nor does there seem to be any 
conclusive evidence that he did so during the following months. Dr. Read 
based his contrary opinion on the document discussed by the Council on 
3 March 28th, which he attributed to Burghley. He failed to indicate 
the grounds on which he reached this decision, however, and it Is 
1 . 
Sommers Tracts, ed. Waiter Scott (London, 1809), I, 168-170. 
2 .. 
Calendar Hatfield Mss., Ill, 67-70. That this was indeed Burgh1ey's 
adVice appears from the copies in BM, Har1. Mss. 4243, fos. 25f, and 
Cotton ~lss.', Callgula C IX, fos. 47-49. 
3 
Lord Burghley, p. 311. 
uncertain whether it is tenable. No record has been found of this 
particular Council meeting, and in what seems to be the only surviving 
copy of the proposal in question no indication is given which Councillor 
or Councillors might have submitted or defended it. The fact that 
Burghley had in October drawn attention to the same risks and dangers 
as mentioned In the document of March 28th is not sufficient proof that 
he was the author, for these were standard objections and had been made 
I by others as well. 
While it is clear that Burghley wasno enthusiastic interventionist 
like Leicester and Walsingham, it seems unlikely that he would have given 
unequivocal negative advice in March. This would have been in contradlc-
tion not only to the opinion he had expressed preViously and to the 
assurances he had given to some Dutch agents in London only one week 
before the Council meeting,2 but also to his subsequent attitude. In 
July 1585, if not earlier, he was again urging Elizabeth to give aid to 
the DutCh,3 and his misgivings about an interventionist course did not 
prevent him from supporting that course once it had been decided upon. 
1 
See for example the advice which Sir Waiter Mildmay gave at the Privy 
CounCil meeting on October 10, 1584. Calf For., XIX, 96f. 
2 
According to a report by Joachim Ortell and the Seigneur de Gryse, who 
were negotiating in England, Burghley had on March 21st 1585 informed 
them that Elizabeth was resolved to take the provinces in protection, 
suggested that an official legation be sent, and promised that he 
himself would help to expedl te the treaty as much as possible. M. L. 
Van Deventer, ed., Gedenkstukken van Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (The Hague, 
1860), I, 67. 
3BM, Cotton Mss., Galba C VIII, fos. 89f. (See Appendix, no. 11.) 
Suspicions that the Queen would be tempted to proceed with half-way 
measures may well have been among the causes of his earlier scepticism. 
That he himself favoured a more comprehensive action than Elizabeth is 
I 
evident both from his growing opposition to her peace policies, and 
from his attitude towards the Leicester experiment. As will presently 
be seen, Burghley appears to have favoured the appointment of an English 
nobleman with political responsibilities, and although there is no 
eVidence that he had been acquainted with Leicester's decision to accept 
a formal fUnction in the Netherlands in opposition to Elizabeth's order, 
he strongly defended him when his acceptance of the governorship was 
2 
challenged by the Queen. 
The decision taken by the Council on Harch 28th is not known, 
but it may be assumed that the interventionists retained the upper hand, 
for there are no indications that Elizabeth was advised to persevere in 
a policy of neutrality. Withdrawal was in fact scarcely possible any 
more. Before the Council meeting the earlier promises of help had been 
repeated," by Walsingham, Leicester, Burghley and the Queen herself, and 
3 an invitation had been extended to the States to send their deputies. 
After considerable delay the legation arrived, and after some weeks of 
hard bargaining an agreement was concluded whereby England did not only 
1 
See below, PP. 326, 340f. 
2 
Bruce, PP. 104, ll2f, 143, 161. 
3 Cal. For., XIX, 333, 336, 352; Van Deventer, I, 65-68. 
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promise to give permanent military aid, but also to send a governor who 
would have political as well as military functions. 
The legation's report of the treaty negotiations shows that the 
idea of a semi-protectorate relationship did not come from the Dutch 
deputies. They willingly accepted this arrangement as the nearest 
Possible substitute to a formal union with England, but they had not 
been instructed to ask for the appointment of an English governor if 
the offer of sovereignty and the request for "perpetual protection" were 
refused. The idea came, according to the report, from the English 
commissioners. l Presumably in the first place from Leicester and 
Walsingham. Leicester coveted the governorship, and he and his partisans 
held the opinion that the extension of mere military aid would not solve 
the problem for England or the Netherlands. They may also have hoped 
that by the means contemplated a first step might be taken on the road 
2 towards an Anglo-Dutch union, Elizabeth's objections notwithstanding. 
As already mentioned, they had some support from Lord Burghley. 
From a paper drafted by Burghley on July 23rd it appears that he was 
one of those who advised Elizabeth to provide for the appointment of an 
3 English nobleman, who might help direct Dutch policies. Another paper, 
V, H, 249. 
2 See in thls connection the hypothesis,which will be considered .later 
in this study, in R. C. Strong and J. A. van Dorsten, Leicester's 
Triumph (Leiden, 1964), pp. 3f and passim. 
3BM, Cotton Mss., Calba C VIII, fos. 89f. (Appendix, no. 11.) 
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written at a somewhat later date, suggests that he had no objections to 
an arrangement whereby that nobleman assumed the leadership of the Dutch 
1 government, if this was in agreement with the States' wishes. It is 
not clear whether Burghley also thought in terms of a permanent union. 
The 16th century copyist of one of the annexationist documents written 
2 during these months assumed this to be so, but there are no other 
indications that Burghley considered a formal union either possible or 
adVisable. He evidently agreed with Leicester and Walsingham, however, 
that a military alliance alone was insufficient. One reason why he 
favoured a semi-protectorate relationship was no dOUbt the governmental 
chaos in the Netherlands. He had discussed this problem at some length 
3 during the Council meeting of the previous October, and he used it as 
his chief argument in his proposal of July 23rd. 
He probably also hoped that the arrangement would make it possible 
for the English government to exert some influence over Dutch domestic 
4 policies. That influence was needed in military affairs, in the 
question of trade with the enemy, and especially in matters of finance. 
Burghley had little faith in the soundness of the Dutch monetary system, 
1 See below, p.55 , note 1. 
2 
BM, Add. Mss., 32,379, fos. 73-75. 
3 According to the "Advice" printed in Calf Hatf. Mss., III, 67-70. 
4 See for some of Burghley's suggestions in this respect his memorandum 
in Calf For., XIX, 705f, which seems to have been written during the 
treaty discussions. 
and during the treaty discussions he expressly demanded that the "order 
of their monyes current [might] be reduced into one standard" and that 
1 
no changes be made without official English permission. He was also 
convinced that the Dutch, if they husbanded their resources properly, 
could raise more for the war than they did. 2 Already in October 1584 
he had warned that in case of intervention English officers should be 
appointed to supervise the levy and disposal of the contributions in the 
Netherlands, and he repeated this demand when the Dutch legation was in 
London. 3 There is reason to believe that the terms of the treaty dealing 
with financial reform, as well as a later English order to Leicester 
regarding the centralization of the system by means of a Chamber of 
Flnances,4 were inspired by the Lord Treasurer. 
III 
It was not until the beginning of August that the Dutch legation, 
lpRO 
, SP 103, XXXIII (Treaty Papers), no. 51. 
2AM 
, SG 3793, fos. 222, 238f; Bor, 11, 875, 929f. 
3 
Cal. For., XIX, 705. Burghley had discussed the topic in another 
memorandum, which was written on July 13/23. Under the headings "The 
contributions and levy" and "Chardge of Collection" he wrotes "Item it 
is necessary to know what soms of money are at this tyme or of late tyme 
in two or three months 1evyed, and out of what contries, and what towns 
do paye the same, and of what natures the same payements are of, and how 
the same may continew, and rather how the same may increase without 
offence of the people if cause shall require. Item also to know what 
are the common chardges in eo11eetyng of those contributions, and what 
is Upon every sorn of 20 or 40 thousand f10ryns that is imposed upon the 
contrey, expended and spent by the collectors, thresorers and payemasters". 
PRO, SP 103, XXXIII, no. 58, fOe 147. 
4 
BM, Add. Mss. 48,129, no fOe number. 
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in conformity with the Councillors' suggestion, asked Elizabeth for the 
appointment of an English nobleman, because it was not until this time 
that there had been any certainty whether she would grant a formal 
alliance. The States' delays in sending their deputies and their 
hesitation in granting all the cautions she desired had increased her 
doubts about the wisdom of formal intervention. International develop-
ments had the same effect. Around April 1st the English government had 
1 been informed about the conclusion of the Holy League in France. 
Initially there had been some hope that this combination might draw the 
French King, the "pol1tiques" and the Huguenots together against Spain 
and the Guises. Early in July, however, Henry resolved to join the 
League and thereby placed the French government under the control of 
the Spanish party. Whatever hopes there had been that France might give 
some support to England and the Netherlands had, for the time being, 
disappeared, and the possibility that it would detain Philip from an 
2 
attack upon England itself had greatly decreased. 
Under these circumstances Elizabeth considered it essential to 
limit her responsibilities abroad, and as far as the Low Countries were 
concerned she was initially not prepared to go much further than would 
be necessary to stem the Spanish threat against Antwerp. During the 
1 Cal. For., XIX, 369f. 
2ef • Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 370. 
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first weeks of the negotiations the legation failed to get more than an 
offer of a subsidy, and a promise of temporary military aid for the 
defence of Antwerp. The subsidy amounted to £65,000 per year, but 
Flushing and De Briel were required as security, and their garrisons 
were to be paid by the Dutch. The minimum demand of the States was for 
a permanent force of 5,000 footsoldiers and 1,000 horsemen, in addition 
to the cautionary garrisons, an army that would cost approximately 
£126,000 per year. The legation accepted the offer of aid for Antwerp 
but rejected the conditions tied to the offer of a subsidy, and by the 
1 end of July negotiations came close to a collapse. At this point the 
Privy Council intervened,2 and on the last day of July the Queen agreed 
to send a permanent army of 4,000 footsoldiers. Shortly thereafter she 
promised to add 400 horsemen to this number. 3 
This offer was not immediately followed by the conclusion of a 
treaty, partly because the deputies had not yet been fully authorized 
by the States of Zeeland regarding the cession of Flushing, and partly 
because the numbers promised still remained below those required by the 
States. Because Antwerp was in imminent danger it was decided to 
proceed with the conclusion of at least a temporary agreement. It was 
1 ~, V, ii, 233-244. 
2 
According to Walsingham all 
affected", had cooperated in 
she grant a formal alliance. 
3 ~. V, ii, 247f, 249. 
the Councillors, ''howsoever inwardly 
the. attempt to persuade Elizabeth that 
Cal. For., XIX, 618. 
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signed on August 12th. By the terms of this so-called provisional treaty 
the Queen promised to send and maintain at her expense, for a period of 
three months and upon security of Ostend or Sluys, an army of 4,000 
footmen. The cost of this force was estimated at approximately fl. 185,000, 
which amount was to be repaid six months after Antwerp's relief or, if the 
1 town should fall, within one year after the expiration of the treaty. 
A few days later authorization was finally received from Zeeland 
to grant Flushing. Their attempts to raise Elizabeth's offer having been 
in vain, the deputies resolved to accept it provisionally, subject to the 
States General's approval. The treaty was accordingly drawn up and 
Signed on August 20th. 2 It provided that the payment of the 4,000 foot-
soldiers would begin upon the expiration of the provisional treaty, and 
that of the 400 horsemen one month after the conclusion of the permanent 
one. The cautionary garrisons of Flushing and De Briel, amounting to 
1,150 men, were to be paid by the States. Upon the signature of the 
agreement the greater part of the legation left to report to their 
principals and obtain the ratification of the treaty. At the Queen's 
request four members stayed behind in London, so that negotiations could 
3 immediately be resumed in case ratification should be refused. 
Shortly after the conclusion of the alliance news of the fall of 
1 
Bor. 11, 637f. 
2 The permanent agreement is also printed in Bor, 11, 641-644. 
3 ~, V, ii, 251. 
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Antwerp reached London. The effect of this calamity upon the Queen was 
such that she resolved to increase her auxiliary to the number of 5,000 
footsoldiers and 1,000 horsemen. A supplementary treaty was drawn up 
on September 14th. The four remaining deputies further appear to have 
obtained the concession from the Council •• apparently without the 
Queen's knowledge _. that the numbers needed for the cautionary 
garrisons would be added to these 6,000 men, and that the Queen would 
1 be responsible for their payment. 
Davison, whom Elizabeth had sent back to The Hague when the fall 
of Antwerp became known, was ordered to procure the ratification of both 
the original and the supplementary agreements. Although he had not yet 
received the special authorization to do so, Davison agreed to the States 
General's request that the cautionary garrisons would be paid by the 
Queen. He had taken this step, as he explained to Walsingham, for fear 
that a refusal might cause the Dutch to reject the entire treaty.2 For 
the same reason he further conceded that the provisional agreement would 
be converted into the principal one. This meant that the latter would 
take effect immediately, and that the repayment of the money disbursed 
for the Antwerp force could be postponed until the end of the war; 
arrangements that were to give rise to some of the financial problems 
encountered by Sir John Norris and later by Leicester. It was further 
1 . . 
Cal. For" XX, 21, 114. 
2 Ibid., p. 41. 
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agreed that the one thousand additional soldiers were to be drawn from 
the English volunteers in the Low Countries. The Act of Ampliation, 
embodying these provisions, was drawn up by the States General and 
1 
accepted by Davison on October 2nd. 
The treaty in its amplified form then provided that Elizabeth 
would maintain at her expense, until the end of the Low Countries' war, 
an army of 6,000 men above the garrisons of the cautionary towns. She 
would return these towns to the States upon repayment of all the money 
she had disbursed, which repayment would begin after the war had ended. 
The parties promised that they would not conclude a peace, or enter into 
negotiations with the enemy, except by mutual consent, and the States 
agreed that they would refrain from treating with any other foreign 
power without Elizabeth's knowledge and approval. 
Eight of the treaty's thirty articles were concerned with the 
duties of the Queen's lieutenant, or the governor general, as the treaty 
called him. These appeared to be extensive, although they remained 
largely undefined. The governor, who was to be assisted by a Council 
of State to which two English members would be admitted, was given the 
comprehensive duty to provide for all that concerned the conservation 
of the public weal. More particularly, governor and Council were ordered 
to restore public authority, to reorganize and reform the financial 
system, and to purge the military establishment of its abuses. 
1 . 
. Res. St. Gen" V, 74.76. 
The manner in which the first of these tasks, the restoration 
of public authority, was to be carried out waS not further explained. 
Most of the emphasis was placed on the central government's authorlty 
in financial and military matters. With respect to the last point 
governor and Council were ordered to restore military discipline. They 
further received the right to commission provincial and municipal 
governors in case of vacancies, and they were made responsible for the 
levying and payment of foreign soldiers. The appointment of governors 
was to be made however from a provlncial nomination, and for foreign 
levies the States General's consent was required. It was not indicated 
whether the supreme direction of the war would fall to the governor, 
but this was perhaps implied. 
In financial affairs the emphasis was also on reform. The 
governor and his Council were specifically ordered to retrench the 
number of financial officers, to correct the abuses and imperfections 
in the system of taxation, and to take measures to ensure that the 
revenue be employed to the greatest possible advantage with respect to 
the war by sea and land. An additional task was to reform the mints 
and to reduce these to a reasonable number. 
Vague as the articles were, they conveyed the idea that an 
effective central government was to be established in which the English 
governor would have considerable influence. The implementation of the 
articles appeared to have been left to the States General, in 
55 
I 
consultation with the English governor. To this task they set 
themselves in January of the following year, shortly after Leicester's 
arrival in the Netherlands. 
I 
That this was not only the States' opinion, but, before Elizabeth 
issued her contrary order, also the Privy Council's, appears from 
Burghley's advice to Leicester that he was to assume such authority 
as the States should give him, provided that he exercised it in their 
names and not in the Queen's. BM, Add. Mss. 48,129, no fOe number. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PR:l:-LEICESTERIAN PHASE CF THE ALLIANCE 
I 
The four months between the conclusion of the alliance and 
Leicester's arrival in the Netherlands do not, strictly speaking, belong 
to our topic, but the history of this period does provide an introduction 
to that of the following two years and some mention must therefore be 
made of its major trends. This treatment has to be selective; attention 
can be given only to those aspects that are of direct relevance to the 
Leicester era, either because they provide an additional explanation of 
the political arrangements made upon his arrival, or because they 
introduce situations and problems inherited by him as governor of the 
Netherlands and as lieutenant-general of the English army. The topics 
falling within this category include the story of the ratification of 
the treaty and the surrender of the cautionary towns, the policies of 
Davison and Norrls, chief English agents in the Netherlands, the 
financial arrangements between the allies, and some of the military and 
1 Political events taking place during these months. 
-
1 For an analysis of the financial, administrative and some of 
the political problems confronting the States at this time see A. M. 
Van der Woude's article in ~, XIV, 38-56 and 81-103. The following 
aCCount of the political situation as it affected the ratification of 
the treaty owes much to his treatment of the topic. 
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So long as Leicester was delayed Davison remained in the Low 
Countries as the Queen's special representative. In cooperation with 
Sir John Norris, the general of the English army, he was to work out 
the technical details of the alliance. His first duty had been to 
procure the ratification of the treaty, a task that was not accomplished 
until the beginning of October. The matter of the cautionary towns was 
one of the causes of the delay. Holland and Zeeland had hoped that the 
Queen would take a town in each of the provinces. The confederacy 
remained, after all, a confederacy, and it was not impossible that if 
the inland provinces had no town to redeem they would leave the 
responsibility of repaying England to Holland and Zeeland alone. 
Elizabeth however had declined the offer. She had sufficient security 
in the two strategic towns of the maritime provinces and suggested that 
Holland and Zeeland solve their problem by demanding assurances from 
their allies, in the form of towns or by other ~eans.l 
Holland and Zeeland resolved to ask for written "Acts of 
Indemnity" from the other provinces and intended to postpone acceptance 
of the treaty until these acts had been received. None of the inland 
areas, however, was in a hurry to comply. They were in the midst of a 
more than extraordinarily violent disagreement with Holland regarding 
the matter of a trade prohibition and appeared diSinclined to accommodate 
l~, V, ii, 251. 
their ally. The warning extended by the members of the legation that 
delays might cause the Queen to change her mind had no effect; when on 
September 21st Davison presented the supplementary treaty to the States 
General the provinces still had not authorized or sent their deputies. 
Dav!son shared the suspicion that Elizabeth might indeed use the delay 
as an excuse to go back on some of her promises. He was not too 
confident about the steadfastness of the Dutch either, and blamed the 
problems surrounding the ratification as much on intrigues by pacifists 
and other anti-English groups as on the particular ism of the inland 
provinces. Fearful that these groups might gain a victory over the 
States and jeopardize the alliance, he was anxious that at least Holland 
and Zeeland Sign, so that he could take possession of the cautionary 
towns. The maritime provinces still preferred to wait for the decision 
of their allies, but when by the end of September the authorization from 
Utrecht arrived they gave in to Davison's request. The Act of Ampliation 
was drawn up and submitted to the ambassador. Its conditions were 
disadvantageous to England and Davison feared that acceptance might 
arouse the Queen's displeasure, but realizing that a new advice from 
England and a new convocation of the States General might take another 
fiVe or Six weeks, and "finding no other way for the time to get her 
I Majesty ensured", he decided to accept the States' condi tlons. 
IVan der Woude, ~, XIV, 39-45; Cal. For., XX, 41. 
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In his letters to London, wherein he explained this step, Davison 
I painted a gloomy picture of the political situation in the NetherUmds. 
The influence of the peace party had, according to these letters, 
greatly increased since the fall of Antwerp, and the arrival of the 
English troops had not sufficiently counteracted that influence. Some 
among the Dutch were in fact inclined to use the existence of the 
alliance as an additional argument to come to a composition with Spain, 
asserting, as Davison wrote, "that they would never have better conditions 
than now, if they list to make their profit of her Majesty's assistance, 
as those of Antwerp had (as they termed it) wisely done, of the only 
bruit and countenance thereof". The ambassador further thought that 
there was reason to fear a revival of the French party, which had been 
particularly strong in Zeeland and which counted among its members 
several of the Prince of Orange's friends and advisers. The Count of 
Hohenlohe, senior commander of the Dutch forces, had had the reputation 
of being pro-French, and the same was true for some of Count Maurice's 
Councillors. Both Maurice and Hohenlohe might, in Davison's opinion, 
oppose the alliance not only because of their possible French inclinations, 
but also because of the appointment of an English governor, which 
threatened "the places and degrees they now occupied in the government". 
Maurice especially had reason to feel that his interests had been 
neglected. The treaty contained no provision that he would succeed his 
I Cal. Foro, XX, 35-42. 
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father as stadholder of Holland and Zeeland. The one official function 
he held at present, his headship of the Council of State, would fall to 
Leicester. In addition there was the fact that he was Marquis of 
Flushing, and that the States had granted this town as a caution to the 
Queen without his prior consent and without a promise of compensation. 
There were arguments sufficient, Davison thought, which the ill-affected 
I 
could use to draw Maurice away from the English course. 
The ambassador's reports on the two Counts were, as it turned 
out, too peSSimistic. There is no indication that Maurice, after he 
had received some satisfaction in the matter of Flushing, in any way 
opposed the conclusion of the treaty. HOhenlohe was at this time quite 
in favour of the alllance. 2 Davison's assessment of the strength of 
the peace party may also have been exaggerated; it is probable that 
he painted the situation in the darkest possible colours in order to 
induce the Queen, who was anxious to prevent the Dutch from concluding 
a separate peace, to a greater effort. There is no doubt however that 
3 pacifism constituted a problem at this time. The failure of the 
attempts to enlist aid from France, Parma's military successes, and the 
disapPOinting results of the EngliSh negotiations had been having their 
1 Ibid., p. 39f. 
2 Bruce, P. 74. 
3Bor , 11, 650; Van Reyd, p. 110; Hooft, PP. 989-991. 
effects. The strongly Roman Catholic population of the inland provinces 
especially was war-weary and inclined to a composition. Upon the collapse 
of the French negotiations Nijmegen and Doesburg had made their peace with 
Spain, and pro-Spanish plots had been discovered then at Arnhem and 
Kampen. Parma, who in the autumn of 1585 tried to open negotiations with 
the States, expected that Gelderland and Overijsel could be brought back 
to their obedience without too many difficulties, especially if some 
Spanish armies were dispatched to those areas for the encouragement of 
1 2 the well-affected. In Friesland the situation was not much better. 
Even in Holland the Spanish party seemed to be gaining ground. In the 
Summer of 1585 the town of Gouda had refused to grant an extraordinary 
contribution for Antwerp unless an attempt were made to procure an 
acceptable composition. While most of the other town magistrates, 
supported by the Calvinists and other anti-Spanish groups, refused to 
contemplate such a step, part of the population sympathized with Goudao 
It was expected also in Dutch circles that an offer of peace, if lt 
included some guarantees for religious toleration, would receive strong 
3 popular support throughout the country. 
lLeon van der Essen, Alexandre Farnese (Brussels, 1937), V, 17. 
2 Van Reyd, p. 110. 
3Res • Ho. 1585, pp. 387f; Van der Woude, ~, XIV, 53. 
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The pro-Spanish groups received little or no official 
encouragement. The States, whose position had been strengthened by the 
arrival of the English troops, ignored Parma's peace proposals and tried 
to counteract the influence of the defeatists. They were entitled, 
Davison had to admit, to better support from England. To combat the 
pacifists Elizabeth had upon the fall of Antwerp agreed to increase her 
aid, but at the same time she herself began to investigate the 
Possibilities of entering into negotiations with Spain. On September 10th 
instructions were drawn up for a certain Slr John Smyth, who was ordered 
to inform Parma of England's willingness to promote a composition between 
Spain and the Dutch provinces and to suggest that Parma prepare the road 
for negotiations by granting an armistice. l Apparently Smyth's embassy 
2 
was cancelled, but rumours about the intended mission reached the 
Netherlands, much to Davison's embarrassment. The cautionary towns had 
not yet been transferred by this time, and Davison warned Walsingham 
that the States might now refuse to surrender those "keys of their 
estate".3 
But the States kept to their bargain. Early in October Hohenlohe 
was ordered to withdraw the Dutch companies from Flushing and De Briel, 
and before many days had passed three English companies entered the 
1 Cal. For., XIX, 67lf. 
2 Van der Essen, V, 86. 
3 . 
Cal. For., XX, 7f. 
latter town. The English general placed them under the command of his 
brother Sir Henry Norris, who was some months later to be replaced by 
Sir Thomas Cecil, Lord Burghley's son. In the meantime Count Maurice, 
1 
after Some pressure by Hohenlohe and in return for an act of indemnity 
from the States, had given his approval for the cession of Flushing. 
On October 29th this town also passed into English hands. Until the 
arrival of Flushing's governor, Sir Philip Sidney, the command of this 
2 garriSon was entrusted to Edward Norris, another of Sir John's brothers. 
Davison, who on a number of other points disagreed with Norris'; 
3 policy, was critical of the arrangements made concerning the cautionary 
towns. He objected to the general's choice of governors; in his opinion 
they were too inexperienced for the task. The companies destined for 
the garrisons were, moreover, incomplete, ill-furnished, and generally 
in a miserable condition. Those sent to Flushing had been on board their 
ship for ten days without protection against the weather and without 
sufficient food. Several had succumbed to the privations, others were 
too ill to be transported from Middelburg, their place of landing, to 
FlUshing and had to be left behind in the former town. Instead of 
750 men, as had been agreed by the treaty, the garrison of Flushing was 
1 Bruce, p. 74·. 
2 Bor, 11, 649; CaI. For., XX, 47f, 96. 
3Such as his insistence upon offensive warfare at a time when, 
in Davison's opinion, a defensive course was the only feasible one. 
Cal. For., XX, 157, l59f. 
only 550 men strong, and this was felt to be an insufficient number to 
keep the inhabitants under control if they should have a mind to revolt. 
There were also serious financial difficulties. The treasurer was not 
supplied with money to pay the cautionary garrisons and Davison was 
forced, time and again, to drive his "poor credit to rack" to provide 
some loans for "the soldiers. It hardly sufficed to keep them from 
starvation, and complaints were heard in Zeeland that the poverty of 
I the companies might cause the towns to refuse further English garrisons. 
Although Davison had managed to get the alliance under way and 
to provide England wi th its "securi ties" hiS cares had evidently not 
ended, and by the middle of November he was more than anxious for his 
recall and for the arrival of the English governor. Sir John Norris, 
although less pessimistic than Davison, also pressed for Leicester's 
2 
appointment. He was faced with a number of problems of his own, for 
the settlement of which the governor's aid was needed. One of these 
concerned, again, the monetary situation. Because the financial 
difficulties with respect to the English army will be treated at some 
length in one of the following chapters, the present discussion can be 
confined to an enumeration of the main factors responsible for the 
shortages. To a large extent the problem was a result of disagreements 
on the question when the English soldiers who had been allowed in 
I . Cal. For., XX, 81f, 91, 108, 156, 247. 
2 ~, PP. 33f, 180. 
addition to the 4,000 men of the provisional treaty, and who were to be 
recruited from the English volunteers in the States' pay, would come at 
the Queen's charge. According to the original agreement, and according 
to Norris, this was not to take place until the middle of November, that 
is after the expiration of the provisional treaty. According to the Act 
of AmpliatiOn however, and according to the States, the Queen was 
responsible for these payments from October 2nd, the day that Davison 
had accepted their act. Davison agreed with the States, but because the 
English treasurer was provided with money for the Antwerp force only he 
asked them to advance 
payment of the extra 
the money (an amount of fi. 18,0001) for the 
2 1,000 troops. But before long it appeared that 
Elizabeth was highly displeased about the provisions of the Act of 
Ampliation. She might, as Walsingham informed Davison, consider 
accepting financial responsibility for the soldiers of the cautionary 
garrisons from the day they had left the camp, October 7th, but she had 
no intention to pay the other 1,000 soldiers before the expiration of 
3 the Antwerp treaty. The States were equally persistent in their 
4 
refusal to pay them, and eventually Norrls advanced the money. 
1ARA , SG 3793, fOe 18. 
2 Cal. Foro, XX, 94. 
3 ' lE.!.!:., p. 114 • 
4 See on these questions A. M. van der Woude, "De Staten, 
Leicester en Elizabeth in financiele verwikke1ingen", ~, LXXIV (1961), 
, 65-67 ~ 
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Another cause of the army treasurer's lack of funds was the 
disadvantageous rate of exchange. Officially one pound sterling was 
considered to equal ten Dutch guilders, but as a result of England's 
unfavourable balance of trade with the Netherlands the actual rate was 
1 
often lower. Norris made at least some payments according to a rate 
2 
of nine guilders per pound. The monthly charge per company rose 
thereby from £170 (the pay was established at fl. 1,700) to almost £189. 3 
There was also the fact that certain amounts of money -- imprests or 
lendings, made to the soldiers before their muster, and sums advanced 
to them for the purchase of their furnishings, which had to be deducted 
from their pay were not immediately received. Because of the high 
cost of living in the Low Countries, which made it difficult for the 
soldiers to manage on a reduced rate of pay, Norris made these 
defalcations in small instalments and consequently a larger amount of 
money was needed. for a monthly payment than had been estimated in 
England. The English government had further counted on the States' 
promise that they would repay an amount of £3,000, which had been 
advanced by the Queen for the levy, furnishing and transportation of 
English volunteers in the States' pay, soon after the arrival of these 
1 . 
Ibid., p. 66, note 6. 
2 .' 
Cal. For., XX, 47~ 
3Apparently the rate fluctuated.. According to a financial 
statement of October 1585 the monthly pay per company amounted to 
£184.3.4~ Ibid., p. 129. 
I forces, a promise that was not fulfilled. 
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The settlement of these problems and of questions of a similar 
nature was referred to the governor general. Norris further felt that 
Leicester's presence was necessary to coordinate the allied forces and 
create some unity of command. While Hohenlohe would probably refuse to 
follow the English general's orders, Norris himself hesitated to entrust 
the disposal of the English forces wholly to Hohenlohe. The German Count 
was a gallant enough soldier but, perhaps as a result of the fact that he 
was hardly ever sober -- a circumstance that had induced Parma to nickname 
• 2 him "le Conte a bouteille" -- an unreliable military leader. He 
certainly was no match for Parma; his prestige in the enemy camp was 
low, and it is not unlikely that the States themselves were relieved at 
the prospect that he would lose his leading position to the English 
governor. The States as well as Norris nevertheless realized that 
Hohenlohe was to be treated with respect. "A right Almayn in manner and 
faShion, free of his purse and of his drynk", as Leicester was to 
describe him,3 he was popular with his soldiers, and many of the 
garrisons in Holland and Brabant were at his devotion. It would be 
dangerous to alienate him. 
1 Van der Woude, ~, LXXIV, 66. 
2 According to an inhabitant of Middelburg, who objected to 
Leicester's appointment of Hohenlohe as his lieutenant-general. BM, 
Cotton Mss., Galba C IX, fo. 88. 
3 Bruce, p. 75. 
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The difficulty was that not all the Dutch generals were willing 
to follow his direction. Among his opponents was the Count of Neuenahr 
and Meurs, one of his compatriots. Meurs, who as stadholder of 
Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijsel controlled most of the frontier 
regions, also was to be satisfied and Norris had, as he informed 
Walsingham, "much ado to carry an indifferent hand" between the two 
1 
men. Davison already detected some dangers in regard to Meurs. The 
stadholder was not only at odds with Hohen1ohe, but also with the former 
Archbishop-Elector of Cologne, Gebhard Truchsess, who now lived as an 
eXile in the Low Countries. Upon his conversion to protestantism 
Truchsess had been deposed in favour of the Spanish-supported Ernest 
of Bavaria. Al though the ensuing "Bishops' War" had not yet been 
officially concluded, Ernest had succeeded in gaining control of the 
larger part of the Electorate. Truchsess however still held a few 
places, including Rheinberg and Neuss, both of which were situated on 
the Rhine. The last-mentioned town had been reconquered for him by 
Meurs in the spring of 1585. The disagreement was not about this 
conquest but about the fact that Meurs, whom Truchsess had appointed as 
his "Guardian" for the Lower Diocese, had begun to disregard Truchsess' 
rights in Rheinberg and elsewhere and to use the revenue of the 
2 
ex-Archblshop's posseSSions for his own purposes. The two men had 
1 .. 
Ca1. For., XX, 33. 
2 ~, pp. 266f. 
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agreed to submit the question to the arbitration of Elizabeth or her 
governor, but in the meantime attempts were made by certain German 
princes to persuade Meurs that he leave the Dutch side and lend his 
Support to the new Elector. Davison was afraid that under the 
circumstances Meurs might be tempted to consider the suggestion and 
1 
ordered Norris to keep an eye on the stadholder. The precaution was 
no doubt unnecessary, but the fact remained that the disagreements 
between the German nobles constituted a source of embarrassment and 
might have an adverse effect upon the military efforts. 
11 
One redeeming factor was that the military situation did not 
drastically deteriorate during these months. The fear that Parma would 
follow his success at Antwerp with a large-scale offensive in the 
northern provinces was not realized, partly because of his own 
financial and supply difficulties, partly also as a result of the timely 
arrival of the English army. To what extent these two factors affected 
his striking powers will presently be seen; it is necessary first of 
all to give a picture of the general military situation and of the 
positions occupied by the States and by Parma at this time. 
The line of demarcation between Spanish-occupied and States l 
territory was made up, roughly speaking, of the southern and eastern 
boundaries of Zeeland in the west, and the southernmost of the great 
1 ~, p. 37. 
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rivers, the Maas between Gorcum and Venlo, in the east. South of this 
line the States' possessions were limited to a few strongholds, of which 
Ostend and Sluys on the Flemish coast, and Bergen op Zoom, Willemstad 
and the Maastown of Grave in Brabant were the most important. Parma's 
holdings north of the line were far more extensive. The three western 
provinces and Utrecht were free from Spanish occupation, but the eastern 
ones were all partly enemy-controlled. 
Most of the North-East was in Spanish hands. The town of 
Groningen was held by Philip's stadholder Verdugo, who from that 
Position controlled the province of that name, the territory of Drenthe 
to the south, and much of Overijsel. The enemy had gained posseSSion 
of Groningen in 1580, as a result of the defection of Rennenberg, then 
stadholder of the three northern provinces. Although far removed from 
the centre of Spanish power in the Netherlands, Verdugo had well been 
able to maintain his position, largely because by way of Delfzijl he 
retained Some contact with the Baltic regions and especially with the 
town of Emden, which provided him with victuals and other supplies. 
The navies of Friesland and Holland attempted to cut down this commercial 
intercourse by blockading Emden's harbour, but because the fleet had to 
retire at the approach of winter the blockade was never entirely 
successful; Verdugo usually succeeded in providing himself with the 
necessary supplies during the winter months. 
In the North-East therefore the States' position was particularly 
weak. Further south the parties were more evenly balanced. Most of the 
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countryside of Overijsel was enemy-controlled, but the chief towns of 
that province, Deventer, Kampen and Zwolle, were on the side of the 
States. The States' position in the most important of these, the Hansa 
town of Deventer on the IJsel, was not however unchallenged. It had 
been largely because of Deventer's opposition that Overijsel had been 
unwilling to join the other provinces in their negotiations with England 
1 
and to accept the treaty once it had been concluded. Unlike Kampen and 
Zwolle, it refused to admit a States' garrison, attempting instead to 
maintain a precarious but economically not unprofitable neutrality 
between the contending forces. The problem created by Deventer's 
political aloofness was one of those which stadholder Meurs attempted 
to solve, initially with some measure of success, after Leicester's 
arrival.2 
Politically and strategically the most important of the western 
provinces was Gelderland~ It was the region of the great rivers, the 
Rhine, Waal and Maas, which formed the major highways from Holland into 
the German hinterland, and the IJsel, which connected Arnhem on the 
Rhine with the towns of western Overijsel and the Zuiderzee~ The last 
two were partially controlled by the enemy. On the IJsel, some distance 
south of Deventer, Verdugo's lieutenant De Tassis held Zutphen. The 
strength of his position here lay especially In his possession of the 
IJ. C. H. de Pater, "Leicester en OVerljsel", ~, LXIV (1951), 
271. 
2See p~ 157 below. 
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Veluwe forts, situated across the river from Zutphen and considered 
"invincible"l since the time that the States' army under Hohenlohe had 
2 in vain besieged them for several months. From these strongholds 
De Tassis controlled the Veluwe __ the Northern Quarter of Gelderland 
and from there he organized his raiding parties northward into Overijsel 
and westward into Utrecht. Until recently the Waal had been held by the 
States, but in the spring of 1585 Nijmegen, situated on the south bank, 
had made its peace with Spain. On the north bank Parma held a number of 
smaller strongholds and much of the Betuwe, the territory between Waal 
and Rhine, was enemy-infested. By their possession of Grave in Brabant 
and Venlo in the Upper Quarter of Gelderland, the States controlled the 
Maasriver as far south as Roermond. The Rhine, from the point where it 
entered Dutch territory, was also completely held by them. East of the 
boundary the river went through the territory of the Electorate of 
Cologne, now a Spanish client-state, but so long as Neuss and Rheinberg 
remained in the hands of Truchsess the Dutch connections with the German 
hinterland as far as the city of Cologne could be kept open. 
These towns were of course constantly threatened. Since the 
outbreak of the Bishops' War the Electorate and neighbouring areas had 
been exposed to raids by Dutch forces, which plundered the territory as 
I Bor, II, 754. 
2 Van Meteren, fOe 359, 359b. 
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far south as the town of Cologne itself. Ernest of Bavaria, who was 
powerless to end these excursions, expected Parma to protect him against 
the Dutch brigands and to help him in the conquest of Truchsess' holdings. 
Because the States' control of Rhine and Maas cut his connections with 
Germany Parma himself was interested in clearing the Electorate. The 
possibility had been contemplated by the Dutch that, once Antwerp was 
put in security, he would direct his forces against Grave, Venlo and the 
Rhine towns. There had been other possibilities. He might have attempted 
to reduce the States' strongholds in Brabant and Flanders. He might have 
drawn his forces into Gelderland and, using Zutphen as a base, begun an 
offensive against Utrecht. There were opportunities for an offensive 
along any section of the extended frontier. If they had been utilized 
immediately after the reduction of Antwerp and before the arrival of the 
English troops, the Dutch position would have been hazardous. 
Parma had hoped to begin such an offensive but had been unable 
to execute his plans. For more than a month he was occupied in settling 
Antwerp's affairs and putting the town in a state of defence. When that 
was achieved a mutiny broke out among his Walloon soldiers. Lack of 
money and provisions prevented him, also after the Walloons had been 
appeased, to organize his armies for a major campaign. For the time 
being he remained in the Antwerp area, hoping to achieve something 
against the States' possessions in the neighbourhood. Plans were made 
for attacks on Bergen op Zoom, some of the Dutch Scheldt forts, and the 
town of Ostend, but before the forces for the. exploits could be organized 
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the States had succeeded in strengthening the defences of the threatened 
places and in increasing their garrisons with new English companies, 
1 precautions which caused the enemy to abandon his plans. 
During the autumn Parma further organized a few excursions into 
Gelderland. These were mainly of a defensive nature, having been 
provoked by Norris' and Meurs' attempts against some of the Spanish 
strongholds in the Betuwe. They left the situation as it had been 
2 before the allied attack. Shortly after, in January 1586, the Spanish 
commander Charles Mansfelt settled down before Grave. Sir John Norris, 
who had all along thought in terms of an offensive type of warfare but 
who had been unable to convert either the Queen or the States to his 
3 Views, believed that this was the beginning of the long-expected enemy 
offensive. Once Grave was taken, he predicted, the Spanish armies would 
enter Gelderland and, finding no resistance there, succeed in recovering 
4 that province before the end of the winter. His prediction proved 
wrong. Mansfelt was,to lose five months before Grave, and no major 
enemy offensive was to take place in the terrItory north of the Maas, in 
spite of the fact that a Spanish army remained in the neighbourhood. 
Parma's financial difficulties continued, and the shortage of victuals, 
which had plagued him throughout the autumn, was becoming serious. 
I Van der Essen, V, 21-23. 
2 Bor, 11, 650fj Van Meteren, fos. 393 f 393b; Cal. For., XX, 157, 219. 
3 ....... . 
Cal. For., XX, 31, 76, 180, 219. 
4 . 
~, p. 203. 
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One of the causes of this scarcity was that the Walloon provinces 
of Artois and Hainault, which normally supplied the country with part of 
its provisions of grain and other victuals, were suffering from 
depredations by army bands and as a result unable to spare food for the 
other provinces. The harvest had, moreover, been bad In 1585, not only 
in the southern Netherlands but in large areas of western Europe. The 
countryside of Brabant and Flanders, and before long that of Cleves and 
other neighbouring areas in Germany, were eaten bare by Spanish or 
devastated by Dutch forces. Because of their control of Rhine and Maas 
the Dutch were able to prevent Parma from drawing supplies from central 
Germany. The States themselves, as well as their English ally, had 
forbidden the export of victuals to the enemy. They were guarding the 
passages between France and the obedient provinces, while the navy of 
Zeeland blockaded the Scheldt mouth and the Flemish coast. Every 
passage was closed, and unless the Dutch lifted the blockade or unless 
Philip paid heed to Parma's request that provisions be sent for at least 
the army, so that an attempt could be made to force open some of the 
supply lines, there would be little prospect of relief until the 
I following harvest. 
III 
The Dutch blockade, which contributed to Parma's distress and 
to the near-famine In the urban centres of Brabant and Flanders, had 
1 Van der Essen, V, 24f. 
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created difficulties in the United Provinces as well. Here they were 
of a political and financial nature. The political problem was caused 
by the States General's issue of a highly comprehensive prohibition of 
trade with the enemy and by Holland's refusal to enforce that decree. 
The division on this issue was not a new one. The southern provinces 
and the inland regions, supported by the non-mercantile section of the 
population elsewhere, had long argued that the surest means to force 
Philip to a composition was by a cessation of exports to the enemy, 
combined with a strict blockade of the obedient provinces. The States 
of the maritime provinces were usually reluctant to go that far. They 
had to content their merchants who were loath to lose their profitable 
Southern markets, and they needed the revenue of the licents, a special 
tax leVied on trade with the enemy, for the maintenance of their navies. 
Nor did they accept the argument of the prohibitionists that a cessation 
of DutCh exports would cause more than temporary distress In the southern 
provinces. A fool-proof blockade was, they asserted, impOSSible; Parma 
could always get some of his supplies by land from Germany and France, 
and by sea from English, Scandinavian and Hanseatic merchants. In the 
long run a trade prohibition would therefore only profit foreign 
competitors, while depriving the Dutch treasury of an important source 
of revenue. l 
1 One of the most complete memorandums containing the arguments 
for and against a prohibition of trade with the enemy is that submitted 
to Leicester in April 1586. It is printed by Van Deventer, I, 118-127. 
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Because Holland carried the purse (since the loss of Brabant 
and Flanders it paId close to two-thirds of the cost of defence), Its 
will was usually law, and the normal policy was one of partial free 
trade with the enemy. At times however it gave in to allied, popular 
and military pressure by agreeing to a more comprehensive prohIbition. 
This had been the case during the siege of Antwerp, when the export of 
all merchandise to the obedient provinces and that of victuals and 
munitions to various neutral places in the neighbourhood had been 
forbidden. The decree had not been enforced very strictly. Several 
towns in Holland had never favoured it and had, long before Antwerp's 
fate was decided, asked for a re-introduction of licents. When Antwerp 
fell the request was repeated and on August 26th the States General put 
the demand on its agenda. l 
This time the opposition was led by the Zeelanders. Zeeland 
was no less interested in the southern trade than Holland, but it 
happened to be nearer the enemy, lived in daily fear of invasion of its 
own territory, and felt that if such an invasion could be bought off for 
Some loss in llcent revenue the price would not be too high. When 
therefore the Council of State on August 28th asked the States General 
that in view of the "apparent and certain dearth" in the obedient 
provinces it continue the prohibition of licents, the request had 
Zeeland's support. The deputies of Holland were absent at the meeting 
lJ. H. Kernkamp, De Handel or den Viiand (Utrecht. 1931). I. 
148f, 168; Res St. Gen., V, 199. 
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and the resolution was passed with perfect unanimity. The States 
General added, for good measure, that the export of victuals to neutral 
1 
areas would also be forbidden. This additional restraint was probably 
partly a result of the wish to prevent scarcity and an increase in 
prices at home, but especially of the fear that otherwise the decree 
could not be enforced. If any exports were allowed control would be 
difficult; once the fleet was at sea there was little to prevent it 
from changing its destination. It was also to be expected that part of 
the victuals sent to neutral areas would be re-exported to the southern 
prOVinces so long as the scarcity and high prices continued there. 
At first Holland seemed to acquiesce. Some towns, such as 
Dordrecht, favoured the measure. Dordrecht was especially interested 
in the river trade. It nevertheless opposed a reopening of Rhine, Waal 
2 
and Maas, and it saw no reason why the towns that depended on mari time 
commerce should not show a similar spir~t of patriotism. There was of 
course also the question of Elizabeth's wishes. She herself had upon 
the conclusion of the alliance re-issued her decree against English 
trade with the southern provinces and she had made It clear to the 
Dutch legation that Holland and Zeeland were expected to follow suit.3 
The Queen's apparent determination provided in Zeeland's view a good 
1 Kernkamp, I, 168f. 
2ARAt .. SG 3780, fOe 369. 
3ARA , SG 3792, fOe 22lverso; .Van Deventer, It 114. 
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opportunity to distress the enemy: England and the Netherlands could 
together issue and enforce a decree forbidding not only native but also 
foreign merchants to send victuals and war materials to Spain, the 
1 
obedient provinces, and such neutral places as might supply the enemy. 
With England's cooperation a strict blockade would be possible, and the 
danger that Dutch trade with the obedient provinces and Spain would be 
diverted to other countries, eliminated. Several towns in Holland 
however, with Amsterdam in the lead, objected to such drastic measures. 
Amsterdam was willing to agree that the export of grains and munitions 
of war to the southern provinces be forbldden, but felt that trade in 
other merchandise could well be allowed, and it was quite persistent in 
its demands that the export of victuals to neutral places should remain 
free. Its Baltic fleet was ready to leave port when the States General's 
prohibition was issued. If no victuals could be sent to the northern 
countries no grain could be had, the town argued, and if the annual 
grain cargo did not arrive famine would threaten even the northern 
2 provinces. 
The majority of the States of Holland agreed with Amsterdam. 
On September 7th and 8th they passed a resolution that the export of 
Victuals except grain (which was not usually sent to the Baltic) and 
1 H. Brugmans, ed., Correspondentie van Robert Dudley (Utrecht, 
1931), I, 12-14, 25. 
2 Kernkamp, I, 169; ARA, SG 3780, fOe 369-371. 
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dairy products would be permitted to all areas east of Emden. For the 
rest they promised to adhere to the decision of August 28th, and they 
also expressed their willingness to end trade with Spain and Portugal 
I 
until the Queen's decision should be known. The latter concession was 
an important one, for Holland's prosperity depended very largely on the 
carrying trade between North and South, and in this trade the Iberian 
peninsula formed an essential link. At a time when Europe was starved 
for silver Spain was, moreover, the great supplier of this commodity. 
A prolonged disruption of commerce with the enemy would therefore create 
a serious shortage of revenue; the decrease in the Spanish trade in 
recent years, and especially after Philip's embargo in the early summer 
of 1585, had contributed to the monetary problems the States were facing 
2 
at this time. . One of the reasons why Holland nevertheless considered 
forbidding this navigation may have been Elizabeth's request that the 
supply of contraband to Spain be ended. Another was undoubtedly the 
fear of a new embargo. The Dutch merchants were willing to take the 
risk of confiscation rather than end their lucrative trade with Spain, 
but the States trembled at the prospect of another seizure which, if 
well-timed, might seriously weaken their fleet. 
Although common prudence seemed to make a cessation of navigation 
on Spain advisable, Holland's suggestion did not immediately result in 
I Kernkamp, I, 169. 
2 J. G. van Dillen, "De opstand en het Amerikaanse zllver", ~, 
LXXIII (1960), 28. 
o~ 
Vi 
an edict forbidding the Spanish trade. The causes of the delay are not 
clear. Perhaps opposition from North-Holland was too strong; perhaps 
the States General refused to agree to the condition that export to 
neutral places be allowed. Holland meanwhile did enforce its resolution 
regarding the trade with the northern countries; with the consent of the 
provincial States, and in spite of opposition by the Council of State, 
Amsterdam's fleet left port. Before long some among the States began 
to demand the introduction of licents for exports to the southern 
1 provinces as well. Zeeland replied by strengthening its guard on the 
Scheldt and along the Flemish coast, and by attempting to enlist the 
2 
support of Davison and the Queen in its opposition to Holland's policies. 
It had Some success. By the middle of November a letter arrived from 
Leicester wherein he asked that the prohibition of trade with the enemy 
3 
remain in force until his arrival. 
Licents were not introduced, but the disagreements between 
Holland and the other provinces continued. Holland refused to annul 
its resolution of September, and the States General refused to adopt 
it. Nor was the conflict confined to the States only. Early in 
November the leaders of the burgher militia of Utrecht joined the 
battle by sending a legation to the States' assembly in The Hague. 
1 Brugmans, I, 24. 
2 ~, pp. 10, 23. 
3ARA, SG 3792, fOe 283. 
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Having issued a strong-worded protest against what they called 
Amsterdam's insubordination and war-profiteering, they required the 
States General to proceed against the trespassers of its decrees and 
suggested that it ask the Queen to send her governor without delay. 
The intervention was followed by a busy exchange of accusations and 
counter-accusations between Amsterdam and the Utrecht group. Maurice 
and the Council of State, anxious to prevent a widespread political 
upheaval, tried to mediate but were unable to stem the stream of 
remonstrances. l The incident apparently convinced States and Council 
that something should be done to settle the trade issue at least at the 
governmental level. Late in November Holland repeated its compromise 
suggestion and now the States General accepted it: trade with the 
northern countries would be allowed and that with Spain and Portugal 
forbidden. This did not mean that the Spanish trade would cease 
altogether. Exports to Calais, Rouen, La Rochelle and other French 
ports were, with certain restrictions, permitted, and part of the 
merchandise sent there would find its way to the enemy. The danger of 
2 
confiscation was avoided, however. 
With this new decree, which was issued on November 29th, unity 
in the country's commercial policies had been restored. At least, so it 
seemed. In fact, Amsterdam and other towns in North Holland refused to 
I Bor, .11, 652-663. 
2 Kernkamp, I, 173. 
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accept the prohibition of trade with Spain, while Niddelburg in Zeeland 
1 
also left the decree unpublished. Amsterdam's opposition had been 
expected. The objections of Middelburg must perhaps be explained by 
its wish to reach a prior agreement with England regarding the prohibition 
of English and neutral trade with Spain, by its fear that Amsterdam would 
monopolize Dutch trade with the enemy, or by its disinclination to approve 
of the provision regarding the export of victuals to neutral countries. 
It had become clear by this time that neither the States General 
for the country as a whole, nor the States of Holland and Zeeland for 
their own prOVinces, were able to enforce their decisionso The English 
governor would indeed, as the burgher captains of Utrecht had already 
suggested, have to bring the solution. On December 6th the States 
General sent a letter to Leicester with the request that he hasten his 
coming so that by his authori ty and "suivant la bonne volont~ de sa 
Majest~" the trade question might be defini tely settled.2 In view of 
what was known regarding the Queen's good pleasure there was reason to 
expect that Leicester's sympathies would be with the prohibitionists. 
The States of Holland, faced with recalcitrant Amsterdam and with 
divisions among their towns, had no choice but to take this risk. 
l~, pp. 173f. 
2ARA , SG 3792, fOe 296. Brugmans, I, 7, erroneously dated this 
letter October 6th.' 
CHAPTER III 
LEICESTER'S APPOINTMENT AS GOVERNOR GENERAL 
I 
Since Professor Fruin extended the warning that an understand-
ins of the Leicester period is impossible unless regard is had to the 
political divisions within the country - which divisions in his 
cpinion almost forced the governor to embark upon his fateful course 
1 
of opposition to Holland this aspect has been given its due share 
of attention in histories of the period. One fact~or, that of the 
2 -influence of the interprovincial rivalries, received perhaps more than 
its due share. These rivalries did exist. The quarrel on the trade 
issue, which has just been discussed, reflected a deepseated resentment 
which the inland provinces nourished against Holland, a resentment 
that is perhaps partly to be explained by historical factors, but 
largely by the other provinces' weariness of Holland's leading 
position in the present confederacy and their distrust of its policies. 
There was a widespread feeling that Holland, itself safe from enemy 
invasions, tended to close its eyes to the problems of the frontier 
areas, neglected to use all its resources for an offensive war, and was 
indeed content to risk the loss of allied territory to strengthen its 
1 Vgrser. Geschr., IIl. 141. 
2 Ibid., p. 149. 
8j 
own economic position. 
These animosities no doubt affected the inland provinces' 
attitude towards Leicester, the man who might be able to "ride the 
States of Holland on the curb".I It must be pointed out however that 
there was another and equally obvious reason why they were prepared 
to go to greater lengths than Holland in attempting to retain his 
goodwill and English aid; namely the fact that an English withdrawal 
would have far more immediate and drastic consequences for them than 
, 
it would have for the maritime provinces. As tar as Leicester's 
policies are concerned, it is true that they were influenced by the 
support he received from the inland provinces, but it is also clear 
that their promptings did not determlne his approach. His own 
conception of his task was to organize the countries' resources tor 
a maxtmum war effort, and this implied an attempt to subordinate 
regional interests to those of the generality. That course would 
have been followed by him regardless of the inland provinces' approval, 
and it would inevitably have produced a clash with the States of 
Holland. These would not be alone in their epposition, however. The 
States of the other areas had themselves reason to fear, both in 
financial and in political matters, the effect of a powerful central 
government, and it is to be noticed that there is no evidence that in 
I P. Gey1, The Revolt of the Netherlands (2nd ed.; London, 1962), 
p. 209. 
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January 1586 they exerted themselves in favour of a highly centralized 
system. 1 In his bid for additional powers Leicester was to receive 
more support from the States of Holland than, for example, from those 
I 
of Utrecht. 2 I The desire to maintain the political status quo was general; 
I 
the Sates of both the maritime and the inland provinces agreed that 
~ 
however great the benefits of a strong central government might be, 
they were not to be had, if it could be helped, at the price of a 
drastic reduction in their own powers and a serious weakening of 
provincial autonomy. There was, in other words, a strOng political 
Interest uniting them against a governor who might be tempted to take 
their injunctions about the need of centralization too seriously. 
Another bond of union among the States was the one against 
the domestic opposition, a factor that is of particular importance 
in explaining the relationship between Holland and Utrecht at this 
time. Misunderstandings about Utrecht's attitude regarding its 
union with Holland under one stadholder have caused Fruin to over-
1 As has been suggested for example by L. J. Rogier in his Paulus 
Buys en Leicester (Nijmegen, 1948), pp. lOf, where he port~ays the 
Regents of Utrecht and Gelder1and as the upholders of the "generality 
idea", and by P. L. Muller in De Staat der Vereenigde Nederlanden 
(Haarlem, 1872), p. 359, where it is asserted that they were willing 
even to consider a dictatorial form of government if thereby Holland's 
supremacy might be ended. 
2 Fruin, 02. cit., p. 157. 
emphasize especially the antagonisms between these two provinces. l The 
union in question had been instituted in 1534, shortly after Charles 
V had added the Bishopric of Utrecht to his Burgundian possessions. It 
had ended in 1572, when Holland and Zeeland began their revolt against 
Spain, but was restored one year after the Pacification of Ghent by 
Utrecht's reacceptance of William of Orange as governor. Fruin's 
suggestion that this decision was delayed for twelve months because of 
2 3 Utrecht's reluctance to join Holland has been shown to be incorrect. 
There was opposition in Utrecht to the Prince's appointment, but a 
dominant party within the States, as well as the city population, favoured 
it and the delay was largely a result of the central government's refusal 
to approve of their choice. Although there were indeed political and 
military reasons urging a closer cooperation with the eastern provinces, 
Utrecht did in this period not consider exchanging its union with 
Holland and Zeeland for one with Gelderland and Overijsel. When in 
1581 attempts were made to join it with the last-mentioned provinces, 
either under a lieutenant-governor to be appointed by the Prince of Orange 
4 
or under a separate stadholder, the States of Utrecht showed little 
1 Fruin, Ope cit.,pp. 141f, 145. 
2 ~, p. 141. 
3 Arthur le Cosquino de Bussy, Het ontstaan der satlsfaetle van Utrecht 
(Amsterdam, 1910), pp. 4f and passim. 
4 Van Deventer, I, 33f. 
enthusiasm for the first proposal and they altogether refused to 
1 
consider the second. 
There also seems to be insufficient ground for Fruin's 
assumption that after the Prince's death they were anxious to end their 
union with the maritime provinces. The statement made by his opponents 
that Floris Thin, Advocate of Utrecht, was determined to restore 
2 Utrecht's "independence" gives no indication of the attitude of the 
States as a whole. It Is true that in 1584 these refused to wait until 
Holland and Zeeland had chosen another stadholder and proceeded to 
install the Seigneur de Villiers as governor, but this does not 
necessarily indicate a separatist tendency. Holland and Zeeland were 
to leave Maurice's installation in abeyance for more than a year, and 
neither the political northe military situation made it possible for 
Utrecht to postpone the appointment of a governor for any length of 
time. It is unlikely, moreover, that the arrangement made with Villiers 
Was intended to be a permanent one. His instructions indicated that his 
appointment was made provisionally and that it did not prejudice the 
States' rights to make a settlement with Maurice and the States of 
Holland and Zeeland regarding Utrecht's future government. 3 
The instructions of the Count of Meurs, who replaced Villlers 
I See the States' reply in Kluit, Hol1andsche Staabregering. It 422·5. 
2 Bor, Ill, 165. Cf. Fruin, OPe cit •• p. 145. 
3Johan van de Water. ed., Groot Placaatboek (Utrecht, 1729), I, 160. 
in 1585 when the latter was taken prisoner of war, did not contain 
this proviso. Meurs however was originally appointed for the duration 
of Villiers' imprisonment only.l He moreover appears to have been the 
choice of the burgher captains, leaders of the opposition groups in the 
2 
city of Utrecht, who had put pressure on the States to appoint him. 
The burgher captains and their allies had at first strongly supported 
the union with the maritime provinces, but they were now drawing away 
from Holland and in favour of a closer bond with Gelderland and Overijsel, 
the two provinces which Meurs already served as stadholder. It is not 
clear whether in September 1585 the opposition leaders had attempted to 
institute safeguards preventing a union with Holland, but a year or so 
later they were to oppose the proposal of the States that the clause 
regarding Utrecht's right to treat with Maurice be incorporated in 
3 Meurs' commission. The .aspirations of this opposition group will be 
discussed in some detail in a following chapter. At this point it is 
sufficient to mention that in the 1580's its political influence was 
great enough to pose a danger to the Regents and to force these to rely 
more strongly on Holland than they may have been inclined to do other-
wise. 
Although there were aspects on which governor and inland areas 
1 Johan van de Water, Groot Placaatboek, I, 160. 
2 Sor, 11, 627f. 
3 Ibid., p. 869. 
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could and would combine against Holland -- the matter of the trade 
prohibition is a case in point -- there were also reasons to force the 
States of the other provinces to cooperate with their maritime ally. 
the chief threat to the government of that prOVince, and indeed to the 
States as a whole, came from Leicester's alliance with the '-disunited" 
provinces of Brabant and Flanders (a matter that will be considered 
later in this chapter) and with the domestic opposition. The problem 
of internal political divisions was not confined to Utrecht. There were 
influential groups also in the western provinces that were, for a variety 
of reasons, dissatisfied with the existing system and consequently 
inclined to unite with the central government against the States. 
Because after that of Utrecht the opposition groups of Holland and 
Friesland played the most notable part in the political history of the 
period, some attention will be given to their composition and aims. 
The centralists of Friesland belonged to a group that stood 
under the leadership of Dr. Hessel Aysma, president of the provincial 
Council. In Burgundian times the Council, which had political as well 
as judicial functions and which was appOinted by the central government, 
formed with the stadholder the provincial executive. In Gelderland lt 
still performed this office, but in Utrecht, Ze.land and Holland the 
Council had been reduced to a judicial college; its politlcal functions 
had been taken over by the College of States' Deputies, a body formed 
by a limited number of members of the provincial States. l The change 
lR. Fruin, Geschiedenis der Staatsinstellingen in Nederland, edited by 
H. T. Colenbrander (2nd ed,; The Hague, 1922), pp. 218f, 224. 
was a result of the States' determination to consolidate their power 
and preserve the newly established provincial independence. The Council 
had always been the representative of royal authority and as such the 
opponent of States' influence upon the government. If it retained its 
political functions it was likely to continue its habit of ruling in 
opposition to the States and in close cooperation with the central 
government. By entrusting the "daily government" to their own deputies 
the States eliminated this threat. 
Unlike those of Utrecht and the maritime provinces, the States 
of Friesland had met with strong resistance in their attempts to replace 
the Council by their College of Deputies. Although by the mid.eighties 
they had succeeded in establishing the College's predominance, OPPOSition 
to its rule continued. This opposition came not only from the provincial 
Council itself. During the time of Leicester's government the CounCil 
members were in close cooperation with a number of rural noblemen. Most 
of these came from the Quarter of Oostergoo, where the president's 
brother, Doeco Aysma, was one of the leaders of the centralist movement. 
The Council was further supported by the eleven towns of Friesland. 
While in Holland the urban magistrates were among the upholders of the 
system of government as it had been developing since the outbreak of the 
Revolt, those of Friesland objected to an unlimited increase in States' 
power. The main reason was that in the latter province the urban 
element held a minority position in the States; three of the four votes 
in the diet were held by the rural areas, that ia by the Quarters of 
Oostergoo. Westergoo and Zevenwolden. The towns, with only one vote 
between them, had little to gain from a States' monopoly in the 
provincial government. For the grant and maintenance of their urban 
I privileges they had in former times depended on the central authority, 
and they preferred to keep the powers of the provincial Council, once 
r 
the representative of that authority, in tact. All these opponents of 
~ 
the College fixed their hopes on the federal government as it was to be 
established under Leicester. The College group on the other hand prepared 
measures to safeguard States' rights and powers under his governorship. 
The strongest opposition to the States General's offer of "absolute" 
authority to the English governor was to come from the Friesian States 
under the leadershlp of Carel Roorda, the soul of the College group and 
the chief antagonist of Hessel Aysma and his associates. 
The States of Holland were not threatened by a hostile combination 
of dissatisfied towns and a politically ambitious Council. Nor was there 
much reason to fear actlve opposition from the minority group in the 
States, the nobility, which represented the rural areas. The nobles 
might be more interested in a restoration of the old system than the 
burgher politicians, but as a class they were too few in number and too 
uninfluential to present a serious menace. In Holland the opposition 
came in the first place from a dissatisfied Calvinist clergy, whose 
objections to the Regents were shared by an important part of the native 
I . J. S. Thelssen, Centra.l Gezag en Frlesche Vrijheldl Friesland onder 
Karel V (Gronlngen, 1907), pp. 302-311. 
population and by many of the southern exiles living there. 
It is not possible to give more than a summary of the factors 
I 
causing the antagonisms between church and government. The problem 
centred around the States' refusal to accept the provisions of the 
synodical Church Orders and so to grant the church its full doctrinal 
and organizational independence. One of the controversial points had 
to do with the right of appointment of consistory members, another with 
the question whether the church should be allowed freedom of meeting in 
provincial and national synods, while a third was concerned with the 
church's demand that it be permitted to take the disciplinary and other 
measures necessary for the maintenance of religious orthodoxy. 
The States' reluctance to agree to this last demand was a 
result of their wish to counteract the church's doctrinal exclusiveness. 
Political considerations made it advisable to allow only one religion, 
and it was the government's concern to make that religion acceptable to 
the largest possible section of the population. It was felt that with 
a broad confession, one that could accommodate protestant and perhaps 
even some Roman Catholic dissenters, the church's proselytizing power 
would increase; exclusiveness and precision in matters of doctrine and 
a too strict enforcement of the rules against unorthodoxy might have 
IFor a more detailed account of the church.state relationship at this 
time see R. Fruln, Tlan jaren uit den Tachtig'arigen Oorlog (6th ad.; 
The Hague, 1904), pp. 213-258, or J. Reitsma, Geschiedenis van de 
Hervorming (5th ed.; The Hague, 1949), Chapter VI. 
the oPPosite effect and increase the existing disunity in religion. The 
States' opposition to the demands for organizational freedom was caused 
by their fear that the church would become too independent a force within 
the state, one that might interfere with the government's freedom of 
action, and probably also with what remained of the non-Calvinists' 
religious liberties, for the church leaders demanded a stricter enforce_ 
ment of the laws against dissenters than the civil authorities considered 
advisable. The problem was that the great majority of the people, 
especially in the earlier years of the Revolt, either remained loyal to 
the old faith or belonged to other protestant denominations, while 
several members of the municipal governing groups were also opposed to 
the Reformed church. The States could not afford to alienate these 
people, and they might well do this if they allowed too much influence 
to the Calvinist leaders. To keep the church in check it was considered 
advisable not only to retain some control over consistorial policies and 
appOintments, but also to restrict the possibilities of cooperation 
between the various congregations and classes and, especially, to prevent 
the church from organizing itself on a national basis. Although some 
national synods had been held in past years, the States were disinclined 
to allow the church to continue this practice. 
There was a third reason why the government was anxious to keep 
the church in a subservient position. This was the fear that the 
ministers might become the organizers of a "popular opposition". 
Popular discontent with States' rule was increasing, and the people came 
more and more to look to the ministers, who never hesitated to voice 
their objections to the government's policies, as their spokesmen in 
political matters. By drawing attention to this factor it is not 
suggested that attempts were made to pave the way for popular control 
over the government. Professor Geyl's statement that the struggle 
between church and state coincided with one between democracy and 
1 oligarchy may be correct for a later period but does not apply to the 
pre-Leicesterian and Leicesterian years. There is no evidence that at 
this time the people demanded democratic reforms in the system of 
government, or that they tried by other means to advance their own 
political rights. Whatever influence they had possessed in affairs of 
state had been procured for them by the Prince of Orange, who probably 
hoped by this means both to counteract the exclusiveness of the Regents 
and to ensure a more general support for his policies, and who had on a 
number of occasions Succeeded in persuading the States that they consult 
2 the heads of militia companies, guilds, and other burgher organizations. 
When in 1581 the States put an end to this practice by passing a decree 
forbidding magistrates to discuss provincial matters with these groups 
3 they encountered no popular resistance. Nor does it appear that in 
following years, either before or during the Leicester period, attempts 
lThe Revolt of the Netherlands, p. 208. 
2 See Kluit, I, 132-137. 
3 Ibid., PP. 263f, 270. 
were made by the people to have the decision reversed. As far as the 
Leicester era is concerned, it would perhaps be more appropriate to 
speak of a struggle between the confederate system on the one hand, and 
a semi-monarchical and federal one on the other. There were undoubtedly 
other than political reasons to explain the support given to Leicester 
by the church, the Calvinists and other sections of the population, but 
it is evident that the dissatisfying state of affairs in recent years 
had caused widespread political discontent with the States' system and 
awakened. or perhaps re-awakened, a movement in favour of centralization. 
11 
The alms and aspirations of the opposition groups help to 
explain many of the political disagreements of the Leicester period, but 
they had little or no influence on his appointment or on the extent of 
the authority given to him. These matters were controlled by the States 
only, and for this topic attention hastobe focus sed once more upon them. 
Because the initiative, in this question as in most other matters, came 
from Holland, and also because Leicester's future relations with Holland 
dominate the story of his rule, the emphasis will b. placed on the 
proposals and general attitude of the States of that province. 
In connection with the problem of the internal divisions it is 
to be noted that the States, if they contemplated the possibility of a 
hostile alliance between governor, church and people, took few precautions 
to counteract this particular threat. The restrictions placed upon 
Leicester's authority tended almost without exception to guarantee the 
./1 
continuation of States' influence upon the central government and to 
safeguard, to some extent, the independence of the provinces. The 
decision to appoint Maurice as governor over Holland and Zeeland before 
Leicester's arrival -- a matter that caused some controversy largely 
because of its timing and because the installation took place without 
Leicester's knowledge -- was inspired by the same considerations. 
Maurice would undoubtedly have been chosen regardless of Leicester's 
appointment. He had earlier been considered for the function, and the 
reason why the dignity had not been conferred immediately after his 
father's death appears to have been the fear that this step would 
interfere with the success of the foreign negotiations; both France and 
England might hesitate to accept the sovereignty if it appeared that 
the maritime provinces would remain under the Orange "dynasty". The 
States' right to appoint him had consequently not been among the condi-
tions on which they offered the sovereignty to Elizabeth, but the fact 
that they did demand the continuation of the present stadholders and that 
they had instructed the legation to mention Maurice in case the names of 
these governors were asked, indicates that it was intended eventually to 
install him.l Their anxiety to do so was undoubtedly increased by the 
prospect that an independent or semi-independent central government 
would be established; a separate provincial governor provided some 
safeguards against undue encroachments by the central authority upon 
the provincial government. 
1 Res. Ho. 1585, p. 306. 
The reason why they proceeded with the installation without 
Leicester's knowledge seems to have been the fear that the latter might 
himself covet the position. This at any rate was the argument of 
Oldenbarnevelt, who was the driving force behind the decision to settle 
the matter before Leicester arrived. As pensionary of Rotterdam (his 
definitive appointment as States' Advocate was delayed until March 1586) 
Oldenbarnevelt had been a member of the Dutch legation in London. 
According to him it had been suggested there that Holland should perhaps 
dispense with a governor of its own, such in conformity with the 
Burgundian tradition according to which the most important province 
(Brabant at that time) had as the governor general's residence been 
without a separate stadholder. 1 If in the case of Holland and Leicester 
a similar arrangement had been made the effects might have been beneficial. 
As head of Holland's government Leicester would perhaps have associated 
himself more closely with that province's interests than he actually 
did, and it Is possible that this consideration was one of the reasons 
why some among the States considered following the procedure and objected 
to Oldenbarneve1t's proposal. Another reason appears to have been the 
2 fear that a hasty appointment might create a wrong impression in England. 
The States of Zealand, who had earlier pressed for Haurlce's installation, 
3 
now also drew back. Oldenbarnevelt nevertheless found a majority for 
1 Van Deventer, I, pp. 1Jf. 
2 Den Tex, I, 243. 
3BM, Cotton Hss., Galba C VIII, fOe 182. 
his suggestion, and on November 1st Maurice was installed as stadholder 
of the maritime provinces. 
Holland postponed discussions on the governor general's authority 
until his arrival. On the 23rd of December, a few days after Leicester 
had landed in Zeeland, the States of Holland commissioned Josse de Menin, 
pensionary of Dordrecht, Fran~ois Maelson, pensionary of Enkhuizen, 
and Johan van Oldenbarnevelt to study the question and draft an Act of 
Authority. The three men suggested that Leicester should be given title 
and commission as governor- and captain general of the United Provinces. 
In military affairs he was to have supreme authority; in civil matters 
he and his Council were to receive the powers outlined by the treaty, 
but if the States of the other provinces felt that he should have "such 
further authority as the governors of the Netherlands possessed under 
Charles vu, the deputies of Holland were to give their consent. In 
December the nobility and most of the towns accepted this proposal, but 
Amsterdam, Haarlem, Gouda and Alkmaar declared that they were 
1 insuffiCiently authorized. Two weeks later the matter was again 
discussed and on January 9th Holland's resolution was submitted to the 
States General. It was similar to the proposal of the three pensionaries. 
Leicester was to have absolute powers in military affairs, whil. in other 
matters he would receive the same authority as his Habsburg predecessors 
had, except that in conferring the principal civil offices, which had 
IARA, Coli. Van Wijn, no. 11; Res. Ho. 1585, pP. 778f. 
j,' -
formerly stood at the governor general's disposition, he would be bound 
1 by a nomination submitted by the provincial States concerned. 
It does not appear that in the January discussions there was 
much disagreement on these points among the States of Holland. Not even 
Amsterdam vetoed the suggestion that governor and Council would be free 
to issue decrees affecting the affairs of the confederacy, although 
this implied their right to settle the trade issue without the States' 
advice. The only dissenting voice that has been recorded concerned the 
decision that the central government would have power in religious 
matters. It came from the town of Gouda, whose strongly Erastian 
government wished to leave the control over matters ecclesiastical with 
2 the municipal magistrates. Gouda's objections were however overruled. 
At the assembly of the States General it appeared that all the 
provinces except Friesland subscribed to Holland's resolution. The 
Friesian deputies agreed that Leicester should have supreme military 
power, but they had not been authorized to grant him full authority in 
political affairs or to cede the domains to the central government as 
3 the other provinces intended to do. But at the national assembly also 
the opinion of the majority prevailed. The so-called Act of Authority 
4 
was drawn up according to the suggestions made by Holland. On 
1 Res. St. Gen. , V, 392. 
2 -
Res. Ho. 1586, p. 9. 
3 394f, 396. Res. St. Gen. , V, 392f, 
4 The Act Is printed by Bor, II, 685f. 
1 
January 11th it was sUbmitted to Leicester who, after some changes had 
been made in the conditions, accepted the function. 
This arrangement did not contradict the treaty regulations, but 
it was contrary to a later order by the Queen: some time before his 
departure to the Netherlands Elizabeth had forbidden Leicester to 
accept a formal function from the States. l The Queen shared the 
opinion of her Councillors and of the States that the existing system 
of government in the Netherlands was chaotic and that an effective 
central government was necessary if her aid was to have the desired 
effect. Experience and the States' own confessions having convinced 
her that the Dutch themselves were unable to introduce the needed 
improvements, she was not unwilling to give them some support. Her 
wish to counteract the inadequacies in the present system explains why 
she had approved of the political terms of the treaty and why she had 
decided to send Leicester. She could not, however, agree to the latter's 
appointment as head of the Dutch government and so create the impression 
that she had accepted the provinces as a protectorate, because this 
might draw her too deeply into their war, and because it could interfere 
with her attempts to reach an understanding with Spain. Although the 
de facto authority of her lieutenant was to be extensive (an authority 
which the Dutch were to be obliged by treaty to acknowledge), it was to 
remain unofficial. Leicester's only formal function was to be his 
generalship of the English army. The term governor general, which she 
had allowed to be used in the treaty, no longer occurred in his 
1 instructions. 
It is unlikely that the States knew of this decision. The 
authors of a recent study on the first phase of the Leicester era have 
suggested that the States' offer and Leicester's acceptance was the 
outcome of an intrigue staged by English and Dutch advocates of an 
Anglo-Dutch union, that is by Leicester himself, his political 
2 
supporters at home, and the Dutch deputies. By investing the Queen's 
lieutenant with the authority he would have possessed if she had agreed 
to a political union it was attempted, according to this thesis, to 
override the Queen's negative decision on the States' offers. Leicester's 
almost regal reception, which established his image as governor general 
and therefore made it more difficult for the Queen to persevere in her 
refusal, should have been an integral element in the intrigue. 
The theory is not unattractive. It is very probable that English 
and Dutch advocates of a protectorate relationship or annexation hoped to 
realize their plans through Leicester, and there possibly was more than a 
tacit agreement on this point. But this does not necessarily mean that 
1 The instructions are in Bruce, pP. 12-15. 
2 Strong and Van Dorsten, pp. 3, 23, 50-56. 
the States realized that in appointing Leicester they acted against 
Elizabeth's express command. Neither they nor their deputies had 
officially been informed of the prohibition and it was in Leicester's 
interest to keep them ignorant. The States knew of Elizabeth's 
reluctance to give the impression that Leicester had been appointed 
governor at her request, but may well have believed that she would 
favour the appointment so long as it could be justified to the world as 
coming from them alone. In the other ease they would no doubt have 
tried to cushion the initial shock by representing his authority as 
less formal or less extensive than it was. Such an attempt was not 
-
made. The States General informed the Queen that they had granted him 
"l 'authori t~ supreme et commandement absolut au faict de la guerre" 
and in matters of civil government "tel pouvoir et auctorit; comme 
, , 
parcidevant ont eu les gouverneurs generaux des Pays Bas ••• saulff les 
droicts et privileges du Pays ••• "I The States of Holland defined, even 
more enthusiastically, his military powers as an "autorit; & Puissance 
Souveraine & absolue ••• ", while again they compared his civU authority 
to that which the governors of Charles V had possessed. 2 The notion 
seems to have been (and it was one that Leicester's advisers encouraged)3 
that the more extensive his powers were the more agreeable it would, 
under the circumstances, be to the Queen. 
1 Brugmans, I, 71. 
2 . . 
Res, Ho. 1586, p. 66. 
3 Brugmans, 1, 55, 57. 
As far as Leicester himself is concerned, his decision to accept 
the governorship was not inspired merely by his desire for an Anglo-Dutch 
union, or even by the consideration that refusal to comply with the Dutch 
demands would exacerbate the political instability in the Netherlands. 
The treaty had ordered him to provide for the introduction of certain 
reforms in the financial and military establishments, and his instructions 
had not relieved him of these responsibilities. It would be difficult to 
discharge them unless he received the position that the treaty had 
reserved for him. He further believed that by assuming control over 
Dutch affairs he might be able to ensure Elizabeth's continued support 
for the war; it was and remained his primary concern to try and prevent 
her withdrawal. The success of these attempts seemed to depend largely 
on the extent to which he should be able to control the government of 
the provinces, and to direct their financial and military means to an 
all-out war effort. Apart from a downright military disaster nothing 
would incline the Queen more to a peace than the probability of a 
lengthy, indecisive and above all costly war; nothing on the other hand 
seemed better calculated to reconcile her to the alliance than the 
prospect that before long the Dutch would be able to relieve her of 
part of the expenditure. 
To achieve these purposes he thought that he needed more freedom 
of action than not only the Queen was willing to allow him, but also 
than the States had offered. One of his objections to their Act of 
Authority concerned the appointment of his advisers. The Act provided 
- ./ 
that the Councillors of State were to be nominated by the provinces which 
they represented, and that they were to be appointed by the States 
General. The States further asserted it to be their prerogative to 
provide both Council and governor with a set of instructions according 
to which they would have to rule. These rights had traditionally been 
the sovereign's, and the sovereignty now rested with the States. Their 
insistence on these points was therefore logical, but no less valid was 
Leicester's contention that the restrictions interfered with the "absolute" 
powers offered him and threatened to perpetuate States' and provincial 
control over the central government. Although on the point of provincial 
nominations he was willing to compromise, he continued to oppose the 
States General's right to appoint the CounCil, refused the demand that 
he as governor should be bound by States' instructions, and asserted 
that he himself should supply those which would' define the Council's 
duties. l 
A little over a week was spent in negotiations on these issues 
by deputies of the States General on one side and Leicester, Davison, 
and Sir Philip Sidney on the other. Eventually Leicester received the 
right to appoint his own CounCillors, provided that he chose them from 
the provincial nominations. This at least appears from the Act of 
2 Delation of February 1st, which superseded the Act of Authority. The 
I See the report of the negotiations in Brugmans, I, 34f, 42, 49; Bor, 
1I, 686. 
2 Bor, Il, 686f. 
I States had been ready to grant him a free election, and no objections 
were made when by the end of January he proceeded to appoint some 
Councillors on his own authority, while agreeing to choose the others 
from the nominations so soon as these should be submitted. The members 
thus appointed were the Seignieur de Brederode for Holland, Jacques 
Valcke for Zeeland, Dr. Elbertus Leoninus for Gelderland, Paul Buys, 
formerly Advocate of Holland, for Utrecht, and Adolf van Meetkerke for 
2 Flanders. It was further agreed that the States General would issue 
the Councll's instructions, but that they would not apply to the 
governor, that he or else the Council would be allowed to revise them, 
and that he would not be bound by the Council's decisions. 3 Not all 
these concessions were quite so substantial as they seemed. Leicester's 
later complaints about the limitations imposed upon him by the instruction! 
suggest that elther the revision did not take place, or else that his 
suggestions were rej.cted. The States' promise that the Council's 
functions would be advisory only and that Leicester was not bound by 
its instructions was qualified by a number of provisions in the 
instructions themselves. Articles 11 and 22, for example, established 
that all ordinances of payment were to be approved by three Councillors 
I Res. St. Gen" V, 402. 
2Bor, 11, 690. Meetkerke however had already been nominated; ARA, SG 
4866, Bund.l Staten Generaal. 
3 Brugman~, I, 54,,58. 
4Bor, 11, 721; BM, Cotton Mss •• Galba DIll, fo. 22. 
from different provinces and that all letters were to be signed by the 
Councillors present and then, if these agreed, by the governor, while 
article 20 provided that no resolutions could be taken except in the 
I presence of the majority of the Council members. 
III 
Although by no means absolute, Leicester's powers were considerablt 
If he had been fortunate enough to procure Elizabeth's sanction, if he had 
received more material support from England and the States, and if he 
himself had possessed the necessary skill in political navigation, some 
success might have followed. The first month, before Elizabeth's reaction 
to the appointment became known and before the monetary shortages tempted 
him to embark upon his controversial financial and economic policies, the 
situation did not seem unpromising. His relations with the States of 
Holland had not perceptibly suffered as a result of the disagreements on 
the Act of Authori ty. Holland had been accommodating during these 
discussions. The suggestions that Leicester, if he inSisted, should 
receive the right to elect his own Councillors and that he would not be 
bound by the instructions, came from the States of that province. 
Earlier, when Leicester remarked that he objected to merchants as 
CounCillors they had agreed that he should be humoured in that respect 
also, on condition that some members of the mercantile class were allowed 
2 
"in the Finances". The province's nomination for Councillors -- it was 
IThe'instructionsare in Bor, 11; 688-690. 
2ResO- St. Gen., V, 398, 401; Res. Ho. 1586, pp. 23, 24f. 
entitled to three, and Leicester had chosen only one without nomination 
gave him indeed the opportunity to elect the non-mercantile people 
he had said to prefer as advisers; the States submitted the names of 
Adriaan van der Mijle and Sebastiaan van Loozen, two lawyers who were 
president and member respectively of the High Court of Holland, Dr. 
Fran90is Maelson, pensionary of Enkhuizen, and Willem Bardesius, one of 
I the burgomasters of Amsterdam. 
In selecting Van Loozen and the merchant-burgomaster of Amsterdam 
Leicester had, in turn, not too severely disappointed the States. The 
choice of his five "free" Councillors also was, on the whole, acceptable. 
Valcke had earlier served on the Council and would probably have been 
nominated again by Zeeland, while the Seigneur de Brederode seems to 
have been considered as a nominee by the States of Holland. 2 Leoninus, 
the Chancellor of Gelderland and one of the Prince of Orange's circle of 
advisers, was equally acceptable. He was a politician of moderate views 
and one who on the whole sympathized with the religious and internal 
political establishment maintained by the States of Holland. So did 
Paul Buys, the representative for Utrecht. According to Leicester there 
3 had been opposition to Buys' appointment. This may have come from the 
States of Holland. Buys' relations with his former employers were 
1 Res. Ho. 1586, p •. 39 •. 
2R• Broersma and G. Busken Huet, eds., "Erieven over het Leycestersche 
tijdvak uit de papierim van Jean Hotman", !illl!Q, XXXIV (1913) (henceforth 
cited as BMHG, XXXIV], 35 • 
.. -
3 Bruce, p. 33. 
1 
strained, and the States may have considered it dangerous if he became 
too influential with the governor. It is also possible however that the 
objections came from the opposition group in Utrecht, which was, as in 
Holland, Calvinist in sympathies and which disapproved of Buys both 
because of his outspoken anti-Calvinist attitude and because of his 
association with the Regents of Utrecht. 
Another Councillor whose election appears to have aroused 
opposition was Adolf van Meetkerke, the ex-president of the Council of 
2 Flanders. Again the objections may not have come from Holland, although 
presumably the States of that province were not enthusiastic about the 
appointment. Anti-southern feelings, resulting in measures which 
intended to limit the influence of the southerners, were strong among 
the northern Regents. The problem posed by the politically turbulent 
exiles was partly responsible for this attitude, but there was also a 
growing conviction that the loss of Brabant and Flanders, while 
militarily a disaster, was not in all respects an evil. Holland and 
Zeeland were beginning to benefit from the blockade of Antwerp and other 
southern towns, and also from the influx of a wealthy or industrially 
competent army of exiles. Holland's political dominance in the 
confederacy was now, moreover, assured. If Brabant and Flanders should 
be regained it hoped to retain these advantages. For the time being the 
lRogier, Paulus Buys en Leicester, p. 8. 
2 Bruce, p. 74. 
States made it their policy to set bounds to the influence of both 
exiles and of those southerners who represented areas that still 
supported the Revolt. 
It had not at first been intended to deprive these regions of 
their right of representation in the Council or in the States General. 
When after the fall of Antwerp the deputies of Brabant declared that 
their province would cease to send representatives to the national 
I 
assembly, attempts had been made to dJssuade them from this step. 
Flanders continued it. representation. In October 1585, when discussions 
were held about the number of members each province was to have in the 
Council of State It had been decided, although "wlthout prejudlce", 
that Brabant and Flanders would be represented by one CounCillor each. 
In the case of Flanders this member would be nominated by the areas that 
still remalned unconquered, that is Het Vrije of Ghent, Ostend and Sluys; 
2 in the case of Brabant the States General would choose him. 
3 The following January, when similar discussions were held, it 
was still agreed that Flanders would have its member, but Brabant was 
now no longer mentioned, and the request of the "remaining towns and 
nobles" of that province for readmission to the States General was 
ignored. At about the same time the deputies of Sluys and Ostend were, 
1 Res. St. Gen L , V, 11. 
2 Ibid" p. 183. 
3Bor 11 part 11 (Authentieke Stukken), p. 61. , , 
1 at Holland's suggestion, also refused admission to the national assembly. 
Only Het Vrije continued for some time to send its deputy to the States 
2 General, but in the course of 1586 this too was ended. Before another 
year had passed the northern States were to give an indication that they 
had written off Brabant and Flanders even as potential members of the 
confederacy. In the Articles of the Sovereignty submitted to Elizabeth 
it was asked, both in 1585 and in 1587, that those among the provinces 
that had not joined the negotiations should, if they expressed this 
wish, be accepted by the Queen on the same conditions as the contracting 
3 
ones. The Secret Instructions of 1585 explained that this article 
polnted to the Ommelanden of Groningen, Overijsel, Drenthe, Brabant and 
Mech1in (Flanders was one of the contracting provinces), but in 1587, 
when neither Brabant or Flanders had joined in the offer of sovereignty, 
4 the Instructions mentioned only the three northern provinces. 
Leicester's attitude towards the South and the southerners was 
not the determining factor in this change of policy; Holland's measures 
would have been basically the same regardless of Leicester's temporary 
presence in the Netherlands. The governor's close cooperation with the 
natives of Brabant and Flanders nevertheless strengthened the States' 
1 Res. St. Gen., V, p. ix. 
2l!'?i!!. 
3ARA , Loketkas Enge1and 2, Art. 22. 
4See Art. 22 Secret Instructions in ARA, Loketkas Loopende Engeland 2 
(for 1585) and Loketkas Loopende 56 (for 1587). 
determination to exclude the representatives of these two areas. The 
rift between North and South and Leicester's decision to take the side 
of the latter region at the same time produced, as is well known, one 
of the main stumbling blocks in Leicester's own career. It is less 
generally recognized that in embarking upon this course he attempted 
not merely to strengthen hisiown "party". This consideration was 
undoubtedly present. From Leicester's pOint of view the exiles formed 
a highly compatible circle of advisers. For their political advancement 
they relied on him, and for the reconquest of their own provinces they 
had fixed all their hopes on the English alliance. They nourished 
their resentment against the States with their exclusive political 
system and were anxious to seethe English governor invested with the 
"absolute" powers which the northern Regents had denied him. This 
community of interest would in itself suffice to explain the sympathy 
between governor and exiles. There was however also the fact that 
Leicester considered the suppression of southern influence politically 
inopportune. The English government, more so perhaps than the States 
of the United Provinces, still thought in terms of the old Burgundian 
state and did not yet consider the breach between North and South as 
permanent. The southern nobles' jealousy of the Prince of Orange was 
recognized as one of the factors responsible for the rupture. l With 
the Prince's death this obstacle to a union was removed. Another cause 
1 . fOe 577verso. Cal. For., XIX, 240; BM, Add. Mss. 48,014, 
had been the military exhaustion of the southern provinces, which for 
years had been forced to bear the brunt of the war. Part of the South, 
and this applied especially to the non-Walloon regions, had returned to 
its obedience not by inclination, but by force and by despair of adequate 
foreign support. Now that England had extended aid there was a chance 
that it would attempt to rejoin the North. 
That England considered this possibility appears from suggestions 
made by both Burghley and Walsingham, shortly before the alliance was 
granted, that the extension of English aid to the Dutch should be followed 
1 by attempts to draw the southern provinces back into the war. In the 
spring of 1585 plans were indeed made -- it does not appear whether they 
were executed -- to send an English agent to the obedient provinces whose 
duty it would be, among other things, to gauge the attitude of the 
southern nobles towards the Queen's intervention and find out whether 
2 there was hope of a favourable reaction. To dissuade Elizabeth from 
continuing her peace negotiations Leicester himself tried for a time to 
keep the hope of a southern revolt alive in England. 3 There was perhaps 
little ground for his expectation that the Walloon areas were ready to 
1 Cal, Hatfield Mss., Ill, 70; PRO, SP Dom. XII, 176, no. 5, fOe 236. 
2 BM, Harleian Mss. 287, fOe 9. 
3BrUCe, pp. 247, 251. Leicester's hopes to regain the South affected his 
military plans. From a memorandum submitted to the Privy Council after 
the loss of Sluys it appears that in 1586 he had intended to draw his 
forces into Flanders but that the States had counselled an offensive in 
Gelderland an advice which Leicester followed. Cal. For., ad. Sophie 
Crawford L~as and AlIen B. Hinds_(London, 1929), XXI, ill, p. 258. 
throw off the Spanish yoke, but it was less unrealistic to contemplate 
the possibility that places like Antwerp, Brugge or Ghent might be 
induced to make another attempt if military affairs went well under the 
alliance. The economic depression plaguing the South at this time 
increased that possibility. The unaccommodatlng attitude of the 
northern provinces towards their former confederates threatened to 
interfere with it. 
As it happened Leicester was drawn into the North-South 
controversy almost as soon as he had entered the country. In January 
and February representatives of the "remaining towns and nobles of 
Brabant", a group that included Count Maurice of Nassau as Marquis of 
Bergen op Zoom, sent him two remonstrances to complain about their 
exclusion and about the States General's attack upon the autonomy of 
I their region, especially in financial matters. Leicester then tried 
to give them some satisfaction by proposing that natives of Brabant 
should be present at the States General's auditing of their province's 
2 
accounts. He also brought the remonstrants' requests for representation 
in Council and national assembly to the States General's attention, 3 
but his mediation was unsuccessful. In May the States of Holland came 
with their formal, and as it appeared final, veto lA the form of a 
I Brugmans, I, 64-70, 74-77. 
2 Res. St. Gen., V, 329. 
3srugrnans, I, 47; Res. St. Gen" V, 2l6f. 
resolution stating that Holland's deputies to the States General were 
to refuse Brabant's requests, even if this should be against the combined 
I 
opinion of the other provinces. 
The question of the South then was already beginning to constitute 
a point of disagreement between States and governor. It did not however 
lead to immediate conflicts, and no other matters of serious discord 
arose during the first months of Leicester's presence in the Netherlands. 
Whether this period of good feelings would have continued much longer if 
Elizabeth had agreed to his appOintment is difficult to say. That her 
refusal to accept the arrangement decreased his usefulness in the States' 
eyes is obvious, and that it at the same time affected their attitude 
towards the English ally is equally clear. Old fears and new rumours 
about the Queen's pacific intentions were confirmed both by her violent 
denunciation of the governorship and by her subsequent suspension of 
payments to the English army. Her ultimate decision to resign herself 
to the situation did not allay these suspicions. The threat of an 
English scheme of forcing the provinces to a peace with Spain remained 
present throughout the period of Leicester's governorship. The extent 
to which this situation affected the States' relations with the English 
governor and with England itself, and the manner in which Leicester 
reacted to the challenge, forms one of the themes of the following 
chapters. 
1 .. 
Res. Ho. 1586, p. 188. 
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CHAPTER IV 
IEICEStER'S GOVERNMENT IN 1586: 
FINANCIAL, ECONOMIC AND MILItARy POLICIES 
I 
The previous chapter has suggested some of the reasons why 
Leicester was to lose the support of the States, and particularly of 
--
those of the maritime provinces, namely the Queen's pacifism, his own 
alliance with the native opposition groups and the southern exiles, and 
his commercial and monetary policies. The last two aspects of his 
government form the topiC of the present chapter, where they are 
considered against the background of the general military and financial 
situation. The interconnection between these factors is usually 
disregarded or only cursorily mentioned in the accounts of his career 
but is nevertheless obvious. His financial needs and his consequent 
inability to organize the army for either offensive or defensive 
purposes explain his economic and financial policies, and even many of 
his poli tlcalmeasures. 
Attention will first be given to the financial arrangements made 
with the States. These had agreed that a monthly grant of fl. 200,000 
would be paid by the tour "contributing" provinces of Ho11and, Zee1and, 
Friesland and Utrecht, to which would be added the imposts and other 
117 
1 
revenue derived from the frontier regions. They had further promised 
the income of the domains, after the deduction of the "charges·· assigned 
on them, such as the interest on loans made on the security of these 
properties, the salaries of judicial officers, and other expenses. 
Except in the case of Friesland, the only province that had not yet 
decided to cede them, the net-revenue of the domains appears to have 
been negligible; the States promised at any rate that possible deficits 
2 
would be bome by them. Convoy and licent duties, which were also ceded 
to the central government, were to be used for the maintenance of the 
navy, 
The States asserted that the ordinary contributions for the 
land war should be sufficient for the payment and provisioning of 
garrisons, the cost of munitions, and other normal defence expenditure, 
They agreed that for the formation of a field army extraordinary grants 
3 
would be necessary. Precisely how great this additional sum would 
have to be is difficult to estimate. According to a "State of War·. of 
1587, which was drawn up, in Leicester's absence, by the States and the 
Council with the advice of Lord Buckhurst, Sir John Norris and some of 
the Dutch generals, the financial requirements for offensive warfare 
amounted to approximately five million florins. This would cover the 
lRes, St~ Gen., V, 318f. 
2Ibid., pp. 377f; Brugmans, I, 42. 
3 Bor, 11, 691. 
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cost of the normal garrisons and of a field army that operated for four 
to five months and that consisted of 12,000 footsoldiers, 5,000 horsemen 
andl,OOO pioneers. In addition to the English subsidy of fl. 1,260,000 
and the States' grant of fl. 2,400,000 (the revenue derived from the 
"non-contributin~' provinces was disregarded and may have been destined 
for the maintenance of the forces that were to be kept in the frontier 
areas throughout the year) an extraordinary grant of fl. 1,500,000 was 
estimated to be necessary. At that time the States promised to contribute 
two-thirds of this sum, on condition that the Queen paid the additional 
1 fl. 500,000. 
No such "State of War" was drawn up for 1586 and the amount of 
the extraordinary grant Leicester might expect remained, for the time 
being, a secret. He did from the beginning attempt to induce the States 
to increase their contributions. Additional money was required not only 
for the formation of a field army. but also to cover the expected 
deficit in the normal budget, for the States' estimate of the ordinary 
cost of defence had, in Leicester's opinion and in that of the Council 
of State,2 been too optimistic. Whether this would have been 80 under 
normal circum.tances is not certain. The present deficit may have been 
caused largely by the extraordinary increases in expenditure. stores 
and magaZines, depleted after the exertions of the previous year, had 
1 Bor, 11, 957. 
2ARA , SG 3782, fOe 27. 
I 
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to be replenished, the threatened towns in the Electorate of Cologne 
victualled and garrisoned, and even the navy asked for subsidies from 
1 the normal contribu~ions. Another cause of the deficiency seems to 
have been that the income derived from the frontier provinces remained 
below the States' expectations. Only that from Brabant had, according 
to a report by Thomas Vilkes, still constituted a considerable sum, but 
it had nevertheless been insufficient to pay the forces needed for that 
2 
area. 
On February 7th, ~ree days after his installation, Leicester 
asked the States to cede him the income of a special tax on salt, soap 
and beer, the so-called "three species".3 Earlier this tax had been 
at the disposal of the central government, but in 1585 it had been 
4 
returned to the provinces. In order to provide for the establishment 
of a field army he also asked permission to borrow, in case of need, 
fl. 100,000 at the country's charge, and he suggested that the provincer 
further grant an extraordinary contribution of tl. 400,000, to be paid 
in equal instalments during the months of March to June inclusive. 5 
On February 15th, the States General decided, in conformity with a 
resolution taken by Holland a few days earlier, that the request for 
lRes, Ho. 1586, p. 299. 
2 Brugmans, 11, 423. 
3 Res. St. Gen., V, 323. 
4Van der Voude, l!Q, LXXIV, p. 70. 
5 Res. Ho. 1586, p. 100. 
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1 the three species would have to be refused. In March Holland agreed in 
principle, however, to grant the fl. 400,000 and it further allowed the 
2 
central government to borrow the additional fl. 100,000. The States 
l General also approved of this loan, but no decision was taken regarding 
the fl. 400,000, and in order to provide for some of the more pressing 
needs Leicester was forced to have recourse to new loans and to anticipa-
tions upon the general means destined for the following months~ 
Other attempts made by him to augment his revenue brought him 
into conflict with the States. the first of these concerned his 
rosenoble project. This EngliSh coin was popular in the Netherlands 
and was issued at a rate that exceeded its intrinSic value by more than 
4 
ten per cent. A certain mintmaster by the name of Hans Vleminck had 
suggested that some profit could be made it the noble were minted in 
the Netherlands. 5 Leicester passed the suggestion on to Burghley,6 
lBor, 11, 691; Res. Ho. 1586, p. 61. 
2Res ; Ho~ 1586, pp. 101f. 
lYan der Woude (op. cit., p. 70) states that this approval had been 
withheld. It appears from the States General's resolutions of June 28th 
however that consent had been given; the States' ind1gnatlon concerned 
the fact the Leicester had taken it directly from the "general means", 
instead of borrowing it elsewhere on security of these means. Res. St. 
~, Y, 479. See also ibid., p. 383. 
4" . Res. Ho. 1586, p. 109. 
5BM, Harleian Mss. 251, fos. 57verso, 58. 
6Ca1 • Foro, XX, 348. 
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who tried to dissuade him by explaining that the coin's inflated value 
was a result of the fact that it was still scarce, and that a sudden 
increase in its supply would before long bring it down to its just 
value. l Leicester did not await Burghley's reply but went ahead with 
his plans. Although Holland's mint was established at Dordrecht, he 
resolved to have his nobles coined at Amsterdam. this decision was 
taken after consultation with his Councillor Willem Bardesius, former 
burgomaster of Amsterdam, whose advice he had asked regarding the 
privileges governing the creation of mints, and also regarding Vleminck's 
reputation as a minter. Bardesius, who may not have been acquainted with 
all the details of the project but who appears to have been anxious to 
have a mint established in his own town, gave encouraging replies. 
Vleminck was recommended, and Leicester was assured that he was free to 
establish mints in whatever place he wished, because the treaty had 
reserved the disposition in monetary matters to the Queen and her 
2 lieutenant. 
The plans aroused immediate opposition from Dordrecht and the 
States of Holland, and it is not certain whether they were ever executed. 
In March, after he had been acquainted with the States' objections, 
Leicester promised that he would keep the matter in abeyance.) Somewhat 
later Dordrecht complained that Vleminck's preparations in Amsterdam 
1 Bruce, p. 153. 
2BM, Add. Mss. 48, 083, fos. 77f. 
3 . 
Res. Ho. 1586, pp. 108f. 
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1 continued, and the States were to assert the following year that by the 
minting of rosenobles Leicester had deprived the country of several 
2 thousands of guilders. Leicester himself, who shortly after he had 
made his promise to the States received a letter from Burghley informing 
3 him that the Queen also opposed the project, said that it had not been 
4 put into effect. He may well have spoken the truth~ English coins 
continued to be minted in the Netherlands, but this was not necessarily 
done with his approval. The provinces formed an illegal minters' 
paradise, and rosenobles had already been produced, without the govern-
S 
ment's approbation, before Leicester introduced his project. 
Another point of disagreement concerned the disposal of 
Brabant's revenue. That province's current imposts had been ceded to 
the central government, but the States General had assumed control over 
the remainder of its income, including that derived from confiscations 
and ecclesiastical goods. It also claimed the "rests" of Brabant, that 
is those contributions which had become due before Leicester's 
administration began but which had not yet been paid. Brabant's 
representatives opposed these claims and had promised Leicester that 
1 . Res~ Hoo 1586, pp. 109f. 
2 Bor, 11, 943. 
3Bruce, p. 153. 
4cal • For., ed. Sophie Crawford Lomas and Alien B. Hinds.(London, 1927), 
XXI, li, pp. 25, 120. 
S Ibid., pp~ ·25, 40, 120. ' 
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they would cede all their revenue to the central government so Soon as 
1 
their province was represented in the Council of State. Although this 
condition had not been fulfilled Leicester proceeded to collect the 
2 
money, apparently with Brabant's approval. 
The States General issued its first protest in April. One of 
its arguments was that because the States had assumed responsibility 
for the payment of the old debts, the "rests" of the contributions, in 
Brabant as elsewhere, belonged to them. Their claim to Brabant's 
confiscations and ecclesiastical goods was explained with the remark 
that in deferring the government to Leicester these goods had been 
3 
reserved "to the general1 ty and the soverei gn tylt. The asserti on was 
only partly true; the means in question had not been granted to the 
4 States General but had been retained by the individual provinces. 
Each of these consequently had the right to cede them to the central 
government~ Whether Brabant also had this right depended 01\ the 
question whether or not it was still entitled to full membership in the 
lBrugmans, I, 76. 
2This at any rate was asserted on Leicester's behalf; ibid" p. 203, 
This letter and the one immediately preceding it were obviously not 
written by the States General, as the editor thought. The drafts in 
ARA, Loketkas Loopende 50, do not indicate the sender, but presumably 
It was Leicester's Chamber of Finances. 
3Res • St~ Gen~, V, 331. 
4 Brugmans, I, 45f~ 
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confederacy. Leicester preferred to think it was, and for the better 
part of the year he continued his attempts to collect the revenue,l 
although eventually he was forced to resign himself to the States' 
wishes also in this respect. 
These disagreements, and the suspicions engendered by Leicester's 
political and commercial measures, inevitably affected the States' 
attitude to his demand for an increased subsidy. Discussions on the 
extraordinary grant of fl. 400,000 dragged on during the spring and 
early summer months. On May 3rd the national assembly had begun to 
consider the request, but it was not until July 7th that the formal Act 
2 
of Consent was drawn up, and it was to take another month or more 
before the first instalment was paid. This grant, which brought the 
States' contributions to ~l. 2,900,000, did not solve the financial 
problem. During the summer Leicester had accumulated a debt that 
approached, and perhaps exceeded, the amount of the extraordinary aid,3 
and his deficit was to increase over the following months.4 The money 
did however help to relieve the military Situation, which had been 
seriously deteriorating during the summer. The achievements of 
September and October were Significant enough to warrant the assumption 
lef. Brugmans, I, 201-204 (see for the probable sender of these letters 
note 2 on the previouS page) and Res. St. Gen., V. 377. 
2Res , St. Gen., V, 335f, 366f. 
3ARA , SG 3781, st. 142. 
4See below, pp. 222-5 for a discussion of the states' accounts. 
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that part of the earlier losses might have been prevented if the 
additional contributions had been granted, as he had requested, in the 
spring. 
II 
To complete the monetary picture attention must be given to the 
difficulties encountered in the financing of the English army. This 
matter has received a detailed treatment from Professor J. E. Neale,l 
whose study is indispensable for an understanding of the monetary 
aspects of the alliance, although subsequent research has shown that 
not all the conclusions drawn by him can be accepted without 
qualifications. Professor Neale regarded the question primarily from 
Elizabeth's point of view and blamed the shortages almost exclusively 
on what he called the States' "parasytic financing" (that is their 
reliance on English loans and their delays in repaying them), and on 
Leicester's incapacity and possible dishonesty as an administrator. 
This interpretation has been challenged by the Dutch historian 
2 A. M. van der Woude, who suggested that Elizabeth's own financial 
policies were at least in part to blame for the shortages under 
Leicester's government. He mentioned in this respect the delays in the 
shipments of money from England,3 and thereby put his finger on a factor 
l''EUzabeth and the Netherlands, 1586-7", in hls Essays in Elizabethan 
History, pp. 170.201. 
2 In his previously cited article in ~, LXXIV, 64-82. 
3·· . 
~. pp. 75t. 
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to which Professor Neale gave indeed insufficient attention. In 
defending the Queen against the accusations of ill-payment, Professor 
Neale based his case largely on the fact that over the entire Norris 
and Leicester period she paid what she owed, but neglected to point out 
that on most occasions the payments were made long after they had become 
due. As his own discussion of the matter has shown, this procedure 
removed Leicester's chances of introducing the needed reforms into the 
army's financial administration. It also prevented him from using the 
army for offensive purposes during the larger part of the campaign 
season. 
In order to clarify the situation it is necessary first of all 
to give an indication of the Queen's total commitments and of the sums 
she made available to the army at various periods. As already mentioned, 
Professor Neale has shown that over the first two and a half years of the 
alliance she fulfilled her financial obligations. According to his 
figures she had by December 1587 paid an amount of £283,760, exclusive 
of an extraordinary grant which she advanced in 1587 for the relief of 
Sluys~l Her commitments for this period amounted to approximately 
£281,360. This sum is made up of £ 29,000 for the four months of 1585 
when Norris administered the army and of twice the annual subsidy of 
£126,180 for the two years of the Leicester period proper. The £'29,000 
for the flrst four months consists of the charge for the provisional 
INeale, pp. 172f~ 
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1 
army which the treaty had established at.£ 18,500, and of an addi tiona1 
£, 10,500 for the period of November 22nd, when the permanent treaty went 
into effect, until December 21st. 
2 Norris received a total of S~2,OOO, an amount which exceeded 
the subsidy for these months. One of the reasons why he nevertheless 
left a deficit was, as has been mentioned earlier, the fact that 
3 
certain amounts of money had been advanced to the Dutch. Part of his 
deficit was therefore to be recovered upon the settlement of his accounts 
with the States~ In January 1586 Norris claimed that of the fl. 125,363 
that had been lent to the States an amount of fl. 44,023 was still to be 
repaid. The States asserted that the amount was too high and Leicester, 
whose arbitration was asked, reduced it to fl. 28,864. That sum 
included the fl. 18,000 which had been paid for the additional 1,000 
footsoldiers between October 2nd, when Davison accepted the Act of 
Ampliation, and November 21st. On this point therefore the Act of 
Ampliation was rejected, but in order to relieve the States' burden it 
was agreed that the money would be paid in instalments over a three-
4 
month period. 
The size of Norris' total deficit is not clear, but apparently 
it exceeded the amount of the settlement. Leicester used part of the 
lBor, lIt 638. 
2 Neale, p. 184. 
3 See p.65-7 above. 
4 Van der Woude, l!£, LXXIV, 68. 
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£20,000 he had brought with him to complete payments until December 21st, 
and appears to have lacked the money for a full pay in January. Only 
imprests were given, and by the end of January the treasurer reported 
I that little more than£ 5,000 remained in cash. Requests for additional 
funds were made but remained without avail until April, when £24,000 was 
2 
sent. Again the money had to cover too long a period; it was not until 
July that the next payment, an amount of £10,000, was made available to 
3 Leicester. Until August therefore he received £54,000 instead of the 
£73,600 to which he had been entitled. During the second part of the 
year the situation improved: a sum of £35,000 was sent in August and 
4 
another £30,000 in October, bringing the total for the year to £119,000. 
One of the reasons moving Elizabeth to postpone payments was her 
5 disgust with Leicester's acceptance of the governorship. Another was 
of course her Itdislike of charges lt ; the decision to resume payments in 
April and the temporary improvement of her attitude towards Leicester at 
this time seem to have been due, at least in part, to premature reports 
6 about the financial success of Drake's expedition to the Indies. In 
1 Nea1e, pp. l85f. 
2~, p. 187; Cal. For., XX, 531. 
3 Bruce, p. 338. 
4Neale, pp. 188f. The author gives ;45,000 for August, but presumably 
this sum includes the July payment which he did not mention. 
5 . 
Van der Woude, l!£, LXXIV, 75. 
6Read , Walsingham, Ill, 142-144. 
I ~ 
t 
\ 
l 
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addition there was the uncertainty about Philip II's intentions. There 
were, on the ene' hand, the persistent rumours about Spanish naval 
preparations against England, which rumours strengthened the Queen's 
inclination to save the available military and financial resources for 
1 home defence; while on the other hand there were the equally persistent 
reports about Spain's anxiety to enter into peace negotiations with 
England. Both Philip and Parma believed that by withholding payments 
the English government intended to prevent Leicester from embarking upon 
an offensive and thereby jeopardizing England's chances of reaching an 
2 
agreement with Spain. Whether or not this assumption was correct, there 
was a definite connection between Elizabeth's assessment of the 
possibilities of a composition and her financial policies with respect 
to the army in the Netherlands. During the first part of 1586 it was 
considered possible in England that the negotiations held by Andrea de 
3 Loo and other agents would lead to a formal peace conference. Early 
In July these preliminary talks collapsed, apparently as a result of 
Walsingham's disclosure of certain indiscretions committed by the 
4 English agents. A few weeks later Walsingham discovered the Babington '. 
IRead, Walsingham, Ill, pp. 140f. 
2 Joseph Lef.vre, ed., Correspondence de Philippe 11 sur les affaires 
des Pays Bas (Brussels, 1956), 11, iii, pp. 133, 138, 141; Van der Essen, 
V, 101, 103. 
3 Read, Walsingham, Ill, 142; Van der Essen, V, 89t. 
4 Read, Lord Burghley, p. 337; ~, Walsingham, 111, 150-153. 
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plot. This discovery did not weaken the Queen's desire for a peace 
but it convinced her that preparations for war should be continued, 
and for a time her interest in the affairs of Leicester and of the 
alliance increased. This appears not only from the greater regularity 
of her payments, but also from the fact that she granted her lieutenant's 
oft-repeated demand to allow his future field marshal Sir William 
1 Pelham to come to the Netherlands, and that, again at Leicester's 
2 
request, she sent Thomas Wilkes on an embassy to the Low Countries. 
After this digreSSion about the political aspects of 
Elizabeth's financial policy attention must be given to the factors 
which Professor Nealehas shown to have aggravated the monetary 
problem and to have been responsible for the debt which Leicester 
3 
accumulated in 1586. One of these was that under Leicester, as 
4 
under Norris, English money was diverted to the States' forces, 
1 Cal. For., XXI, ii, P. 12; Bruce, pp. 55, 132, 136, 250, 346. 
2 Bruce, pp. 291, 305. 
3professor Neale (P. 190), estimates the total expenditure and debts 
for the first ten months of Leicester's government at£ 135,000. 
This suggests that Leicester had exceeded the amount of the Queen's 
subsidy for this period by£30,OOO, minus the money used to complete 
payments for the Norris era. 
4 Neale, PP. 175-177. 
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and a second that under Leicester's administration the monthly charge 
of the English army increased. This was partly a result of the fact 
that the responsibility for the payment of certain English military 
I 
chiefs and other officials devolved on him. The treaty had 
failed to indicate whether these salaries were to be paid by the 
Queen or by the States, and no account had been taken of them 
when the amount needed for the maintenance of the English army 
2 
was established. 
Another cause was Leicester's policy of raising his own 
salary from fi:.fJ to £,10.13.4 per day, and of increasing the pay 
of the infantry companies from £170 to an amount that is variously 
reported as £173.5 and £ 176.5 per month. 3 Leicester justified 
the first step with a reference to precedent: the Earl of Pembroke, 
who had as general of the English forces at St. Quentin occupied 
a position similar to that which Leicester held in the Netherlands, 
4 had been paid the higher rate. The decision to raise the 
pay of the English infantry companies appears to have been taken 
1 Neale, pp. 171f. 
2Ibid.; Cal. Hatfield Mss., XIII (Addenda), 293. 
3 Neale, p. 185. 
4 BM, Harl. Mss. 6994, fOe 42. 
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according to official directions. Burgh1ey had ordered Leicester to 
bring the rates in accordance with those paid in Ireland, which were 
higher than the Dutch ones. Professor Neale suggested that this order 
was probably inspired by a financial statement of the Norris period 
1 
which listed the pay per company as £184. the author's censure of 
Leicester's decision to obey the order seems overly severe. He implies 
that he should have disregarded the direction and shows that Norris, who 
had also been told to introduce the new rate, had informed the Council 
2 that this would increase the Queen's charge. this proves however that 
the government was aware of the difference when it sent its orders to 
Leicester. the calculation of £184 was, as has been seen, a result of 
the fact that the pound sterling was valued at less than ten Dutch 
3 guilders. It is probable therefore that the change was suggested in 
order to escape the even more disastrous consequences resulting from 
the disadvantageous rate of exchange. 
Leicester's failure to correct some of the most striking abuses 
in the administration of the army and thereby to relieve the Queen's 
charges was, as has been suggested, partly due to Elizabeth's habit of 
postponing payments. Professor Nea1e has shown that one of the chief 
causes of these abuses was the system employed in paying the army. 
1 Neale, p. 186, note 1. 
2 . . 
Ibid., note 2. 
3 Above, p. 66, note 3. 
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Although some attempts had been made to pay the wages by poll, that is 
directly to the soldiers, the normal procedure was to hand the money 
over to the captains. The system invited corruption, not only at the 
expense of the soldier to whom the captain might or might not pay his 
full wages, but also at that of the Queen herself. This was so because 
it was difficult to prevent the captains from claiming money for a larger 
number of soldiers than was actually in their bands. Only if regular 
musters were held could such frauds to some extent be prevented, but it 
had become an established practice that musters were accompanied by a 
full pay. When there was no money for a complete payment -- and under 
Leicester this was the rule rather than the exception -- the soldiers 
were relieved by means of imprests and these were given according to 
the captains' rolls. For months on end therefore companies could be 
and were presented and imprested as full while in reality they had 
wasted down to half their strength or less. When the muster master 
eventually passed his muster he had no means to verify the captains' old 
rolls and the amount of the "checks" -- that is the Sum which was to be 
deducted for the number of soldiers lacking in each company __ was 
consequently smaller than It should have been. l 
1 Neal., pp~ 180-183, 190-192. The checks were stUl further reduced 
because they were in large part refunded to the captains for the 
repletion of their bands. It does not appear that Leicester was more 
generous in this respect than for example Norris and Buckhurst; see 
Cal. For., XXI, lil, p. 33~ 
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These were among the factors causing Leicester's financial 
embarrassments. It is evident that the responsibility for the situation 
can indeed not be placed on the Queen's shoulders alone. The main cause 
of the difficulties must no doubt be sought in a number of fundamental 
weaknesses in the general system of army administration, weaknesses 
which affected most of the military expeditions into foreign countries 
and for which the government had not yet been able to find an adequate 
solution. l It is also clear however that the situation under Leicester 
was aggravated not only by his own or the States' financial poliCies, 
but also by those of the Queen. There were no doubt extenuating 
circumstances; it is possible to understand her concern and irritation 
about the manner in which her money was being administered, and 
particularly about the fact that debts and charges far exceeded her 
estimate, that no checks were returned in spite of the complaints about 
the incompleteness of her army, and that no accounts could be had to 
show her how her money had been and was being spent. Similar excuses 
might be brought forward, however, on behalf of the States. These did 
not cooperate in the attempts to keep the Queen's charges within the 
limits of her budget, but this attitude could be explained by their own 
financial problems and by the fact that they also had grievances 
concerning the administration of the English army, some of which were 
ISee in this connection C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army (2nd ed.; 
Oxford, 1966), passim. -
135 
no less legitimate than the Queen's. The incompleteness of her forces, 
the increase in the companies' pay, and the absence of checks might be 
mentioned as examples. The first concerned them directly; the last two 
increased for the time being Elizabeth's problems rather than theirs, 
but eventually they would be the losers. As far as Elizabeth's 
lieutenant, the third actor in the drama, is concerned, the preceding 
discussion has made it clear that he was by no means responsible for 
all the financial problems. There is no evidence that Leicester, who 
1 
mortgaged his own possessions to help finance the expedition, tried 
to defraud either the Queen or the army. Nor does the fact that he was 
unable to make ends meet establish his utter incapacity as an administrator. 
He probably failed to make the best of the situation, but it should be 
remembered that he was not the only one to be baffled by the difficulties 
confronting an Elizabethan army leader. 
III 
The monetary shortages had their effect on Leicester's commercial 
policy. His first serious disagreement with the States of Holland was 
caused by his decision to issue a highly comprehensive edict against 
trade with the enemy. Although that decision may have been influenced 
by political considerations. it was in the first place a result of the 
apparent impossibility of waging war by military means. The States' 
1Lawrence Stone, An Elizabethan: Sir Horatio Palavicino (Oxford, 19'6). 
PP. 191f. See also Cal. Dom •• Addenda 1580-1625 (London, 1872), p. 208. 
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replies to his requests for money had been discouraging, and it is 
unlikely that by April 4th, when the decree was issued, he had received 
1 the tidings that Elizabeth intended to resume payments. His own 
resources and his credit with the Merchants Adventurers had been 
2 insufficient to keep the army from starvation and mutiny; they certainly 
would not stretch to equip and pay a force for military duty for any 
length of time. Under these circumstances the temptation was too great 
not to attempt the prohibitionists' panacea. A further increase in 
Parma's supply difficultles would at the very least weaken his offensive. 
At best it would force hlm to postpone it altogether, particularly if the 
perennial hope of a revolt in the southern provinces should be realized. 
the assumption that this might happen was perhaps not so 
unrealistic as the free traders had maintalned, and as the majority of 
later historians have supposed. It depended in the first place on the 
question whether the Dutch were in a posltion to institute an effective 
blockade. the free traders had often proclaimed this to be impossible. 
Although thelr contention may have been valid for the earlier years of 
the Revolt, it is unlikely that it applied to the period following 
Antwerp's surrender; Holland's and Zeeland's commercial relatlons wlth 
the obedient provinces after the clOSing of the Scheldt suggest that 
IShirley's letter informing him that the £24,000 would be sent was dated 
March 21/31. Bruce, p. 180. A letter written by Leicester to Burghl.y 
on March 29/April 8 (Cal. For., XX, 496-498) gives the impression that 
even at this time the news had not yet reached him. 
2 --
Cal. For., XX, 496-498. 
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they were in a position to enforce their monopoly there. 1 The situation 
in the South during the spring and summer of 1586 invited, moreover, the 
kind of economic warfare which Leicester was contemplating. The scarcity 
of victuals continued unabated, but it was not the only problem farma 
faced. The departure of various merchants and artisans after the 
reduction of their towns, and the fact that the Dutch controlled the 
major trade routes, had caused a general economic depression in the 
southern Netherlands, where the population suffered severe unemployment 
and poverty. Expectations had been high that the conquest of Antwerp 
would cause a revival of trade and industry, but these hopes had been 
frustrated, and many were Parma's complaints in his letters to the King 
about the unemployment, misery and general discouragement of the people 
2 in the reconciled areas. 
1Dr~ Kernkamp, who made a detailed study of Dutch trade with the enemy 
during the Spanish war, admitted this. In the introduction to his 
work he had asserted that an effective blockade of the southern 
Netherlands was physically impossible (Hande1 met den Vijand, I, 3), but 
in the concluding section of his first volume, which closed with the 
year 1587, he stated that by that time the Dutch were well able to 
prevent foreign merchants from competing with them In their southern 
trade." ~, p. 219. Tbe author failed to take this factor into 
account In his evaluation of Leicester's trade policies (ibid., p. 189), 
which he felt to have been inspired more by political considerations, 
such as Leicester's wish to gain prestige among the people, than by 
military ones. 
2 Van der Essen, V, 33, 34, 38f, 43f; Corresp. Phl11ppe 11, 11, 111. 
p. xu. 
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These were among the factors accounting for the unprecedented 
severity of the decree, which aimed at a total cessation of Dutch and 
foreign trade with enemy territory and at a far-reaching curtailment of 
that with neutral countries. It was this severity which aroused 
Holland's, and eventually also Zeeland's opposition, not the fact that 
Leicester should attempt to regulate their trade with the enemYe 
Although at this time they still disagreed about the nature of the 
measures to be taken, both the maritime provinces desired the introduction 
of a uniform regulation, for so long as the existing decrees were not 
mutually accepted, it was inevitable that the interpretation by the 
judges of the Admiralty Colleges of Holland should be different from 
that by those of Zeeland. There was even less agreement between the 
merchants on the one hand and the captains and privateers on the other. 
The privateers of Zeeland especially applied the strictest decrees 
existing, and mercantile complaints about their activities were many. 
J.~ The States of Zeeland, who were inopportuned by irritated merchants and 
, I 
"perplexed" Admiralty judges pressed Leicester on February 21st, and 
again on April 11th (by which time they seem to have been unaware of his 
edict) to settle the issue once and for all. l They did not ask for a 
new decree against trade with the occupied provinces because thiS, they 
explained, had by the States General's edict of June 1584 been forbidden 
I Brugmans, I, 80, 108.110. 
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to merchants of all nations. No such general regulation existed however 
with respect to the Spanish trade, for the prohibition of November 1585 
had not been published in North Holland and at Middelburg, and it did 
not apply to foreigners. It was on this point that the difficulties 
arose and it was here that they desired a definite regulation, both for 
natives and neutrals. The latter point was stressed. If Dutch trade 
only were forbidden it would result in a diversion of their commerce to 
other countries and cause"the ruin and total downfall of these uni ted 
provinces".l 
Zeeland probably continued to hope that Elizabeth would 
cooperate in the enforcement of a fairly comprehensive interdiction 
applying to all nations. For the time being it was particularly anxious, 
and so was Holland, that there should be uniformity in the regulations 
applying to Dutch and English shipping. In December or January the 
States had ordered Joachim Ortell, their agent in London, to discuss 
the matter of trade with the obedient prOVinces, France and Spain, with 
2 
the English government. It appeared that England was still in favour 
of an inclusive prohibition. Elizabeth believed that the southern 
Netherlands might soon be forced to demand a "reasonable peace" if the 
1 Brugmans, I, p. 110. The editor's note on p. 108 is incorrect. He 
seems to confuse the edict of 1584, which was in force during Antwerp's 
Siege, with the prohibition of August 28th 1585. See for this latter 
decree p. 77f above. 
2 . 
Cal. For., XX, 236f. 
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I blockade were tightened, and she also desired a continuation of the 
restraints on the Spanish trade. In December 1585 there were rumours 
that Philip was preparing an Armada against England, and the English 
government was consequently more anxious than ever to prevent Philip 
2 from acquiring the necessary naval supplies. The Privy Council then 
suggested a comprehensive prohibition. It informed Ortell that no trade 
whatsoever should be allowed with the southern Netherlands and with the 
French ports north of the Seine, that direct trade with Spain and 
Portugal was to cease, and that the indirect export of contraband 
that is ships' materials and Victuals -- to those countries was also to 
3 be forbidden. On January 27th Burghley asked Leicester to inform the 
States of this decision and to assure them that, if they introduced these 
4 measures, English commerce would be regulated accordingly. 
In the course of March Leicester and the Council of State took 
the matter of a new trade regulation in hand. The discussion appears to 
have been started by a request for a moderation of the existing decrees 
which Amsterdam and the Northern Quarter of Holland submitted to the 
provincial States on March 3rd. The remonstrance, which was concerned 
with the harmful consequences of the export prohibition of dairy products 
and of the restraints on the Spanish trade, was sent on to Leicester, who 
1 . 
Cal. For.,XX, p. 227. 
2 Bruce, Pp. 41f. 
3 ." 
Cal. Por., XX, 294. 
4 Bruc., pp. 66f. 
around the middle of March resubmitted it to the States of Holland for 
advice. l Rather than prescribe a definite course the States decided 
to present the arguments for and against an inclusive prohibition of 
trade with Spain and the southern provinces, and to leave the ultimate 
decision to Leicester. The task of drafting the advice was entrusted 
to Oldenbarnevelt, who had recently been installed as Advocate of 
Holland. He had completed the work by April 11th, on which date the 
2 States appointed delegates to submit the document to Leicester. 
The latter had not considered it necessary to wait for Holland's 
advice, however, but had proceeded on his own authority. The new edict 
had been drafted and issued on April 4th, and it was to be published on 
3 the 14th of that month. Already before the day of publication a 
"certified copy" had been sent to the Privy Council with the request 
4 that it be introduced in England. Its provisions were in conformity 
with the ideas of the prohibitionists. All trade whatsoever with the 
southern provinces, Spain and Portugal was forbidden to native and 
foreign merchants, and so was the export of victuals, munitions of war 
and ships' materials from the United PrOVinces, or the transportation 
of these wares via the Dutch coasts, except by Leicester's consent. 
IKernkamp, 1, 184f; Res. Ho. 1586, pp. 81, 121. 
2 Res. HOe 1586, p. 121; Van Deventer, I, 117. Oldenbarneve1t's advice 
is printed by Van Deventer, pp. 118-127. 
3 ARA, Res. Raad van State 5, fos. 18, 32. 
4 Cal. Foro, XX, 470. 
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Merchants who wished to export non-contraband from the Dutch provinces 
or to ship these wares past the Dutch coasts were obliged, for the 
prevention of fraud, to declare their merchandize in one of the Dutch 
ports and to pay convoy duties. Sentence against trespassers of the 
decree was to be passed by the judges of the Admiralty Colleges of 
Holland and Zeeland. For foreigners the penalty would consist, in most 
cases, of confiscation of ships and goods, for natives of confiscation 
and death. Intention to transgress the decree would be considered in 
the same light as the transgression itself. l 
Although there was an understandable tendency to overstress 
prohibitions and penalties in any decree against trade with the enemy, 
Leicester's was undoubtedly too Inclusive to be practicable. If ha had 
limited himself to a general interdiction of trade with the Spanish 
Netherlands and neighbouring neutral places, and to a prohibition of direct 
Dutch navigation on Spain, the decree might have been acceptable as a 
compromise measure to both the maritime provinces and to England. More 
cooperation would have been given in the attempt to enforce it and its 
effectiveness as a military measure would have Increased. The present 
decree became an almost unqualified failure. Its political consequences 
at home were disastrous, Its military benefits negligible, and its 
finanCial effects entirely negative. The prohibition had been issued in 
the hope that the loss in normal customs revenue would be balanced by the 
I See for the edict Bor, 11, 703f. 
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income derived from the additional convoys to be paid by foreigners, 
from the licents Leicester might grant, and from fines, confiscations 
and prizes. Only in case of a strict enforcement could these hopes have 
been realized. As it was, the prohibition merely aggravated the financial 
problem. 
It is true,however, that Leicester was not alone in disregarding 
or minimizing the political obstacles to an enforcement of the decree. 
At first the measure aroused few or no objections outside Holland and, 
1 
apparently, Friesland. Leicester himself declared later that the 
2 Council of ~tate had favoured it, and there is indeed no evidence of 
any strenuous opposition by the Councillors. 3 The English government 
4 
approved of it and promised to introduce it at home; it was not until 
Elizabeth had been informed of the fact that France and other foreign 
countries objected to the measure that she required Leicester to moderate 
It. 5 Although Zeeland's practice was once more at variance with its 
theory -- as late as June 5th Leicester had to warn that province to 
6 proceed with the publication -- the provisions of the decree were in 
1 Van Reyd, p. 122. 
2 Calf For., XXI, li, p. 196. 
3 . 
Bardesius, who ·as burgomaster of Amsterdam would probably have opposed 
it, was absent on April 4th. Den Tex, I. 276. 
4 . 
Cal~ For., XX, 585. 
5 Calf For., XXI, ii, p. 40. For Henry 111'. objections see ~, pp. 69.71, 
6 . 
ARA, Res. R. v. St., 5, fOe 124. 
close conformity with the suggestions Zeeland had been making since the 
1 fall of Antwerp. 
Holland did not immediately attack. An attempt was made via 
the States General to move Leicester to postpone publication of the 
decree,2 and the provincial States decided to submit Oldenbarnevelt's 
advice. But they also issued the warning that all endeavours "to 
prevent the expedition or maintenance of the edict, or to diminish his 
Excellency's legal authority in any other way" were strictly forbidden. 3 
Although they were undoubtedly pressed to renew the attempts for a 
4 
moderation of the decree they resolved to wait, in the hope that 
Leicester might be forced to introduce the necessary changes as a result 
not of political but of financial pressure, which could be applied by 
Holland's withholding its consent for the extraordinary contribution. 
Holland employed this device, but it had to exercise its patience for 
four months. It was not until the end of July that Leicester, faced 
with the danger of an overall military disaster, agreed to a substantial 
moderation of the prohibition. 
The military situation had begun to deteriorate long before this 
time. The first setback had been suffered early in June, when Parma 
ISee Chapter 11, pp.78f. 
2 - .. 
Res. St. Gen., V, 462f. 
3 .. . 
Res~·Ho. 1586, ·P. 174. 
4 Ibid., pp. 188f. 
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succeeded in taking the Maas town of Grave which had been under siege 
since the previous January. He had encountered no allied resistance. 
The news that Parma himself was taking the field had induced Leicester 
to collect such forces as were available for a campaign and to move into 
Gelderland, but the intention was probably not so much to divert Parma 
from Grave as to put heart into the garrison of that town. Preparations 
for the recruitment of English, Irish and German soldiers had begun, and 
Leicester hoped that until these arrived Grave would hold out under the 
siege. He had been too optimistic. On June 7th the governor of Grave, 
moved by the entreaties of some civilians rather than by military 
necessity, yielded the town. Immedlately afterwards neighbouring Megen 
and the House of Batenburgh fell. The way into Gelderland lay open to 
Parma and an attack on Bommelerwaard, a region enclosed by Maas and Waal 
and one from which an invasion into Holland could be launched, was expected. 
Leicester removed part of his army to that area and employed the rest to 
strengthen the garrisons of Arnhem and other neighbouring towns. When 
it appeared that the enemy was moving against Venlo, Martin Schenk and 
Sir Roger Wl1liams tried to enter it with additional forces. They failed, 
and on June 28th Venlo also surrendered. 1 
In a campaign that had lasted little more than a month Parma had 
Succeeded in wresting control of the Maasriver from the Dutch. Without 
IBor, 11, 707f, 713; BM, Briefe Report of the Militarle Services done 
by the Erie of Leieester (London, 1587), PP. 7-11. 
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loss of time he prepared to challenge their hold on the middle Rhine; 
early in July his army settled down before Neuss. Rheinberg was to be 
the next goal. Both towns were strong and well provided, but they were 
situated in the heart of enemy country and it was to be expected that 
eventually they would be forced to follow the example of the two Maas 
towns if no relief was sent. Leicester made a number of attempts to 
come to the support of Neuss. Twice he assembled an army, but both times 
I he was forced by lack of money to disband it. Part of it was sent back 
into garrison, another part put under Norris' command for the defence of 
Gelderland and Utrecht, while a number of companies were employed in 
minor attempts to divert the enemy. Hohenlohe and others were sent into 
Brabant, Count Maurice and Sir Philip Sidney went into Flanders. The 
forces in Brabant confined themselves to isolated raiding parties, but 
2 Maurice and Sidney were able to surprise the Flemish town of Axel. The 
reduction of Axe 1 , which remained the only notable achievement of the 
summer, did not cause Parma to interrupt the slege of Neuss. An attempt 
against one of the more important of the enemy's holdings might have done 
so, but no such attempt could be made. The Dutch garrisons had been 
3 
without pay for three months, and it did not appear that the States 
would give any extraordinary aid unless the governor accepted their 
1 Cal. For., XXI, 11, p. 106 0 
2 -
Briefe Report, pp. 11f. 
3ARA, SG 3781, st. 142. 
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conditions. The English army was no better provided. The soldiers 
starved or deserted in great numbers and Leicester wondered, as he 
confessed to Walsingham on July 17th, why they did not mutiny "and 
rather kill ••• all then runn away".l 
By the end of that month Leicester found the situation serious 
enough to reconsider his policies and attend to the States' grievances 
in return for their monetary grant. The decision was taken upon the 
failure of his most recent and most drastic attempt to solve the financial 
problem without recourse to the States, namely through his newly organized 
Chamber of Finances. The Chamber had been established in the last week 
of June, according to the advice and under the direction of Jacques 
Reingout, whom Leicester subsequently appointed treasurer general. 
Reingout's appointment alone would have sufficed to explain the States' 
objections to this innovation. He was a native of Brabant and a man of 
2 questionable political antecedents, who was strongly distrusted by the 
Statel. He was at the same time, however, an experienced administrator, 
who had served three successive Spanish governors, as well as the Prince 
3 
of Orange and the Duke of Anjou, in important financial functions. He 
knew the financial setup and its shortcomings, and many of his counsels 
1 Bruce, pp. 338f. 
2See on this point the list of accusations which the States of Holland 
sent to Leicester in the autumn of 1586. Klult, 11, 525.535. 
3 Fruln, Verspr. Geschro, 111, 167; P. L. Muller, p. 374; Cal. For., 
XIX, 701. 
to Leicester were financially sound, even if politically they were 
utterly impracticable. The Dutch themselves acknowledged his ability, 
as is evident by the fact that a member of the legation in London, 
probably Valcke, had suggested him to the Privy Council as a possible 
financial adviser for Leicester. l 
Reingout then was the presiding genius over the discussions 
leading to the organization of the Chamber of Finances. The idea itself 
was not an original or a highly revolutionary one. The need for a 
central auditing office had often been recognized. Financial matters, 
insofar as they were under the central government's control,were now in 
the hands of the Council of State. The Councillors were anxious to be 
relieved of their responsibilities in this respect and not opposed to a 
further centralization of the financial administration. 2 The English 
government also desired this and had ordered Leicester to provide for 
3 the establishment of a Chamber of Finances. The matter had first been 
broached on Leicester's behalf during the discussions on the Act of 
Authority. At that time the States had not applauded the idea, but 
4 
neither had they completely rejected it. If Leicester had insisted 
they would probably have given their consent. He preferred however to 
I ..... . 
Cal~ For., XIX, 791. 
2 See the Council's requests and suggestions in ARA, Loketkas Loopende 68. 
3 BM, Add. Mss. 48, 129, no fOe number. 
4 Brugmans, I, 40. 
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proceed without their advice. A Chamber of Finances established by the 
States would have implied States' control, States' nominations and a 
States' instruction. This meant that Leicester would have been prevented 
from implementing most of Reingout's suggestions about the Chamber's 
functions, for these tended to a drastic increase in the central 
government's financial independence and to a proportionate decrease in 
the provinces' control over their means. 
It was not only Holland that could be expected to object to such 
a reorganization. The strongest opposition would come from that prOVince, 
but its allies were likely to back its protests. Proposals to replace 
the system of farming the imposts by one of direct leVies, or to bring 
the administration of domains and church goods under the central 
1 government's control, were quite as objectionable to the States of the 
inland provinces as to those of Holland. It is doubtful even whether 
the former group applauded what in the opinion of the maritime provinces 
were the most objectionable of Reingout's ideas, those that were concerned 
with the Chamber's enforcement of the trade prohibition. It is to be 
noted that not only Buys criticized this scheme of Reingout's -- Buys' 
attitude must perhaps be explained by personal reasons -- but that 
Leoninus also expressed his doubts about the practicability of the 
2 
experiment. 
lp. L. Muller, PP. 388f. 
2Van Deventer, I, 139. 
j 
I . 
I 
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The chief controversy raged around the proposals regarding the 
execution of LeIcester's trade decree. It had long been evident that 
neither the States of Holland nor those of Zeeland were cooperating in 
the enforcement of the prohibition. The manner in which they protected 
their merchants appears from a remonstrance submitted to Leicester by 
sea-captains and privateers. These complained that whenever they had 
seized a ship and transported it to one of the ports of Holland or 
Zeeland they faced a virtually hopeless battle with the judges of the 
Admiralty Colleges and members of the prOVincial States. Almost without 
exception these officials, so the captains asserted, rendered their 
efforts fruitless by declaring ships and goods free on the pretext that 
the States had not yet published Leicester's decree, or that the merchant 
in question had received a special passport. When the captains tried to 
appeal to the central government the judges either refused to send the 
relevant documents or, if they did forward them and the merchant was 
conVicted, they refused to execute the sentence. Those who tried to 
obey the central government's decision were threatened with imprisonment. 
Privateers and captains had been threatened in the same way; some had 
1 
actually been thrown into prison. 
If under these circumstances Leicester intended to maintain his 
edict and enjoy its financial fruits it should be executed, Reingout 
IBM, Add. Mss. 29, 302, fos. 33f. 
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suggested, by the central government and by means of officials who were 
independent of the provincial States. To make their work more worthwhile 
from a financial point of view these officials would have to inquire also 
into transgressions of earlier prohibitions, that is those passed since 
the summer of 1584. The procedure he had in mind was that the commis-
sioners would travel around the country and examine the accounts of the 
receivers and controllers of convoys and licents over the past two years, 
as well as the books of those merchants who were suspected of having 
I transgressed the decrees. By means of the fines imposed upon the 
guilty, and by the recovery of cautionary sums that should appear to 
have been unjustly reimbursed to merchants, the central government might 
be able to realize, according to Reingout's calculations, some millions 
2 
of florins. 
Apparently Leicester expected opposition not only from the States, 
but also from his Councillors, for not even their advice was asked. On 
June 26th the Council was surprised with the information that the 
Chamber had been established. Its personnel had already been chosen. 
Leicester had appointed as heads the Count of Meurs, Sir Henry Killigrew, 
English member of the Council of State, and the Seigneur van Brakel, an 
Utrecht nobleman of strong Leicesterian sympathies; as treasurer general 
Reingout, and as auditor Daniel de Burchgrave, formerly attorney general 
I Kernkamp, I, 195. 
2 Bar, 11, 722. 
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of Flanders, who was now employed by Leicester as secretary. It would 
have been difficult to select a group that was more "independent" of 
the States, although the balance was to some extent restored by the 
inclusion of three Councillors who were to serve as clerks: the Hollander 
Van Loozen, the Zeelander Teelinck, and Paul Buys, the Councillor for 
Utrecht. l 
The Council, or at least some of its members with Paul Buys and 
Willem Bardesius in the forefront, indeed attacked the measure as both 
unconstitutional and impracticable, and the three men chosen as clerks 
refused to accept the function. They were unable to dissuade Leicester, 
however. The only satisfaction which Bardesius received was that the 
intended measures against smugglers would apply only to actual 
lorrendraaiers, that is to people who had directly supplied the enemy, 
2 
not to those who had otherwise transgressed the various prohibitions. 
More effective than the Council's opposition was that by the States of 
Holland. On July 17th these had resolved that for the time being they 
3 
would ignore the innovation. A few weeks later, in cooperation with 
the States of Zeeland, they forced Leicester to agree that the administra-
tion of Holland's and Zeeland's contributions would remain with the Council 
of State.4 By that time the matter was still to be discussed by the States 
I Bor, II, 721. 
2 
Ibid., pp. 721f. 
3 Res. Ho. 1586, p. 265. 
4 Ibid., pp. 292f. 
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1 General, but whatever verdict the other provinces would give, the 
refusal of Holland and Zeeland to cooperate had as early as August made 
it clear that the Chamber's effectiveness would be limited. 
Reingout's attempts against the lorrendraaiers were also ending 
in failure. The sixteen travelling commissaries who had been appointed 
received no more cooperation than the privateers, and they found their 
occupation among the Hollanders and Zeelanders just as hazardous. One 
of them, who tried to execute his commission in Gouda against the 
2 
magistrate's orders, was banished by the States of Holland. Others who 
escaped a similar fate nevertheless found it necessary to request the 
3 governor general's special protection. In September Holland waS able 
to strike its final blow at Reingout. Somewhat earlier his partner 
Steven Peret had been arrested on the charge that he had publicly 
denounced the States. An examination of his papers produced incriminating 
material not only against himself but also against Reingout. Provided 
with these documents delegates of the States of Holland travelled to 
Leicester, who was in the camp before Zutphen. They requested him to 
arrest Reingout on the double charge that he had tried to enrich himself 
at the country's expense and that he had attempted to promote disagreement 
IOn August 10th the question was referred to the States General, which 
resolved in November, after Reingout's fall, against the re-establishment 
of an "independent" Chamber of Finances. Res. St. Gen., V, 231, 434, 437. 
2 Bor, 11, 759. 
3ARA , SG 11,072, fos. 285-287. 
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between governor and States. Leicester, who had just received the first 
instalment of his extraordinary grant and considered it inopportune to 
cross the States of Holland at this particular time, complied. Reingout 
was arrested and lost his function. l 
The Chamber of Finances did not long survive his fall. With 
respect to its other major grievance, the trade prohibition, Holland had 
earlier scored a victory, again in cooperation with Zeeland. Although 
the States of the latter province maintained a more cautious attitude 
towards the question than those of Holland, they had by this time come 
close enough to Holland's point of view to back its protests. This change 
of attitude was no doubt partly a result of their distrust of Leicester's 
political and financial measures, partly also of the fact that he had 
been unable to procure England's cooperation In the enforcement of the 
trade prohibition against neutrals. The fact that Parma was concentrating 
upon an offensive in the South-East rather than in Flanders or north-
western Brabant may have been an additional reason. 
In July the two provinces prepared a remonstrance and drew up a 
number of suggestions for a new decree. They did not ask that trade 
with the Spanish Netherlands be permitted to either natives or foreigners, 
and they were further willing to retain the prohibition of trade with 
Spain and Portugal, but on condition that it applied also to English 
1 . 
Bor, 11, 755, 758f. 
I 
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merchants. Foreigners however were to be excluded. The Queen had not 
enforced it against these; neutrals had proceeded with the trade and 
the only effect of the prohibition had been that the Dutch provinces, 
which had always formed an important link in this commerce, were bypassed. 
Neutrals engaged in the Spanish trade should therefore again be allowed 
to buy and sell their wares in Dutch ports, although Dutch exports of 
grain and. munitions to Spain could remain forbidden. The States further 
requested that the restrictions on the export to neutral countries, again 
with 1 the possible exception ot grain and munitions, should be removed. 
2 The remonstrance was submitted on July 23rd. On that day 
Leicester had invited the States of Holland and the deputies of Zeeland 
for a discussion of the financial situation, in the hope that he could 
persuade them to grant the extraordinary contribution. He was willing 
to pay the price and accepted most of the States' suggestions, including 
their compromise proposal regarding the indirect trade with Spain. The 
only point on which he insisted was that the general interdiction was 
to apply not only to the Spanish Netherlands but also to the ports of 
north-western Germany and north-western France. Holland and Zeeland 
agreed. Hereupon Bardesius, Valcke, Teellnck and Oldenbarnevelt were 
commissioned to draft the new decree. It was published on August 4th.3 
I Res. Ho. 1586, pp. 277-280. 
2 Ibid., p. 272. For the discussions between States and governor on this 
issue see pp. 280f in this same volume. 
3The edict is printed in Reso Ho. 1586, pp. 282-286. 
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The financial discussions of July 23rd did not lead to an 
immediate payment of the grant. There were other grievances to be 
settled, which had been mentioned in a second remonstrance by Holland 
1 
and Zeeland. They included complaints about the administration of the 
English and Dutch armies, about the fact that Leicester had raised the 
convoy duties on his own authority, and about the Chamber of Finances. 
Apparently Leicester's replies to these complaints were considered 
2 
satisfactory. They were dated August 6th. On August 9th the States 
General renewed its Act of Consent for the extraordinary grant of 
fl. 400,000, promising to make the larger part of it, an amount of 
3 f1. 250,000, available before the end of the month. 
The first instalment was indeed paid in August. Leicester, who 
in the course of that month received a substantial sum also from England, 
was in a position to organize the army. It was too late to save Neuss, 
which had fallen on August 4th. By means of a campaign in Gelderland he 
was able however to divert Parma from his siege of Rheinberg and at the 
same time to make some conquests on the Veluwe. The first fruit of his 
campaign was the town of Doesburg, situated on the Old IJsel. A number 
of smaller strongholds were subsequently taken, including the two IJsel 
forts which defended Zutphen. Attempts against Zutphen itself, the 
1Res • Ho. 1586, pp. 288-295. 
2· 
Ibid., PP. 294f. 
3The States General's Act of Consent occurs in Res, Ho. 1586, pp. 307.309. 
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headquarters of Spanish power in Gelderland and Overijsel, failed, but 
by the end of the campaign it was completely surrounded by allied 
strongholds and it was expected that in time it could be starved into 
surrender.1 
In order to make the blockade foolproof, steps were taken to 
ensure the IJsel town of Deventer, Zutphen's northern neighbour. This 
2 
town, as haS been seen, had refused a States' garrison and had kept 
itself politically aloof from the other provinces by opposing, among 
other things, Overijsel's adherence to the treaty with England. On the 
last point stadholder Meurs had been able to bring it to terms in 
February, when rumours that the town was in correspondence with the 
enemy gave him an excuse to step in and change the magistrate. 3 Deventer 
thereupon ended its obstruction to the treaty and in May Overijsel put 
4 itself under the Queen's protection and under Leicester's governorship. 
The town continued to refuse a garrison however, and in October, when 
the army was conveniently near, it was decided to end its opposition by 
force. Truchsess, Pelham, Norris and some members of the Council of 
State went to Deventer, accompanied by Sir William Stanley and his 
regiment. The magistrate was again changed and a garrison, which 
1 Bor, 11, 750-752. 
2 Above, p. 71. 
3 . ~t XXXIV, 36; Bruce, p. 140. 
4 De Pater, TvG, LXIV, 272f. 
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consisted of 1,400 English and Irish soldiers and which was commanded 
I by Stanley, introduced. 
With the reduction of Deventer the autumn campaign ended. It 
. had not been an unsuccessful one. The earlier losses had not been wiped 
out, but Parma had for once been forced into the defensive, Rheinberg 
had been relieved, the IJsel almost freed, and enemy pressure on Utrecht, 
Overijsel and northern Gelderland greatly weakened. If Leicester had 
heeded the States' advice regarding the choice of governors for Deventer 
and the Zutphen forts the gains might have been permanent. He did not 
heed it, and the treason of his commanders before long restored and 
extended Spanish power in the eastern provinces. The following year 
also failed to bring relief to these areas. By that time the relations 
between the allies in general, and between Leicester and the States of 
the maritime provinces in particular, had deteriorated to such an extent 
that cooperation even for purposes of defence had become impossible. 
The manner In which Leicester's political measures affected this 
development must now be considered. 
I Bruce, pp. 478-480; Briefe Report, pp. 26£. 
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CHAPTJl:R V 
LE lCEStER AND UTRECHT 
I 
Most of the political disagreements of 1586 were a result of 
Leicester's alliance with the opposition groups of Utrecht, the town 
which, probably for no other reason than its central location and its, 
proximity to the front, he had early in April chosen as the federal 
government's residence. As In Holland the OPPOSition included the 
Calvinists, whose attitude was influenced by religious objections to a 
strongly Erastian and still partly Roman Catholic government, and the 
southern exiles, many of whom had settled here. The core of the movement 
however was formed by the heads of the eight militia companies in the 
city of Utrecht, the so-called burgerhoplieden or burgher captains, who 
had since their province's entry into the war formed the vanguard of 
whatever opposition there was against the government at both the municipal 
and the provincial levels. 
In spite of differences in emphasis the alliance between the 
three groups was a solid one. They had a common foe and cooperated In 
the execution of each other's programmes. The captains advanced the 
Calvinists' religious proposals, while Calvinists and exiles subscribed 
to the political reforms advocated by th~ militia leaders. The captains' 
reform programme was the major link uniting the various groups, at least 
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during the pre-Leicesterian years. Under Leicester almost as much stress 
was placed on the promotion of his claims against those of the States, 
and thus on a policy of centralization. 
The Utrecht episode occupies a central place in the story of 
Leicester's rule. The city, and eventually the entire province of 
Utrecht, became his major bulwark and the chief stronghold of EngliSh 
influence. His partisans in Utrecht did not even limit their activities 
to their own province. They supported and inspired centralist groups 
elsewhere. Those in Friesland, Holland and Zeeland were in contact with 
the Leicesterians of Utrecht. On a number of occasions these succeeded, 
moreover, in gaining the cooperation of the States of the other inland 
provinces against those of the maritime regions. 
Although natives of Utrecht supported these activities, a number 
of southern exiles had become the most prominent leaders of the movement 
during the Leicester period. These exiles owed their influential 
position in part to Leicester's policy of advancing his southern 
proteges to political functions, a policy that appears to have had the 
blessing of the native opposition leaders. Without their approval 
Leicester would probably not even have succeeded, for the natives 
continued to form the basis of the movement and to provide it with its 
main strength. After 1585 there was, moreover, no drastic chang. in 
the opposition's policy. While it is true that the emphasis of the new 
leaders was increasingly placed upon a programme in favour of 
centralization, they never allowed themselves to lose sight of the 
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original goals of the domestic opposition; goals which would have to be 
reached if Utrecht was to become a centralist and Leicesterian stronghold. 
The endeavour to execute that domestic programme forms therefore one of 
the threads connecting the events taking place under Leicester's 
government. In order to disentangle that thread it will be helpful to 
make some remarks about the captains' aims and previous policies; the 
manner in which other factors came to affect the situation will become 
apparent in the account of the Leicester period itself. 
Before the captains' programme is discussed attention must be 
given, however, to the historiographical aspect of the Utrecht episode. 
Because of the importance of the town's history, not only for the early 
revolutionary and Leicesterian period but for the Republican era as a 
whole, the situation in Utrecht during the decades immediately following 
its entry into the Revolt has been described by various historians. The 
first systematic analysis was given in Professor Fruin's essay on the 
Leicester era. Fruin explained the events of these years especially 
in terms of the democratic tradition of Utrecht's burghers, a tradition 
which he felt had its origin in pre-Burgundian times. l To clarify his 
thesis a brief outline of the political situation in the Middle Ages 
and the Burgundian era is necessary at this point. 
1 . 
Verspr. Gesehr" Ill, 142f. 
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One of the distinguishing characteristics of Utrecht's medieval 
history was the almost continuous political strife within the city. 
Initially the strife was caused by attacks upon the power of the Bishop, 
Utrecht's temporal ruler. These attacks were organized by the urban 
upper classes in cooperation with the members of the chapter clergy, 
a group that tried to limit the Bishop's powers in order to safeguard 
the autonomy of their colleges. During this earlier period the middle 
and lower classes had partiCipated in the contest, but without 
concluding any permanent alliances. At times they supported the 
Bishop, but on other occasions they took the side of the opposition. 
This situation changed during the second half of the 13th century, when 
the Bishop's political power was declining and the upper classes had 
gained control of the government. From then on the main struggle was 
between the burghers, as organized in their guilds, and the patrician 
families. In this struggle also the opposition was victorious. In 
1304 the guilds gained the power to choose the town magistrate from 
among their own members, a right that was confirmed in 1341. In course 
of time changes were made in the ttconstl tutions" of 1304 and 1341 but, 
barring temporary interruptions, the guilds retained their power for 
I 
over two centuries. 
ISee 1. Vijlbrief, Van Anti-Aristocratie tot Democratie (Amsterdam, 
1950), Chapters I and 11. 
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Their regime was discontinued in 1528 when the Bishop resigned 
his temporal powers over Utrecht to Charles V. The Emperor reduced the 
guilds to their former function, that is to trade organizations, and 
deprived them of all political influence. Henceforth the city government 
was recruited from the urban upper classes and the landed aristocracy. 
These groups did not receive the right, however, to influence the choice 
of the government members. The magistrate, which consisted of forty 
persons (twenty-six Councillors, twelve sheriffs and two burgomasters) 
was annually chosen and appointed by the royal stadholder or his deputy. 
The ruling group nevertheless remained a restricted one. During the 
fifty years of Habsburg rule there were little more than one hundred 
I families whose members served with any regularity on the city Council, 
and it is probable that several of these were interrelated. 
Habsburg dominion over Utrecht ended in 1577. The removal of 
royal control resulted, here as elsewhere, in a highly unstable political 
situation. Deprived of the support of a Spanish governor and of the 
protection of a Spanish garrison, the governing groups once more met 
with opposition to their rule. This time it did not come from the 
guilds; these never recovered their former influence. Th. burgher 
militia, whose captains now organized the opposition, was a comparatively 
recent institution. In the Middle Ages the guilds had possessed military 
IThe lists of Utrecht's magistrates from 1528 onward are printed in 
Johan van de Water, ed., Groat Placaatboek, Ill, 163ff. 
functions, but they had lost these together with their political powers. 
Under Spanish rule the existence of an armed burgher corps was both 
unnecessary and undesirable. But when in 1572 the revolt broke out in 
Holland and Zeeland, the royal stadholder De Bossu found it necessary to 
strengthen Utrecht's defences and in 1573 he established eight burgher 
militia companies, each consisting of two hundred men. A few years after 
Utrecht joined the war it was decided that all ablebodied male citizens 
1 between the ages of eighteen and sixty could be called upon to serve. 
Although by no means every potential militia member favoured the programme 
advocated by the captains, these clearly were able to enlist a large amount 
of support from the city population.· This fact, combined with their military 
power, made them a force which both city magistrate and provincial States 
had to take seriously. 
Before the Habsburg monarchs took control no prOVince or town in 
the northern Netherlands had had a more turbulent history than Utrecht, 
and at least during the latter part of the medieval period many of the 
disturbances were a result of the power contest between the burghers of 
the town and the urban upper classes. These factors account for Professor 
Fruin's attempts to explain the conflicts in Utrecht during the closing 
decades of the 16th century with reference to the town's previous history, 
and for his suggestion that the opposition movement led by the burgher 
captains must be seen as essentially a popular and democratic revolt. 
He further pointed out that this democratic tradition continued to influence 
1 Vijlbrief, PP. 48f. 
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the history of Utrecht, which until the end of the Republican period 
remained the centre of political agitation; the anti-Orangistic, anti-
oligarchic and burgher-democratic movements of the 18th century also had 
1 their main basis in this city. 
It will presently be seen that Fruin's explanation of the late 
16th century partisan situation can not be accepted without qualifications. 
Nevertheless, by drawing attention to the town's late medieval history, he 
did point to a factor that is of unquestionable importance in explaining 
the developments in subsequent centuries. Fruin's interpretation has 
remained the authoritative one. His thesis was worked out in more detail 
by Dr. I. Vijlbrief, who in a doctoral dissertation traced Utrecht's 
2 political history from the early Middle Ages until the end of the Republic. 
Dr. Vijlbrief did object to Fruin's use of the indeed anachronistic term 
"democratic" in describing the poll tical movements led by the aldermen of 
the medieval guilds and by the burgher captains in the late 16th century_ 
In his opinion the term "anti-aristocratic" would be a more appropriate 
one to define their attitudes and goals. 3 He followed Fruin, however, in 
1" ••• De geschiedenls van het Sticht, van de oudste tijden tot op den 
ondergang onzer Republiek, is een gedurige worsteling van de volkspartij 
tegen de geestelijkheid en den adel. Onder allerl.i leuzen wordt die 
strijd gevoerd, nu eenS in vereeniging met de graven van Holland, dan 
weer in verbond met de hertogen van Gelderland, nu eens onder de vlag 
der monarchie, voor Leicester tegen de veelhoofdige regeering der Staten, 
dan weer, in naam der volksvrijheid, voor de patriotsche regenten tagen 
den tyran Willem V: alles verandert met de omstandigheden der wisselende 
tijden, alleen de democratische geest blijft door alle tijden onveranderd 
dezelfde ••• " Fruin, Ope cit., P. 142. 
2Vijlbrief, Ope cit. 
3Ibid., PP. B5f. 
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stressing the continuity and similarities between the pre-Burgundian and 
the revolutionary periods, and it is clear from his account that he also 
considered the 16th century movement primarily in terms of a popular or 
middle class attempt to gain control of the government. 
Other historians have given attention to Utrecht's history before 
and during Leicester's government. Dr. S. Muller, archivist of Utrecht, 
wrote a numbe~ of monographs on the town's medieval history and on 
some of the conflicts between magistrate and burgher captains in the 
1 late 1570's and the early years of the following decade. Of interest 
is also Le Cosquino d. Bussy's work on the negotiations leading up to 
Utrecht's union with Holland and Zealand under the stadholdershlp of 
2 William of Orange. For the Leicester era proper there are Professor 
Rogier's inaugural oration on the relations between Leicester and his 
3 Councillor of State Paul Buys, and the account given by Dr. Broersma 
of the developments in Utrecht during the period of Leicester's 
temporary absence in the winter and spring of 1587.4 the political 
history of Utrecht during these years was influenced by the religious 
changes. Chief among the authors who analyzed the religious scene are 
15. Muller Fzn., Schetsen uit de Middeleeuwen (Amsterdam, 1900); 
Schetsen ui t de Middeleeuwen, Nieuwe Bundel (Amsterdam, 1914); "Het 
oprichten eener Vroedschap te Utrecht", ~, I1 (1879), 73-94. 
2Arthur le Cosquino de Bussy, Het ontstaan der Satisfactie van Utrecht 
(Amsterdam, 1910). 
3L, J. Rogier, Paulus Buys en Leicester (Nijmegen-Utrecht, 1948). 
4 R. Broersema,Het Tusschenbestuur In het Leycestersche Tlldvak (Goe., 
1899), Chapter 11. 
167 
I Professor Royaards and Professor Rogier. The former traced the 
development of the early Calvinist church, the latter described the 
process of protestantization in the city and province. Another study 
containing a description of the religious situation in Utrecht is 
Dr. van Gelder's book on the first decades of the Reformation in the 
2 Netherlands. A detailed account of the conflicts between church and 
state, particularly in connection with the disposal of the church and 
ecclesiastical goods after the prohibition of the Roman Catholic 
3 
religion, has been given by Professor Rengers Hora Siccama. 
There is little factual information to be added to the accounts 
given by these and other authors. This is unfortunate, because more 
than one problem remains unsolved. While a great deal is known about 
the activities of the pressure group led by the militia leaders 
largely because of the minute descriptions given in Bor's chronicles 
there are few indications regarding the captains' social and economic 
background. The archives of the city of Utrecht are disappointingly 
meagre in this respect, and the records of the militia corps·itself do 
IH. J. Royaards, "Proeve eener geschiedenls der Hervorming in de Stad 
en Provincie Utrecht", Archle! voor Kerkel1Jke Geschiedenls, XVI (1845), 
349-357; XVII (1846), 145-288; XVIII (1847), 209-292. L. J. Rogier, 
Geschiedenis van het Katholicisme in Noord-Nederland in de 16. en 17e 
~ (Amsterday, 1947), I, paSSim. 
2H• A. Enno van Gelder, Revolutionnalre Reformat!e (Amsterdam, 1943), 
passim. 
3D• G: Rengers Hora Siccama, GeesteUJke en KerkeU ,ke Goedaran onder 
het Canonieke. het Gereformeerde en het Neutrale Recht (Utrecht, 1905), 
passim. 
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not appear to have survived. It has not been possible, for example, to 
find lists containing the names of all the captains serving after 1576. 
As a result it remains uncertain what proportion of them was recruited 
from the old patriciate, that is from the ruling families of Burgundian 
times. The impression is that at least some were related to these 
families, but that the majority was of a non-patrician background. It 
is probable that this majority belonged to those groups which immediately 
followed the old patriciate in the social scale, but there is no 
certainty on this point. 
Another factor that remains obscure is to what extent the 
mag~strate was able to control the choice of the burgher captains. In 
the late-Burgundian period it presumably was the royal stadholder who 
made the appointments, and according to a statement made by the town 
Council.in 1580 the right belonged at that time to the Prince of Orange. l 
2 The following year it seems to have passed to the magistrate, but in 
1585 it was again the stadholder who appointed the captains, although 
3 from a nomination submitted by the town Council. It is possible that 
this nomination was drawn up in consultation with the captains themselves 
or with their inferior officers. There is evidence that on some occasions 
4 these officers did nominate their captains, but again it is not certain 
1 Bor, 11, 172. 
2GAU, Copieboek K, no. 36. 
3GAU , Raadsnotulen Utrecht, October 9, 29. 1585. 
4~, October 17, 1586; May 1, 1588. 
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whether this was common procedure. It is clear however that the power 
of choosing the captains was not, or at least not always, the magistrate's, 
a factor which no doubt helps to explain its inability to control the 
movement. 
If the conjecture about the captains' social background is 
correct, this might be considered to constitute a factor in support of 
a "burgher-democratic" interpretation of their movement. Assuming that 
in majority they belonged to the politically self-conscious middle 
classes, which for half a century had been excluded from active 
participation in political affairs, it would appear logical that they 
should have tried to procure the burgher element with access to and 
control over the government, and one of the means to achieve this was 
the introduction of an elective system. Nevertheless, the available 
evidence gives no strong support to such an interpretation. Although 
on one occasion during the pre-Leicesterian decade they appear to have 
suggested that provision be made for burgher influence upon the 
I 
magistrate's choice, this device seems to have been considered only as 
a last resort; there are no indications that the demand was an integral 
part of their programme in these years. On the whole the captains, 
whose concern was less with constitutional than with practical political 
matters, tried to achieve their goals by what might be called centralist 
means, that is by reliance on the stadholder. When the stadholder (or 
I Vijlbrief, p. SO. 
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the central government) gave them the desired support they were, as the 
first year of Meurs' government and the Leicester period show, well 
content to abide by the existing semi-oligarchic system. 
If the opposition does not seem to have displayed any great 
anxiety to change the system of government, the captains did demand that 
their opinions in affairs of state be considered by the Regents. They 
referred to themselves as the tribunes of the people and never ceased 
their attempts to persuade States and magistrates that these recognize 
them as such. It will become apparent that in these endeavours they 
did not refrain from using the forceful approach. In various instances 
the captains' or their allies' demands for political and religious 
reforms were preceded and underlined by iconoclastic outbursts or other 
popular commotions. While it is improbable that all these disturbances 
were incited by the captains themselves, these often failed to display 
undue haste in quieting the populace. On many occasions the turmoils 
did not cease until the government had promised to consider the 
opposition's requests and proposals. 
The militia leaders' poUtlcal ambitions and evident upopularismlt 
notwithstanding, there are reasons to suggest that at least for the 
years now under discussion care should be taken not only in qualifying 
the opposition movement as a democratic revolt, but also as essentially 
an anti-aristocratic one. Although it derived its main strength from 
the city population, the movement was supported by native patriCians 
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and noblemen, while most of the southern exiles who under Leicester 
were among the leaders also belonged to the upper classes. The 
composition of the magistrates chosen by the Count of Meurs, whose 
appointment in 1585 inaugurated the three-year period of the opposition's 
ascendancy, and those established by Leicester, also fails to indicate 
that there was a drastic levelling process at work; all three Councils 
contained members of both the nobility and (although to a much smaller 
2 degree than previously) the old burgher patrician families. The chief 
test then applied in the selection of government members was apparently 
not whether they belonged to the middle or the upper classes, but 
whether they were willing to advance the opposition's programme. 
Furthermore, while a comparison of the situation existing in 
the Middle Ages or the late 18th century with that of the early 
revolutionary years suggests various parallels, the movement as led by 
the burgher captains must be explained first of all with reference to 
the special characteristics of their own period. In the years 1586 and 
1587 the issue was complicated first of all by the fact that the 
opposition advanced the governor general's programme. Leicester 
symbolized English aid and he represented the ideal of an independent 
1prominent'among this second group were Reynier van Aeswijn, Seigneur 
van Brakel, Lubbert van Parijs van Suydoort and Johan van Meerle, who 
were to form the Leicesterian faction within the second estate, which 
in Utrecht was formed by the rural nobility. ARA, Loketkas Loopende 
59; Remonstrance of Utrecht'. nobility to the States General, October 
17, 1587. 
2See for the names of these government members Van de Water, Ill, 176. 
I 
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federal government at a time when the inadequacies of the confederate 
system had become obvious. These two circumstances were of special 
importance in a frontier province like Utrecht and may well have earned 
the movement the goodwill and support of people who had maintained a 
neutral attitude in the domestic conflict. There were other factors, 
which applied not only to the Leicester period but also to the preceding 
decade, Among these were the religious changes, and the problems and 
disagreements resulting from the fact that adherence to the old faith 
was in the eyes of many non-Catholics synonymous with a pro-Spanish 
attitude. In addition there were the conflicts between church and 
state, the differences concerning the liquidation of the political 
powers and the redistribution of the material possessions of the Roman 
Catholic clergy, and a variety of other questions. Connected with a 
number of these was what gave rise to some of the major political 
conflicts: the strong rivalry between city and rural areas. While it 
is true that this issue, as well as some of those mentioned before, had 
earlier affected the political situation and continued to affect it in 
later years, they were nevertheless of special importance in this 
transitional period. The accounts of the late 16th century situation 
in Utrecht leave room for the suggestion that in their attacks upon the 
municipal and provincial ruling groups the captains were inspired as 
much by the desire to provide for a government whose members were willing 
to adopt the opposition'S "solution" to these various problems, as by any 
anti-oligarchic or anti_aristocratic feelings as such. 
173 
11 
The burgher captains and their associates have not left a 
systematic programme of their aims, most of which will consequently 
have to be inferred from their activities. Although the scope of this 
work makes it impossible to recount these in detail, it is necessary 
to consider the main trends in Utrecht's history during the first 
revolutionary decade. This can be done by means' of a brief discussion 
of the religious changes in the city, of the opposition's relations 
with the magistrate, and of their disagreements with the first two 
members of the provincial States, the ecclesiastics and the rural 
nobility. Such a discussion will show, among other things, that one 
of the opposition's long-term goals was to change the composition of 
the governments inherited from Burgundian times, to establish a municipal 
and provincial patriciate in which the urban element was strengthened, 
the influence of the rural nobility reduced and that of the Roman 
Catho1lc clergy ended, and, in the process, to deliver the city from 
its domination by the rural areas. It might be added that when this 
goal is kept in mind their revolt invites comparison with that which 
had taken place in Holland, when in 1572 the latter province had begun 
to shake off the Spanish yoke. There also it had tended to bring about 
a change in the personnel of the existing oligarchies to the advantage 
of the urban (and thus the burgher) and the Reformed element, but it 
had neither resulted in the complete exclusion of the aristocracy nor 
had it led to any drastiC changes in the system of government. 
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The first issue to be considered is the religious one. In order 
to describe the changes in this field it is necessary to go back to the 
year 1577, when Utrecht joined Holland and Zeeland. The previous year 
the province had accepted the Pacification of Ghent. One of the 
provisions of this agreement was that the areas which had formerly 
belonged to the Prince of Orange's government were to reaccept him as 
the King's stadholder once they had joined the Pacification. They did 
not have to surrender unconditionally but were free to state their 
terms, a safeguard that was necessary especially for religious reasons, 
because the areas in question were predominantly Roman Catholic. When 
agreement was reached a contract was to be drawn up and signed by both 
parties. This document was referred to as a "Satisfaction". The 
provision appears to have been intended for the towns in Holland and 
Zeeland which in 1576 were still Spanish, such as Amsterdam, Haarlem 
1 
and Goes. Some, including the Prince himself, maintained that it 
applied also to Utrecht, which had been under hls government until 
1568. This claim aroused a certain amount of opposition in Utrecht and 
a great deal in Brussels, but eventually the Prince and the Orangists 
of Utrecht won the day. On October 7th 1577 the province accepted the 
2 Satisfaction. 
lLe Cosquino de Bussy, PP. 45, ,87f. 
2 For the negotiations see ~, passim. 
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In 1577 Utrecht was almost solidly Roman Catholic, and its States 
had no intention to prepare the way, through their union with Calvinist 
Holland and Zeeland, for the introduction of protestantism. The 
maintenance of the religious establishment had been one of their 
conditions for accepting William of Orange as stadholder. The Prince 
had promised to uphold the rights of the Roman Catholic church, be it 
1 in less definite terms than the States required. His promise proved 
to be no safeguard against the introduction of religious changes, nor 
did it long prevent the formal victory of the new faith. Three years 
after the union the public exercise of the Roman Catholic religion had, 
in spite of the stadholder's endeavours, been forbidden in the city and 
province of Utrecht. 
This development was hastened by organized popular pressure 
upon the government. The word "popular" must in this connection not be 
taken in its broadest sense. In Utrecht as in the other provinces the 
vanguard of the anti-Catholic movement was formed by the CalVinists, 
who constituted in 1580, and for many years tO,come, onlY,a very small 
minority.2 But while the Calvinists could not count on the sympathy of 
the population as a whole, the effectiVeness of the popular disturbances 
in favour of their programme suggests that they must have had the support 
of numerous non-Calvinists. they also enjoyed the aid of the burgher 
1 . Le Cosquino de Bussy, p. 227. 
2H• A. Enno van Celder, PP. 105f. 
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captains. There is no certainty about the captains' religious 
affiliation. Their anti-Catholic attitude shows that they must have 
broken with the old church, but it is not clear whether they had joined 
the Calvinist one. Their policies would appear to suggest this; yet it 
does not seem very probable that all or most of the militia leaders 
should have been recruited from this very restricted religious group. 
But whether or not the captains subscribed to the Calvinists' religious 
ideals, they did share their violently anti-Spanish attitude and their 
distrust of the Roman Catholics' political sympathies, as well as their 
pronounced anti-clerical ism. 
This last factor is of importance in explaining the religious 
changes and many of the political conflicts. Anti-clerical feelings 
came naturally to a city like Utrecht. It had for centuries been the 
seat of the Bishop, whose spiritual jurisdiction extended over most of 
the territory belonging to the northern provinces. Although early in 
the 16th century the Bishop had lost his temporal powers over Utrecht, 
the clergy continued to hold a strong position in the province and 
dominated its political and economic life to a considerable extent. 
Their influence had increased when in 1577 much of the power formerly 
exercised by the King passed to the States, for the clergy, represented 
by the members of the five collegiate or chapter churches in the city, 
occupied the first place in this assembly. The nobility formed the 
second estate, and the city with the four smaller towns (Amersfoort, 
Rhenen Montfoort and Wijk_bij-Duurstede) the third. , 
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The church's influence in the provincial government formed, for 
reasons that shall later be discussed, one source of irritation to the 
city population. The social and economiC privileges of the chapter 
clergy constituted a second. When the Roman Catholic church was still 
in power the chapters had, for example, their own jurisdiction, their 
members were free from military duties, and they enjoyed freedom from 
local taxation. These and similar privileges had already in the Middle 
I Ages begun to arouse opposition. In attacking them the Calvinists and 
the burgher captains executed a popular programme. 
The first effective assault upon the power of the Roman Catholic 
church took place shortly after the Satisfaction had been accepted. In 
the course of 1577 Herbert Du1fhuis, pastor of the St. Jacob's church, 
had begun to introduce reformed elements into his services and sermons, 
without however officially breaking with the Roman Catholic church. He 
had the approval of the magistrate, but the deans of the five chapters 
objected to his innovations and asked the government that it order the 
priest to reconform to the old system. Hereupon Duifhuis left the town. 
His followers and sympathizers blamed the ecclesiastics' attitude on 
pressure by the Franciscans or Minorltes, an order that was already 
suspect because of lts inltial refusal to swear the oath of obedience 
2 
to stadholder and States General. Through the burgher captains they 
IS. Muller Fzn., Schetsen uit de Middeleeuwen, pp. 161f. 
2RoyaardS, Arch1ef, XVII, 152-154. 
178 
required the magistrate to expel the order. The Council complied and 
it also decided, shortly later, to recall Duifhuis. In August 1578 the 
latter returned to his old parish, which henceforth he was to serve as 
1 
a reformed minister. He did not, however, institute a Calvinist 
church. For years the Duifhuis group refused the requests of the 
CalVinists to join them. It was not until 1586 that with Leicester's 
help the Calvinists finally reached their goal. 
In August 1578 the Calvinists had not yet been recognized, nor 
had they received a church for their meetings. Duifhuis' victory 
encouraged them to ask the magistrate for the use of a building. When 
the government delayed its decision they proceeded to seize the now 
empty church of the Minorites. Their official recognition followed 
five months later, in January 1579, when the magistrate introduced a 
Religionsfrieden in Utrecht. It superseded the religious settlement 
of the Satisfaction and legalized the existing situation; the Reformed 
were offically allowed the exercise of their religion in the St. Jacob's 
and Minorite churches. This ordinance, which had not been accepted by 
the ecclesiastics, failed to bring the desired peace. It took a number 
of popular demonstrations, the expUlsion (at the burgher captains' 
suggestion) of the Dominican order, and a widespread iconoclastic attack 
before the five chapters agreed to join discussions about the Religious 
Peace. These discussions were held in the presence of delegates from 
lRoyaardS, Archief, XVII, 159-176; Bor, 11, 830f. 
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the burgher militia, a measure that was considered necessary "to prevent 
all distrust". The new regulation, which was more favourable to the 
protestants than the previous one had been, was introduced in June 1579. 1 
The Catholics' ultimate defeat came less than a year later. One 
of the immediate causes was the defection of the Roman Catholic Count 
Rennenberg, stadholder of Groningen, Friesland and Drenthe, an event that 
caused an anti-Catholic revolt throughout the provinces. In Utrecht the 
news was greeted with another iconoclastic outburst. Protestants and 
their sympathizers, organized in militia companies, presented themselves 
before the magistrate to request, among other things, that the public 
exercise of the Roman Catholic religion be forbidden. The Council agreed 
on condition that the stadholder gave his approval. The Prince tried to 
rescue the Religious Peace, but the Council nevertheless issued the 
prohibition. Not long thereafter the States of Utrecht made a similar 
2 decree with respect to the rest of the province. 
This decision did not end the politico-religious disagreements 
in Utrecht. Insofar as the attack on the religious establishment had 
been inspired by the desire to limit the power of the chapter clergy, 
the results of the revolution of 1580 were disappointing. The reform 
groups had expected that the Colleges would be dissolved, their members 
put on a pension, and their goods used for public purposes. This had 
lRengers Hora Siccama, pp. 217f, 220f t 237-239; Royaards, Archief t 
XVII, 193f t 210-219. 
2Rengers Hora Siccama, pp. 247-252, 262f; Royaards, Archief, XVII, 
237-242. 
been the ecclesiastics' fate in other provinces. In Utrecht they did 
lose some of their privileges and they were further forced to contribute 
1 
an annual sum for the maintenance of the Reformed clergy. They were, 
however, left in the possession of their estates, continued to exist as 
a separate group, and retained their political status. As shall later 
be seen these factors were to give rise to further controversy between 
government and opposition. 
Although there was constant friction between the town Council 
and the Calvinists, the magistrate does not seem to have been opposed 
to a gradual process of protestantization; by far the strongest 
objections to the religious innovations came from the first estate, 
which was usually supported by the nobility. The more spectacular 
conflicts between magistrate and opposition took place in the purely 
political field. Among the causes of disagreement were the captains' 
requests that they be consulted by the municipal and the provincial 
governments in matters of state. These demands were made on more than 
one occasion, but never in more definite terms or with greater 
persistence than in the summer of 1583. At that time the captains 
motivated their request by mentioning a number of special grievances. 
One of these was concerned with the negotiations that were being held 
with the Prince of Orange regarding his establishment as Count of 
1 Rengers Hora Siccama, PP. 28lf. 
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Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht. According to the captains the provincial 
States proposed to place severe restrictions upon the Prince's authority, 
restrictions that were intended to safeguard and extend the privileges of 
the nobles and ecclesiastics, rather than those of the burghers. The 
demand that in these and other questions (they also mentioned the 
States' financial administration and their defence policy) the militia 
leaders' advice be asked was underlined by what the Council's resolutions 
1 
referred to as the "Great Commotion", a disturbance that came indeed 
close to an actual popular revolt. The captains nevertheless failed to 
achieve their purpose, partly because the magistrate was supported by 
the first two estates, partly because of the stadholder's and the 
2 States General's intervention. 
A second source of conflict between magistrate and captains ~ere 
the latter,s ~ equally pers is ten t attempts to prevent the ruling group 
from excluding the stadholder's influence upon the establishment of the 
town Council. To describe these attempts it is again necessary to go 
back to the year 1577. It has been seen that in Burgundlan times the 
municipal government was recruited from the upper classes, but that 
these had no direct influence on the choice of the magistrate members. 
During the negotiations with the Prince of Orange about the Satisfaction 
the patriciate had not neglected to bargain for an extension of its 
lGAU , Raadsnotulen, August 20 1583. 
, . 
2 Bor, 11, 379.392. 
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influence. It probably used the situation in the towns of Holland as 
an example. There the municipal patriciate or vroedschap either chose 
the magistrate on its own authority, or it had the right to suggest 
names to the stadholder, who in appointing the government was bound to 
these nominations. The members of Utrecht's ruling group desired a 
similar arrangement. They had hoped that the stadholder would allow 
the introduction of a "Hereditary Council" (that is one whose members 
sat for life and that kept itself complete by co-optation) or else, if 
the magistrate was to be renewed each year, that he would at least agree 
to follow the magistrate's nomination. Neither of these wishes was 
granted. The Satisfaction provided that the stadholder would annually 
elect the fortY,members of the town government from a list of one 
hundred persons. This list would include the names of the men serving 
on the existing Council, of forty others nominated by them, and of another 
twenty whom the stadholder himself would choose. He thus received the 
power to fill half the government with his own nominees, and there was 
no guarantee that these would be acceptable to the ruling group. The 
magistrate hesitated to incur the risk and neglected to submit the 
1 
nominations when the appropriate time had come. 
This delay roused the leaders of the militia corps. These had 
been gaining political influence prior to the negotiations about the 
union with the maritime provinces. In their attempts to draw Utrecht 
lS. Muller FZ~.t ~, 11, 7Sf. 
into the war after the Perpetual Edict had been violated the States of 
Holland had on a number of occasions addressed themselves to the anti-
1 Spanish militia leaders. The captains' influence within the city appears 
from the fact that the magistrate delegated one of their members, Jan van 
Leemputt, to sign the Satisfaction on the town's behalf. The captains 
favoured the provision regarding the stadholder's right of nomination, 
and when the magistrate gave the impression that it planned to boycott 
the Satisfaction on this point, they stepped in and demanded that the 
nominations be submitted. The Council then proceeded, but resolved to 
ask the stadholder that he relinquish his right of adding the twenty 
2 
names. Similar attempts to persuade him to change the regulations were 
made later, but the Prince, who preferred to keep a voice in the 
establishment of the town's government, refused to give his consent. 
After the Prince's death the ruling groups seemed to be 
more successful, at least for a time. In the autumn of 1584 Josse de 
Vi1liers, Seigneur de Soete, became stadholder of Utrecht. His 
instructions provided that he was to establish the Council with the 
3 States' advice and further in the same manner as the Prince had done. 
The magistrate however, supported by Floris Thin, Advocate of the States, 
persuaded Villiers to allow the introduction of a Hereditary Council. 
1 Bor, I, 696f, 698f, 699f. 
~uller, ~, 11, 76f. 
3van de Water Groot Placaatboek, I, 159f. t 
The town acquired the College of States' Deputies' approval for this 
measure on January 8th 1585, when the new Council was established, but 
the States themselves withheld their sanction. This was not done 
because they disagreed with the Council's endeavours to consolidate 
its powers within the city; in its struggle with the opposition the 
magistrate found its staunchest allies in the first and second estate. 
The States' objections to the Hereditary Council are to be explained 
by their wish to retain the influence upon the establishment of the 
magistrate to which they as sovereigns felt entitled, and for which 
they had made proviSions in Villiers' instructions. Because of 
States' obstruction, and also because of fear for unrest within the 
town, the Council agreed the following October to discontinue the 
new system. The Count of Heurs, who replaced Villiers when in the 
summer of 1585 the latter was taken prisoner by Spanish troops, 
established the magistrate in the accustomed manner. l 
Al though the old patriciate held the upper hand in the Council 
throughout the Prince of Orange's stadholdership, the governor's right 
of nomination no doubt had some influence upon the composition of the 
government. The changes made by him were not revolutionary, but a few 
1 Muller, R~1G, 11, 78-84, 88. 
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1 
"new men" were chosen as early as 1577. Among these was Jan van Leemputt. 
The burgher captains had been introduced into the magistrate and they 
were to retain their foothold in following years. While this implied 
a victory for the opposition, it is not certain that the members of the 
ruling group objected to the appointment of some captains as Councillors. 
By having the militia leaders as government members they would be able 
to control them and their movement at least to some extent. This same 
consideration may have been one of the reasons why in course of time 
there came objections to the duplication of functions from the side of 
the people. In 1580, at the time of one of the popular disturbances, 
they required that provision be made for the appointment of new captains 
to replace those who served on the Council,2 and the following year it 
was agreed that the number of captains to be chosen to the magistrate 
would be Umi ted to two or three, "so that the gemeen ten might be 
better served" by their officers. 3 Perhaps this was the real reason 
10f the forty members apPointed in November of that year twelve had served 
on the previous magistrate and another sixteen or eighteen belonged to the 
old patrician families (cf. Van de Water, 111, 174). The names of the 
remaining members do not occur on previous magistrates' lists. The 
majority of this latter group consisted probably of "new men", although 
it Is possible that some were related to the old families. In the 
following six years the average number of men whose names can be found 
in pre_revolutionary magistrates' lists was between twenty-two and 
twenty-four. It would of course be wrong to deduce from these figures 
the relative strength of the conservative and the reform groups. The 
fact that the old families had not been completely excluded from the 
Councils chosen between 1585 and 1588 suggests that at least some members 
of the Burgundian patriciate favoured the opposition's programme, while 
some of the new men chosen to the magistrate may well have strengthened 
the conservative element. 
2 . Bar, lIt 172. 
3Ibid., p. 281. 
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for the objections, for even when in 1585 stadholder Meurs appointed a 
Council that was more acceptable to the opposition than any previous one 
had been, there is no appearance of a change of policy in this respect; 
no active captains served on the Council established in October of that 
1 year. 
One concluding remark should be made in connection with the 
captains' attacks upon the magistrate. It has been suggested earlier 
in this chapter that their movement was perhaps less strongly opposed 
to the oligarchic system than is sometimes supposed. Their attempt to 
prevent the patriciate from introducing a vroedschap or Hereditary 
Council does suggest an anti-oligarchic tendency, but it is necessary 
to consider the opportunistic character of their policies. In limiting 
the powers of the ruling group the opposition tried to increase not 
only its own, but also the stadholder's influence. This second aim is 
understandable. -M?st groups that found themselves on the wrong side of 
the power fence worked for the strengthening of the stadholder's or the 
central government's authority, in the hope that it might form a 
counterbalance against that of their domestic opponents. Utrecht's 
subsequent history shows, however, that the leaders of the opposition 
had no strenuous objections to the vroedschap system in itself. Early 
in the following century, when they had gained a victory over their 
opponents and when they had come to realize that the fruits of this 
1 He had appointed four, but chose new men to serve in their place as 
burgher captains. GAU, Raadsnotulen, October 9, 22, 158'. 
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victory could best be preserved if the magistrate's choice was entrusted 
wholly to the magistrate, they required the establishment of a Hereditary 
Council. l If the Leicester period had lasted they would probably have 
demanded it earlier. A preliminary step was in fact taken in February 
1588, when Meurs was given a new commission which provided that in 
establishing the government he was no longer allowed to elect one half 
of its members on his own authority; the entire Council was to be 
2 
chosen from the magistrate's nomination. 
The captains' attempts against the magistrate must be seen in 
connection wi th their larger programme of destroying the remnants of 
clerical and Roman Catholic influence in the government, and of reducing 
that of the rural nobility. Tha preceding discussion has made it clear 
that it is not possible to force both these issues entirely into the 
single category of the rivalry between city and rural areas; yet this 
factor strongly influenced the opposition's attitUde not only towards 
the nobles, but also towards the clergy. Although the nobility held 
only one of the three seats in the provincial States, the rural element 
was stronger than the urban. One of the reasons was that there had 
always been a close connection between the first two estates. In Utrecht 
as elsewhere the ecclesiastics were often recruited from the nobility, 
I Muller, ~, 11, 88-91. 
2Van de Water, I, 162, art. XVIII. 
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and because of the considerable landed wealth possessed by the chapter 
clergy, the two groups also had a common interest as landowners. The 
landed aristocracy as representative of the rural areas held, in other 
words, two votes in the assembly while the towns together possessed only 
one. In fact the position of the former group was even stronger. During 
the first years of the Revolt the four smaller towns appear to have been 
under the control of the nobility or the church; in the conflict that 
broke out in 1582 about the dismissal of the first estate (about which 
more will be said presently) they took the side of the nobles and 
eccleSiastics. These had some influence even in the city government. 
Since 1584 they had required the stadholder to consider the States' 
advice in establishing the magistrates,l but it appears from earlier 
magistrates' lists that already before this time it was common procedure 
to appoint some nobles to the Council. Members of the urban patriciate 
itself were, moreover, bound by class interests, and in some cases 
probably by ties of blood, to both the country nobility and the 
ecclesiastics. 
The members of the opposition conceived of two means to bring 
about a more equitable division of power. The first was to replace 
those Councillors who wished to maintain, or else tended to acquiesce 
in, the town's subordinate position. The other was the dismissal of 
the first estate, which in their opinion had become superfluous after 
lThis provision occurred not only in Villiers' instructions but a180 in 
those of Meurs. Van de Water, I, 159, art. XIX. 
139 
the dissolution of the Roman Catholic church. The wish to establish the 
town's independence was, as has been seen, not the only reason for the 
captains' agitation against the ecclesiastics. Another consideration 
had to do with the disposal of their property, while still a third 
argument was that many of the chapter members were Roman Catholic and 
therefore potentially pro-Spanish. This was one of the points on which 
some satisfaction was received In 1582 when the captains -- again after 
the outbreak of a popular disturbancel -- tried to force the issue by 
pressing the city magistrate to pass a decree for the dismissal of the 
first estate. In that year the stadholder and the four towns joined 
with the nobles and ecclesiastic., and the first estate continued to 
exist, but the captains' move resulted in some rearrangements restricting 
the'clergy's influence. The five chapters were no longer allowed to 
concern themselves with political questions and also lost the right to 
select their own delegates to the provincial assembly. The members of 
the first estate were henceforth chosen by the City, the nobles and the 
towns: the city nominated ten or twelve chapter members, and the nobles 
with the four towns elected six or eight from thls nomination. The 
chosen ones were obliged to renounce their allegiance to the papacy and 
to Spain, and they were not allowed to communicate their own or the 
2 States' resolutions to the other members of the chapter clergy. 
IThis time it was occasioned by Jean Jaureguy's attempt to assassinate 
the Prince of Orange. Van de Water, I, pp. l83f. 
2 ,." 
Ibid" PP. 182.185. 
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This arrangement removed some of the objections, but it was no 
more than a compromise and it failed to satisfy the opposition. The 
first estate remained the representative of a landed aristocracy and 
the ecclesiastical goods continued to be at the disposal of a small 
privileged circle, that is of the Regent group. Endeavours to prepare 
the way for another and more successful attack upon the first estate 
were to be renewed under Leicester, and the attack itself was to give 
rise to the last of the four or five "great controversies" occurring 
during the first year.of his government. 
III 
When Leicester came to Utrecht his future partisans were in the 
ascendancy. The previous autumn the burgher captains had succeeded in 
forcing the States to appoint the Calvinist Count of Meurs to the 
1 
stadholderate, who chose a magistrate that appears to have contained 
a substantial number of men agreeable to the reform party and that went 
to considerable lengths in accommodating the opposition. If Leicester 
had restrained his own zeal and the impatience of his followers, and if 
he had not been tempted to use his influence in Utrecht for the execution 
of his private programmes, he might have managed to consolidate their 
position. In that case he would have done the province a service. On 
the whole the opposition's grievances were justified and if they had 
been redressed in time many of the sources of future conf1ic·t would have 
I Se. above, p. 89. 
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been removed. As it was, Leicester merely led his partisans through a 
brief period of victory to an almost total eclipse; the fate that 
awaited most of his too zealous supporters. In the case of Utrecht this 
was not so because they were in a minority position. The course and the 
protractedness of the struggle suggest that the two groups were more or 
less equally balanced. The main cause of the opposition's ultimate 
defeat was that their success constituted a danger to the States of the 
other provinces as well, a factor which induced the Regents of Holland 
to come to the rescue of their threatened brethren in Utrecht. Once 
Leicester had left the country this aid was to change the balance of 
power decisively to the opposition's disadvantage. 
Fatal as it was to his partisans, and to his own career, 
Leicester's alliance with the opposition group was of course not 
surprising. The failure of his commercial and financial measures had 
made it clear that he would either have to relinquish his own claims to 
independent power or put pressure upon the States so that they 
relinquished theirs. Having decided upon the latter course he had no 
choice but to rely on whatever anti-States' forces there were and to 
reward them by promoting their policies. In various cases these policies 
were his own. The system whereby the States retained their powers of 
government implied a continuation of the "provincialism" which Leicester, 
with reason, felt to be one of the major obstacles to the execution of a 
national defence programme. Although the opposition in Utrecht had never 
been anxious to weaken the autonomy of its own province it was now (in 
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the case of many of its members no doubt largely for opportunistic 
reasons) willing to give its support to a programme of centralization. 
It further sympathized with Leicester's endeavours to counteract, by the 
promotion of southern eXiles to political offices, the States' policy of 
excluding Brabant and Flanders from the confederacy. States' opposition 
was soon to prevent him from employing exiles in the Council of State or 
other central government departments, but so long as the city of Utrecht 
remained under the control of the Leicesterian faction it allowed the 
southerners to participate in its government. Still a third aspect of 
Leicesterts administration that can not be explained merely by narrow 
partisan conSiderations was his religious policy. As leader of the 
Puritan_interventionist party he was naturally drawn to the CalVinists, 
and he never doubted that the strengthening of this strongly anti-Spanish 
element was a necessary condition for a successful conclusion of the war. 
The first instance of his direct involvement in the domestic 
affairs of Utrecht took place at the request of the Calvinists. In other 
provinces this church was the only recognized one but in Utrecht, as has 
been seen, It had been forced to share this posltlon with another 
reformed church, the Duifhuis or St. Jacob's group. The latter 
distlnguished ltself from the Calvinlsts by a broad confeSSion, the 
absence of dlsclpllnary rules, and pronounced Erastlan sympathies. 
These characteristiCS had earned it the goodwill of the Regents, whose 
support had so far enabled it to resist theCalvlnlsts' demands that 
it join their fold. The Calvinists, on the other hand, had had some 
1~ 
support from the stadholder. The Prince of Orange probably sympathized 
with both the doctrinal and the Erastian views of the St. Jacob's group. 
Nevertheless, when in 1581 Duifhuis died, leaving a successor who seemed 
less strongly opposed to a union with the Calvinist church, he appears 
to have suggested to the government of Utrecht that perhaps the time had 
come to make an agreement acceptable to the Calvinists and so to end the 
1 divisions. Unity among the protestants was desirable, and the Calvinists' 
national strength alone made it inevitable that a union would have to be 
in accordance with their rules. The magistrate however disagreed, and 
the Prince's suggestions were ignored. It fell to Leicester to implement 
them. 
He did so on April 26th, a few weeks after his arrival in Utrecht. 
At the suggestion of stadholder Meurs he invited the ministers of the two 
churches, as well as representatives of States and magistrate, to a 
conference at his own residence. This conference produced or was 
presented with an Act of Union, which was at the same time a Church Order 
for the city of Utrecht. States and magistrate accepted the act, although 
not without reluctance. Two of the three ministers serving the St. Jacob's 
church also agreed to sign the articles, but the majority of its members 
opposed the union; only a small number joined the Calvinist church. 2 
lRoyaards, Archief, XVII, 277f; XVIII, 280. 
20uring 1586 the Calvinist church increased with 226 adult members. The 
average annual increase in adult membership over the previous five years 
had been 120. Cf. Royaards, Archlef,XVlIl, 272f. 
The hostility of his former parishoners induced one of the ministers to 
leave Utrecht. The other remained, to be dismissed in 1589, together 
with his Calvinist colleagues, at the request of the still revengeful 
1 St. Jacobites. 
The religious division coincided with the political one, and 
Leicester's decision in favour of the Calvinists probably had the effect 
of establishing him as early as April in the eyes of both groups as the 
opposition's ally. Politically the scene remained quiet until the end 
of June, when the burgher captains, under the impression of Leicester's 
political and military defeats, began to agitate for a renewal of the 
offer of sovereignty to the Queen. Their agitation took the form of a 
request to the States that they offer it on Utrecht's behalf, on less 
restrictive conditions than those which had accompanied the previous 
presentation, and that they try to persuade the other provinces to make 
a similar gesture. The magistrates of the five towns signed their 
petition, but the first and second estates appear to have ignored It and 
the captains' attempts to incite towns in other provinces to tollow their 
2 
example were unsuccessful. These endeavours, which did not fail to 
3 
annoy the States, were probably made in anticipation of Leicester's 
IFor the relations between the Calvinists and the St. Jacob's church,' 
and for the procedure followed in uniting the two groups, see Bor, 11, 
830.840, and Royaards, Archief, XVII and XVIII, passim. 
2 Bor, 11, 723f. 
31t was one of the grievances mentioned by the States of the three 
western provinces in the discussion of their remonstrance of November 11, 
1586. See below, p. 239. 
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wishes. Although he had little enough cause to expect that Elizabeth 
would accept the sovereignty he continued to urge the course upon her 
and needed evidence that the country still shared his opinion. The 
normal procedure, which he followed the next autumn, would of course 
have been to ask the States General to repeat the offer. It is probable 
therefore that in June he was inspired first of all by the wish to 
provide a proof of the people's pro-English attitude and thereby to 
1 bolster his own position in the States' eyes. 
The agitation on the sovereignty issue was an intelligible and 
a comparatively innocent move. The same can hardly be said of the next 
"incident" taking place in Utrecht. This was the imprisonment of the 
Councillor of State Paul Buys, an act which the burgher captains 
perpetrated, again in conformity with the governor's wishes, in the 
second half of July. Leicester's relations with this Councillor, and 
the causes of the conflicts between the two men, have often been 
2 described and need not be recounted here at any length. Buys had been 
Advocate of the States of Holland from 1572 until 1584, but held no 
government position when Leicester arrived. He had always been a 
champion of cooperation with England rather than France, and the decision 
taken by Holland in .the autumn of 1584 to offer the SOVereignty to 
Henry 111 had been one of the reasons why he resigned his office of 
IFruin, Verspr. Geschr., Ill, 175. 
2The most detailed accounts are to be found in W. van Everdingen, Het 
.Ieven van Mr. Paulus Buys (Leiden, 1895), Chapter IV, and in L. J.---
Rogier's earlier-mentioned work Paulus Buys en Leicester. 
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Advocate. It was not the only one, however. In his work on Buys' 
career under Leicester Professor Rogier has shown that the relations 
between States and Advocate had long been strained, and that the 
disagreement on foreign policy in 1584 was perhaps no more than the 
I proverbial last straw. 
Buys had represented his native province of Utrecht during the 
treaty negotiations in London in the summer of 1585. As the ~cknowledged 
leader of the English party he enjoyed more goodwill in England than any 
other Dutch statesman. Leicester also had considered him to be one of 
his main protagonists, and Buys was among the members whom in January 
1586 he had appointed to the Council without States' nomination. 2 Buys 
apparently seconded his endeavours to induce the States to give him 
more extensive powers than suggested in the Act of Authority, and for 
a while Leicester continued to sing his Councillor's praises. 3 Before 
long his reports on him became less enthusiastic, however. One of the 
reasons of the growing disagreement was no doubt that the personalities 
of the two men were too similar. Like Leicester, Buys was ambitious, 
tactless and domineering; a man, according to Leicester himself, "who 
could not be content unless he ruled all".4 Another factor was that 
Buys' attitude in the domestic conflict in Utrecht, as well as his 
1 Paulus Buys, ,p. 8. 
2See above, p. 106. 
3 Bruce, pp. 47, 74. 
'. . . 
4·" . ~, pp. 311, 372; Cal. For., XXI, ii, p. 38. 
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religious sympathies, had earned him the hatred of the opposition groups 
in that city. These undoubtedly did not neglect to warn the governor 
against the religious aberrations of his Councillor. Leicester's 
qualifications of Buys as "a villain, an atheist, a friend and bolsterer 
1 
of papists", were probably a reflection of these accusations. 
It is unlikely, however, that Leicester's dislike of his 
Councillor's political and religious leanings alone would have led to 
Buys' imprisonment. Buys' own policies kindled the governor's discontent, 
and make it understandable that Leicester desired his riddance. Buys was 
more outspokenly critical of Leicester's government than befitted a 
Councillor, and he apparently saw no harm In intriguing against him and 
his authority both among the Dutch politicians and among army leaders 
2 
such as Hohenlohe and his followers. He undoubtedly invited his own 
fate. It was inevitable that he should have objected to various of 
Leicester's measures, but there was nothing to be gained by his open 
opposition and secret intrigue, and it will always remain a question 
why he did not accept the consequences of his untelable pOSition under 
I 
Leicester by offering his reSignation, the course he had followed when 
he found himself in disagreement with the States of Holland. 
Among the causes of Buys' oPPosition to the governor was probably 
his suspicion of the Queen's pacifism. No less important a factor was, 
lBruce, pp. 130, 291, 303, 312. 
2 Rogier, Paulus Buys, p. 18. 
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as suggested, Leicester's own approach, and especially his choice of 
advisers. An upholder of the political status qUO, an opponent of 
"popularhm" in any shape or form, and an Erastian of strong anti-
Calvinist leanings, Buys could have no peace with the governor's reliance 
on southerners, Calvinists and other opposition groups. He probably also 
criticized Leicester's endeavours to make the central government entirely 
independent of the States. It is true that this is no longer the 
generally accepted opinion. In his study on Paul Buys Professor Rogier 
has portrayed the ex-Advocate of Holland as an extreme centralist, who 
in backing Leicester's demands for additional powers had been inspired 
by the wish to procure for himself a dominant pOSition in the central 
government, to promote the cause of "the generall ty" against the 
particularism of Holland, and by these means to revenge himself upon 
1 his former employers. this characteristic does much to clarify Buys' 
position under the English governor. It is clear that he was both 
ambitious and revengeful and he may well have intended to establish, 
with Leicester's help, his superiority over the States of Holland. It 
is further probable that in order to increase the independence and 
efficiency of the central government he suggested means to Leicester 
whereby the executive and supervisory powers of the States would be 
decreased. 
There nevertheless remain a number of Questions in connection 
1 Rogier, Paulus Buys, PP. 9-11. 
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with Professor Rogier's thesis regarding Buys' extreme centra1ist 
attitude and regarding the manner in which his initial relations with 
Leicester were influenced by his animosities against the Regents of 
Holland. It is, first of all, difficult to understand how a man of 
Buys' experience as Advocate of Holland could have shared Leicester's 
delusion that a government which tried to rule in oPPosition to the 
maritime provinces and relied on the inland regions only (always 
assuming that these were inclined to endorse a policy of centralization) 
had a chance of survival. During his imprisonment at least Buys showed 
that he realized the need of cooperation between central government and 
States; on two occasions he warned Leicester that if he wished to achieve 
anything at all he should "toujours tenlr bonne correspondance avec les 
Estas" and refrain from any actions that violated the treaties or even 
~ I 
that went "contre ce qui seroi t agreable ausdi ts Estas". Another 
point is that not all the arguments which Professor Rogier used in 
proof of BuyS' anti-States' views seem tenable. the author suggested 
that the Queen had probably chosen Buys as her chief adviser in drawing 
up her political counsels to the States, and that Leicester's instructions 
also were framed in consultation with the representative from Utrecht. 2 
If the latter conjecture is correct this would, contrary to Professor 
Rogier's opinion,3 prove that Buys' advocacy of cooperation with the 
1 . BMHG, XXXIV, 48f, 51. 
- . 
3 .... ~., 
Ibid., p. 9. 
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States did not date from the period of his imprisonment but that he had 
from the beginning worked for the retention of States' influence upon 
the government. Unlike the treaty, these instructions did not provide 
for Leicester's appointment as governor general, nor did they, in so 
many wordS, demand the establishment of an independent Council of State. 
They merely ordered Leicester to persuade the States that they counteract 
the inadequacies and confusions of their government by the election of 
"a lesse nomber of wise, discreete and well affected persons, to whom 
the directions of matters of policie [might] be comitted, and for 
cutting off the tediousness and delaies in matters of councell, to move 
them that the deputies of the severall provinces [might] have authoritie 
to consult and conclude, and cutt off the often references to the 
1 particular states". The intention may have been to provide for the 
establishment of a "College of States' Deputies" on a national basis. 
It was clearly not to deprive the States General (which could not help 
but be dominated by the States of Holland, whether Buys liked it or not) 
of its functions of government and to transfer these to Leicester. 
If Buys tried to keep th~ governor general on the narrow path 
of collaboration with the States, he was not the only Councillor to do 
so, and these endeavours again would not in themselves haVe sealed his 
fate. It was his self-appointed role of opposition leader that cost 
him his freedom. In adopting this solution Leicester, who was aware of 
1 Bruce, p. 13. 
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I Buys' isolated position, may not have expected the strong resistance 
which his measure did in fact arouse among the States, including those 
of Holland. He undoubtedly was concerned about the Queen's reactions 
however, and it was probably in the first place to cover himself against 
her reproaches that he did not personally dismiss Buys but left it to 
his partisans to free him of his presence. 
They performed this office for him in the early morning of 
July 19th. Leicester was to leave with his Council to visit the States 
of Holland in The Hague. Before his departure one of the sheriffs of 
Utrecht and Leicester's English agent Webbes called the burgher captains 
to a meeting and ordered them in Leicester's name to apprehend Buys. 
Without asking for the governor's written command the captains obeyed 
2 the order. Buys' papers were seized and entrusted to Meurs. He himself 
was taken in custody and remained in priSon, in spite of intervention by 
the Council of State, the States of Holland, the States General and the 
3 Queen, until the following January when in Leicester's absence the 
States of Holland and the States General procured his release. He was 
never brought to trial. Leicester had expected that an examination of 
his papers would produce enough evidence to support his accusations, 
but when his delegates came to Utrecht to visit the papers they found 
I Bruce, ~. 33., 
2 Bor, 11, 725f. 
3ARA, Index Bogaers [on Resoluties Raad van State), Ill, fOe 409; 
Res. Ho, 1586, pp. 383, 386; Bruce, p. 436. 
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1 that the seal had been broken and the trunk opened. Apparently this 
was done, at Buys' request, by the Count or the Countess of Meurs, whom 
Leicester later accused to have dealt "vily" with him in this respect. 2 
No incriminating material could be found with which to procure an 
indictment by an impartial court, and Buys, understandably, refused to 
be tried by the judges of Utrecht. 
By imprisoning Buys the captains had served their own purpose 
no less than Leicester's, for he was one of their political opponents. 
There were others, who were to be removed in a more conventional manner, 
that is by banishing them as security risks. To exile people who were 
suspected of Spanish sympathies was accepted procedure, not only in the 
frontier regions but apparently also in Holland where, as the records 
of their resolutions show, the States passed acts ordering the removal 
of "evil patriots" at regular intervals. In Utrecht the burgher captains 
3 
sometimes took the initiative, but not always. In April 1585, the last 
time that a group of burghers was sent out of the town, it was done at 
the central government's and stadholder Villiers' request. The procedure 
then followed was that the magistrate members and the eight burgher 
captains nominated persons whom they thought might be in correspondence 
with the enemy, and that those who received ten votes or more were 
1 Bor, 1I,. 726 •. 
2 Bruce, p. 364. 
3· GAU, Raadsnotulen, March 23, 1585. 
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temporarily banished. The people declared ostracized on that occasion 
included "all the priests who could be found" and sixteen others, several 
1 
of whom were members of the five chapters. 
In the summer of 1586, after the fall of Grave, there were again 
rumours that Parma was in correspondence with citizens of Utrecht; at 
2 least so Leicester had been told by the Privy Council, which in turn 
had been warned by the English ambassador in Paris. 3 Leicester informed 
Meurs and the burgher captains and concluded with their advice that the 
. situation called for the removal of a goodly number of evil-affected. 
On the last day of July the stadholder, the burgher captains and the 
Englishman Lord North presented the magistrate with a list containing 
the names of forty-one people to be exiled. Nineteen of these had, 
according to them, been chosen by Leicester himself. The Council added 
another nineteen to the list, making a grand-total of sixty. The names 
of most of the people who had been banished the previous year occurred 
on these lists. Among the remainder there were again several priests 
and canons who may justly have been suspected of Spanish sympathies, 
but also six or seven others who owed their inclusion to the hostility 
borne them by the opposition groups. Chief among these were Nicolaas 
van Zuylen van Drakenburg, bailiff of Utrecht, Floris van Heermale, one 
lCAU, ~aadsnotulen, April 8, 1585. 
2 Bruce, p~.314~ 
3 . 
Cal. For" ed. Sophie Crawford Lomas (London, 1927), XXI, i, pp. 10f. 
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of the ee-eli~eerden (that is the chapter members who since 1582 formed 
the first estate) and Floris Thin, Advocate of the States of Utrecht. l 
The fate of Floris Thin, a man who had from the beginning been a 
determined supporter of the revolt, seems to have been partly a result of 
his function. He was an enemy of the burgher captains and had incurred 
their special wrath by promoting the establ ishment of the Heredi tary Council 
under Vi 11 iers. But as will later become apparent there was also a tendency 
among the centralists to object to the office of States' Advocate itself; 
objections that applied with equal force to that of town pensionary. The 
main reason was that their political influence was too great. These 
officials, who had received a legal training and served on a permanent 
basis, were far more experienced than most government members, who tended 
to rely on their advice and dIrections. Regularly delegated to the States' 
meetings at both the provincial and the national level, the advocates and 
pensionaries threatened to dominate these assemblies and so to form the 
core of a governing group that was almost independent of the States as a 
whole, and that competed, moreover, withthe central government. 
As in the case of Buys' arrest the States of Holland were among 
the first to protest against the measure, and they immediately offered 
2 the exiled politicians their protection. Leicester, who happened to be 
in The Hague, declared that he had been unaware of the fact that 
lGAU, Raadsnotulen, July 21/31, 1586. 
2Res • Ho. 1586, pp. 3l3f. 
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1 
"good patriots" were among the exiles. It is of course possible that 
he spoke the truth; his partisans had probably convinced him that their 
political opponents were security risks. Taken aback by Holland's 
violent reaction he made a few attempts to intervene on behalf of Thin 
and his friends, but when Meurs and the captains ignored his orders he 
2 let the matter rest. 
By this procedure he and his followers had sealed the alliance 
between the Regents of Utrecht and Holland, but Leicester's hold on 
Utrecht was strengthened. Even the provincial States seemed submissive. 
When Leicester filled some of the vacancies left by the exiles with his 
own or his partisans' nominees and afterwards aSked the States' approval, 
it was given in the majority of cases. This was done in spite of the 
fact that some of the appointees, such as Jacques de Bellinchiere and 
Dr. Agileus, whom Leicester made president and attorney general of the 
Provincial Council, were southerners. The States refused only to 
acknowledge Leicester's choice of the Brabant-born nobleman Charles de 
Trillo as bailiff, on the ground that the privileges reserved this 
office to natives. The burgher captains were in favour of him but the 
magistrate, for once, opposed Leicester and also refused to accept 
Irillo's appointment. This served as a reminder that the CounCil, 
accommodating as it had been, still contained hostile elements. The 
1 Bor, 11, 732. 
2 . 
Ibid., pp. 732-736. 
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month that it was to be renewed, October, was approaching however. 
Because Meurs was away in Germany Leicester ordered the stadholder's 
deputy and two of his own advisers, Lord North and the Earl of Culemborch, 
1 to establish the magistrate in Meurs' stead. 
2 Sixteen members of the previous government were replaced. 
Prominent among the new men was another nobleman from Brabant, Gerard 
Prouninck, called Deventer, who was given the fUnction of second 
burgomaster. Prouninck came from 's-Hertogenbosch and was closely 
associated with Agileus, also a former citizen of that town. It had 
been in cooperation with Agileus and with the help of some armed burghers 
that in 1579 Prouninck, a Calvinist and a leader of the anti-Spanish 
group in ~-Hertogenbosch, had forced the municipal government to accept 
the Union of Utrecht. When shortly later the town became Spanish he 
had fl.d to the northern provinces. Here he was in 1581 given the 
function of treasurer-general of the Landraad East of the Maas, one of 
the central executive Councils. He appears to have held this position 
for a number of years, probably until the dissolution of the Landraad 
upon Leicester's arrival. During the larger part of his exile h. had 
been a resident of the city of Utrecht. 3 
1 Bor, 11, pp. 736f. 
2Van de Water, Ill, 176. 
3See for"Prouninck's career. W •. c. ACkersdijck, "Leicester in Utrecht", 
Tljdschr. v. Gesch •• Oudheden en Stat. van Utrecht, 11 (1836), 205-228, 
as well as Pro\..U\lnck's own "Apology" which was written in March 1587 
and has been printed by Bor, 11, 914-918. 
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Like many of his compatriots Prouninck had fixed his hopes for 
the eventual reconquest of Brabant and Flanders and for their reunification 
with the northern provinces on the English alliance and on Leicester's own 
"great-Netherlandish" sympathies. It became his main goal to promote 
Leicester's interests and to support him in his struggle against the 
States and against Holland. Dynamic and resourceful, he was destined 
to become the undisputed leader not only of the Leicesterian faction of 
Utrecht, but of the centralist and pro-English movement in the Netherlands 
as a whole. 
He was also destined to become the chief target of attack by the 
States of Holland. These were as strongly opposed to his appointment as 
those of Utrecht, and less hesitant to risk a conflict with Leicester on 
the issue. Their first attack took place on November 11th when 
Prouninck, as delegate of the City, appeared in the States General to 
resume Utrecht's pressure for a renewal of the offer of sovereignty. 
This matter had earlier been broached, to the States of Holland, by 
1 Leicester himself. It had already been under discussion 1n the national 
assembly on October 15th, at a meeting that was attended by the deputies 
of the three western provinces only. Holland had then suggested that a 
legation should be sent to ask supplementary EnglIsh aSSistance, but 
that its members were not to receive any absolute charge with respect 
to the sovereignty issue. If it appeared that the Queen was prepared 
1 Res. Ho. 1586, p. 446. 
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to discuss the question they were to inform the States and await further 
instructions. Friesland adopted Holland's proposal and the deputies of 
1 Zeeland provisionally gave their approval. The States of Utrecht 
however, whose deputies arrived one week later, proposed that the 
legation should be authorized to make the offer and they further suggested 
that for this purpose the articles submi tted the previous year be changed 
"in such a manner that the Queen might be induced to accept". They were 
unable to persuade the other three prOVinces, and on November 1st the 
instructions for the legation were drawn up in conformity with Holland's 
2 
suggestions. 
It was to redress this situation that Prouninck travelled to The 
Hague. The States of Holland had been informed of his intention and 
3 decided to frustrate it by opposing his admission to the States General. 
It was uncommon to refUse delegates who, like Prouninck, were fully 
accredited by the States of their own province, but Holland felt that 
the circumstances warranted exceptional measures. The argument to be 
employed was that his appOintment as burgomaster had been unlawful. 
According to the privileges only citizens of Utrecht could be chosen to 
that office, and Prouninck apparently had not yet officially become a 
citizen. He was, moreover, a native of Brabant, and this fact alone was 
I Res. St. Gen., V, 257. 
2 .. 
Ibid., ~p. 258f, ,260., 
3 ,. 
Res. Ho, 1586, p. 496. 
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sufficient to disqualify him. Brabant had been in the habit of excluding 
foreigners from political offices and had thereby invited the other 
provinces to retaliate in kind. It was not obligatory to do so; Holland 
itself employed several natives of Brabant in political functions. But 
in certain instances, when a candidate was objectionable for personal 
reasons, the privilege could be invoked, and that was what the deputies 
of Holland did when Prounlnck appeared in the assembly. As usual they 
were able to carry their point. Zeeland and Friesland expressed their 
agreement, Overijsel did not attend the States' meetings during these 
1 years, the deputies from Gelderland had not yet arrived and the legation 
from Utrecht itself was divided. The members representing the third 
estate took Prouninck's side and threatened to absent themselves from 
the meeting if he were not admitted. De Waal van Moersbergen, delegate 
of the nobility, suggested that Prouninck should be admitted but added 
that he did not think he was obliged to leave if the other provinces 
2 persevered in their refusal. This they did, and Prouninck had no 
choice but to leave the meeting. 
Both the magistrate and the College of States· Deputies of 
Utrecht, which since Thin's removal had begun to side with the towns, 
IIts delegates had been refused admittance by the States General itself. 
The reason was that in May 1586~ when Overijsel had accepted the English 
treaty and the Act of Authority, It had treated with Leicester alone and 
had refused to inform the other provinces of the conditions it had asked 
and the terms that had been granted. Res. St. Gen., V, p. x. 
2 Ibid., PP. 236f. 
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wrote on Prouninck's behalf. The College's intervention especially 
threatened to be embarrassing to the other provinces. Buth, the 
representative of the first estate, who had been absent on November 11th, 
and Moersbergen assured them however that the College did nor represent 
the meaning of the States as a whole, so that its arguments could be 
I disregarded, an advice which the assembly followed. Leicester's 
personal intervention was also ineffective. Late in November he organized 
a number of meetings between Prouninck and members of the States General 
to discuss the question, but the States refused to go back on their 
decision and at the end of the second conference Prouninck was advised 
to acquiesce and return to Utrecht. He left with a letter signed by 
Leicester wherein the latter, having declared his intention to maintain 
Prouninck as burgo~master, asked Utrecht to accept the States General's 
verdict, or at least to refrain from further agitation. 2 Acts that 
might increase the disunity were to be avoided. 
The advice was meant to be followed. Leicester was not prepared 
I 
to alienate his supporters by dismissing their leader, but he felt that 
the revolution had proceeded far enough. States' opposition was too 
strong and reports from England showed that the Queen also was irritated 
3 
about the divisions. He was planning to visit England, and if his 
1 Res, St. Gen" Pl? 239f. 
2Bor, 11, 773-775. See also Prouninck's report of his conference with 
Leicester; ibid., p. 7?6 • 
. . -
3· .. 
Cal. For., XXI, li, p. 194; Bruce, p. 436. 
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mission there was to succeed it was necessary to desist from kindling 
further controversy. His partisans in Utrecht thought differently, 
however. They had established their power In the city and they held a 
strong position in the College of States Deputies, but in the prOVincial 
States nobles and ecclesiastics were, as the Prouninck incident had 
shown once more, still combining against the towns. Victory would not 
be complete until the first estate had been dismissed. It seems that 
Leicester had persistently shied away from tackling this problem in spite 
I 
of his partisans' requests; it was not until his departure that the 
burgher captains and the magistrate once again attempted to force the 
issue. On December 1st, before Prouninck's return from The Hague and 
without his knowledge, the town Council passed a decree forbidding the 
members of the first estate who lived in the city to attend the States' 
meetings. The other towns and the nobility were informed of the resolution 
and invited to a meeting wherein the measures to be taken in connection 
with the proposed change could be discussed. 2 
It appeared that the four towns took the side of the city, but 
the first two estates received the support of the Council of State, the 
States of Holland, the States General and stadholder Meurs. It is 
probable that Meurs' opposition came as a surprise to the magistrate. 
So long as Leicester was in Utrecht the stadholder had cooperated with 
I ... . . 
Werken Marnix Vereeniging, 111, iv (1880), 61. 
2Bor, 1I, 775."" The controversy has been described at length by 
R. Broersma, Het Tusschenbestuur, Chapter 11. 
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him and his partisans. On the whole this cooperation seems to have been 
given voluntarily. For the security of the provinces under his charge 
and for the recovery of his German possessions he had expected more 
I help from England than from Holland, and in extending his power as 
stadholder he had, like Leicester, less to hope from the States than 
from the opposition groups. At least so long as these did not request 
or encourage the governor general to enter into competition with him. 
Leicester's encroachments on his domains, as for example in the matter 
of the magistrate's renewal the previous October, may have been one of 
the reasons why after the governor's departure Meurs began to drift 
away from him and his supporters. Another cause was outside pressure. 
Meurs was trying to collect money from the States General for the levy 
of German mercenaries for the defence of the eastern prOVinces, and the 
national assembly had made it clear to him that it expected his 
cooperation against the magistrate of Utrecht in return for a grant. 2 
The overwhelming opposition must have convinced the towns that 
the chances of achieving their goal were small. They were determined 
however to procure at least a change in the composition of the first 
estate, and by sheer stubbornness they forced their opponents to the 
concession that the ecclesiastics would not be reinstated until those 
members who had shown themselves hostile to the towns,- such as Buth, the 
IBM, Lansdowne Mss. 45, no. 25, fOe 58. 
2 Bor, 11, 857; Werken Marnix Vert, Ill, iv, PP. 64f. 
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delegate to the States General, had been replaced. This accord, which 
was drawn up on February 23rd 1587 contained a number of other provisions 
advantageous to the towns. One of these concerned the removal of States' 
influence upon the magistrates' choice. The instructions of Villiers and 
Meurs had provided that the stadholder was to appoint the city and town 
governments with the advice of the provincial States, but the nobles and 
ecclesiastics were now forced to renounce their rights in this respect. 
Another had to do with Utrecht's union with Holland and Zeeland under 
Maurice's stadholdership. Holland demanded a restoration of this union,l 
and the Regents of Utrecht, who sorely needed Holland's support, backed 
Maurice's claims. By the agreement of February they were required, 
however, to put their signatures to an "everlasting resolution" declaring 
that no accord would be acknowledged which indicated that the maritime 
provinces and Utrecht should be governed by one stadholder. The agreement 
further provided that Floris Thin would be officially dismissed, that the 
office of States' Advocate would never be reintroduced, and that 
convocations to the States' assembly would be drawn up not by the head 
of the ecclesiastics, as was customary, but by the College of States 
2 Deputies. 
The towns had received more than they had probably expected. 
If the first estate had been dismissed, power in the States would have 
1 . .. 
Res. Ho. 1586, p. 376; ~, XXXIV, 77. 
2 Van de Water, 1, 188-190. 
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been divided equally between the urban areas and the nobles. As it was 
the towns gained the dominant pOSition, for after the rearrangement of 
February the members of the ecclesiastics tended to cooperate with the 
third estate, either because they had been cowed into submission or because 
1 they themselves belonged to the urban and centralist group. The opposition 
had been victorious in the domestic conflict and could henceforth devote 
its energies to the centralization issue. Under Prouninck's leadership 
this was indeed to be Its major concern during the remainder of the 
Leicester period. 
1 ARA, Loketkas Loopende 59 (Remonstrance of October 17, 1587). 
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CHAPTER VI 
LEICESTER'S DEPARTURE 
I 
In the autumn of 1586 Leicester was asked to return to England 
to attend the coming parliamentary session. Letters by Burghley and 
Wilkes suggest that the invitation may have been a cloak for his 
1 
"honourable revocation", but apparently they desired his presence in 
London also for domestic reasons. They, as well as Yalsingham, had 
informed him that his support might be needed in connection with the 
2 process against Mary Stuart. That consideration was probably the 
immediate cause of Leicester's decision to return. There were other 
reasons however, which had to do with Dutch affairs. The discovery of 
the Babington plot had, in Walsingham's opinion at least, convinced 
Elizabeth that a continuation of the war was inevitable. 3 Leicester 
shared Yalsingham's hopes that it might induce her to a greater effort, 
and he intended to forge the iron while It was hot. The least he hoped 
to achieve was an increase in the English subsidy. The best solutlon 
1 Wm. Murdin, ed., Collection of State Papers (London, 1759), p. 570. 
PRO, SP Dom. XII, 193, no. 58; Cal. For., XXI, 11, p. 164. See also 
ibid., p. 174. 
2 BM, Egerton Mss. 1694, fOe 44; Bruce, pp. 404, 421. 
3 Bruca, p~ 341. 
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remained of course that England annexed the country and assumed a larger 
share of the responsibility fori.ts defence. 
In urging these requests upon Elizabeth he intended to rely 
particularly on the offices of the English Parliament. That body had 
been summoned for October 15th. Its first task was to put pressure on 
the Queen that she execute the sentence against Mary Stuart, but Leicester 
expected that, this duty performed, it would also be given an opportunity 
1 to express its opinions on foreign policy. If the aid to the States was 
to be increased a parliamentary subsidy would be necessary and Parliament 
couJd tie the offer of a grant to the request that the Queen accept the 
sovereignty over the Netherlands. This was indeed what the strongly 
Puritan and interventionist assembly proceeded to do in February 1587, 
when it moved on to the discussion of foreign affairs. 2 
A third factor urging Leicester to visit England was the need 
to defend his policy in the Netherlands. Especially in recent months 
had he become aware of Elizabeth's criticism of his administration, a 
criticism that was not only concerned with the management of the EngUsh 
army but also reflected the States' objections to his government. The 
States' complaints to Elizabeth had never been entirely ineffective; she 
had during the summer already expressed disapproval of some of his 
I ... 
Res. St. Gen., V, 430f. 
2 J. E. Neale, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments (London, 1957), 11, 
Chapter IV. 
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actions. l More influential than these earlier remonstrances had been 
the information supplied by Thomas Wilkes, who had visited the Netherlands 
in August and September. His evaluation of Leicester's policies, which 
differed little from that of the States, created a strong impression in 
England, and the political and financial reports submitted by him were 
among the causes of the far more severe disapprobation of Leicester's 
government expressed by Elizabeth during the latter part of the year. 
2 Leicester himself had asked for the dispatch of an ambassador. 
Realizing that his difficulties with the States were aggravated by the 
lack of "countenance" he and his army received from the Queen, and by 
the suspicions created by the secret peace negotiations, he had stressed 
the need that by means of a special envoy she reassure the Dutch 
regarding her intentions to continue her aid. This was indeed one of 
Wilkes' tasks; he was ordered to renew the old pledge that under no 
3 circumstances England would leave the provinces unaided. His second 
duty was to acquaint himself with the country's financial capacity and 
to investigate Leicester's complaints about the States' refusal to give 
him sufficient cooperation In financlal matters. He was to find out, 
among other things, what proportion of the forces needed for defence 
IIn the matter of Buys' imprisonment and the trade prohibition. Bruce. 
p. 386; Cal~ For., XXI. ii, p. 40. 
2 Bruce, pp. 291f, 305. 
3 ... 
Cal. For., XXI. ii, pp. 81f. 
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could be maintained by the provinces themselves, what the "certainty of 
the revenue" was, and how much of the ordinary and extraordinary 
contributions promised by the States had been paid. In connection with 
these points he was also to inquire into the effects of the trade edict 
and to give his opinion on the question whether, in order to counteract 
the decrease in customs revenue, it would be advisable to re-allow the 
export of victuals and other native products. His instructions suggested 
a positive answer. According to these it might be best "to suffer a 
vent and so to continue the taxes", always provided that the export was 
regulated so that scarcity and high prices at home were prevented. l 
Wilkes arrived in Utrecht on August 11th. He duly delivered the 
Queen's comforting message and thereby raised the Council, according to 
2 
his own report, from deep despair. Having performed this duty he 
proceeded with his financial investigations. That task occupied him 
until the middle of September, by which time he had come to reach his 
conclusions about the ineffectiveness of Leicester's approach and the 
justice of the States' objections. Wi1kes was not an uncritical admirer 
of the States. He shared the bias of most Englishmen against their 
system of government and had occasion to notice its disadvantages, both 
in the course of his embassy and during the time that he served as 
IBM, Add. Mss.48,OI4, fos. 263f~ 
2 Ibid., fOe 267. 
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Councillor of State. He became convinced however that power in the 
Netherlands was in fact concentrated in the hands of the States, that 
these had no intention to transfer it to Leicester, and that Leicester's 
endeavours to rule in opposition to them were bound to result in 
frustration and failure. 
That insight was gained during the latter part of his embassy. 
In the draft of what seems to have been one of his first reports to the 
Privy Council there was as yet little evidence of disagreement with 
Leicester on any of the major issues, while the States were criticized. l 
But this letter was probably written before the Dutch politicians had 
had an opportunity to confer with him. Towards the end of August 
Leicester himself went to the front, leaving Wilkes in the care of the 
Council of State, which was to answer his questions regarding the 
country's financial position. By no means all the Councillors admired 
Leicester's system, and his critics undoubtedly used the occasion to 
inform Wilkes of their objections to his government. So did other of 
his opponents. Not long after Wilkes t arrival the people exiled from 
Utrecht had asked him to intervene with the governor general on their 
behalf. The request had not gone unheeded; in a letter to Leicester 
Wilkes eondemned the procedure held with the banished politieians and 
2 
asked him to procure justiee for them. 
1 . -
Cal. For., XXI, 11, pp. 135-137. 
2 BM, Egerton Mss. 1694, fOe 37. 
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The States of Holland appear to have postponed their interview 
until September. On the 14th of that month Wilkes informed Leicester 
that they had invited him to The Hague to acquaint him with ttsundry 
particularltlestt that might be of value in completing the financial 
1 
report given him by the Council. The discussions were not concerned 
with monetary matters only. The States availed themselves of the 
opportunity to inform Wilkes of the political situation. Much attention 
was given to the question Reingout, who at this time had not yet been 
arrested. the ambassador was given an account of the treasurer general's 
past and present misdemeanours and asked to give a tttrue reporttt of the 
issue to both the Queen and Leicester. Wilkes complied, although with 
little enthusiasm. By the middle of September he no longer seems to 
have relished the role of acting as an intermediary between Leicester's 
critics and Leicester himself. In informing the latter of the States' 
disclosures he told him that he had refused to deal in the matter, 
because it was not on his commission.2 This scruple no longer plagued 
him when he was back in England and made his report to the Privy Council. 
The instructions given him when, early in November, he was sent back to 
the Netherlands to serve as Councillor of State, reflect the States' 
3 
criticism of Reingout and his circle. 
IBM, Egerton Mss. 1694, fOe 41. 
2
Ibid
'" 
3See for these instructions Bruce, pp. 433-437." 
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Wilkes' report on political affairs in the Netherlands does not 
seem to have survived. Its tone and contents must be inferred from his 
1 
own correspondence, from the reactions of Queen and Privy Council, and 
from the change in Leicester's attitude towards him: Leicester's earlier 
appreciation of the ambassador, on whose "sufficiency and painfulness" he 
had commented as late as September 9th,2 turned into hostility when the 
effects of the mission became known. Among the documents that show 
official reactions were, as mentioned, WIlkes' new Instructions. Herein 
he was ordered to inform Leicester that the trade prohibition of April 4th 
3 be revoked or modified in accordance with the States' wishes; that he 
pay heed to the States' objections to his financial advisers; that he 
satlsfy them with respect to Paul Buys; and that he provide redress for 
the exiles of Utrecht. Wilkes was further told to make it his policy, 
"without feare or dreade of any parson or parsons" to advise Leicester 
in his government and to make certain that Queen and Privy Council were 
regularly acquainted with developments in the Netherlands. 
The tone of the instructions was mild in comparison with the 
letter which Elizabeth wrote about the middle of October. 
1 . 
Such as his letters to Sir John Norris, Cal. For., XXI, 
and to Sir Edward Norris, PRO, SP Dom. XII, 193, no. 58. 
memorandums in Cal. For., XXI, il, pp. l68f and 174f are 
from Wllkes. 
2 Ibid., p. 143. 
The letter 
U, pp. l63f, 
The two 
probably also 
3 . . 
The fact that this particular decree had already been revoked appears 
to have escaped the Privy Council's and Wilkes' attention. 
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itself does not seem to have survived. but its contents appear from 
I Leicester's reply, which opened with a profession of grief and the 
assurance that he would rather have died than receive such ftdiscomfortable 
words" from her. In this message Elizabeth had rejected most of the 
criticism implied in Wilkes' instructions and added the interesting 
warning that he "should not irri tate the States and grow too popular, 
for that they were wise men". at though at the same time he was to make 
sure that they did their duty. The attack was concentrated on his 
military and financial policies. Leicester was told, among many other 
things, that he had insufficiently acquainted himself with the States' 
financial capacity and called in more soldiers than he or they were able 
to pay; that it was incomprehensible how he could have received such 
great contributions from the States (the Queen held the opinion that 
2 the extraordinary grant amounted to 400,000 pound sterling) and 
consumed it all without order or cause; and that, if he had administered 
the money properly he would have achieved some military success, while 
as it was he had accomplished little more than gaining the scorn of the 
Queen's foes and bringing shame to her army. 
These outpourings were inspired, at least in part. by the 
financial account which the Council of State and the States of Holland 
I . 
In Cal. For., XXI, ii. pp. 189-197. 
2 . 
Ibid., p. 191; Bruce, p. 438. 
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had given to Wilkes. That report, with some of the material used to 
1 document it, is extant, and its contents created enough controversy to 
merit a brief analysis. The statements do not excel in clarity and they 
sometimes contradict each other, but they all convey the notion that the 
war was costing more than the provinces were able to pay. In their 
anxiety to stress this in itself indisputable fact the authors had been 
2 tempted to give an exaggerated estimate of debts and expenditure. In 
one of the accounts it was asserted that the monthly cost of defence, 
inclusive of the charges for a field army, amounted to fl. 632,144. It 
suggested that if this sum were multiplied by thirteen it would bring 
3 the annual expenditure to fl. 7,217,870, but failed to mention that 
there was not always a camp, and also that the States were in the habit 
of paying most of their forces their monthly wages not every twenty-eight 
but every forty-eight days. 
Another account, which purported to give a view of the States' 
disbursements to Leicester over the first half year of his government, 
stated that they had already paid f1. 400,000 in extraordinary aid.4 as 
1BM , Add. Mss. 48,014. fos. 375.390. 
2See in this connection the remarks by the newly appointed treasurer 
general Joris de Bye in PRO, SP Holland 84, XII, no. 5, and the criticism 
of the accounts by Jacques Valcke, member of the Dutch legation in London. 
and Daniel de Burchgrave. in BM, Add. Mss. 48,084, fos. 393f. 
3 BM, Add. Hss. 48,014, fOe 381. Actually it would have been one million 
florins more. 
4 Payment of this grant had in fact not begun until AU~8t; see p. 156 
above. 
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well as the fl. 1,200,000 of the normal contributions for this period. 
Leicester had nevertheless anticipated an amount of fl. 964,637 upon the 
contributions of the following months, contracted an unspecified debt 
for victuals and other provisions, and faUed to pay the larger part of 
the garrisons for four months, which debt alone was estimated at 
1 fl. 1,447,864. The total expenditure amounted in other words to more 
than fl. 4,000,000 for a period of six months only. Because Leicester's 
ordinary and extraordinary income for the year (including the revenue 
derived from the "non-contributing" provinces) did not quite reach the 
2 three-million mark, the probable annual debt could on the strength of 
this document be calculated to amount to more than five million guilders. 
A third statement gave a more conservative estlmat~ although the 
discrepancy with the previous two was not explained. It gave the 
3 disbursements and anticipations for seven months as fl. 2,600,000. 
This suggested a yearly charge of fl. 4,457,000 and thus a deficit of 
just over fl. 1,400,000. That was, in fact, more or less in conformity 
with the conclusion reached by a later financial account which gave the 
revenue and the expenditure for the entire year and appears to have been 
drawn up in December or January. probably for the use of the Dutch 
4 legation. The deficit suggested by this account (a sum of fl. 1,438,056, 
IBM, Add. Mss. 48,014, fOe 380. 
2 . 2 verso BM, Cotton Mss., Calba C IX, fos. 04 -5; Add. Mss. 48,084, fOe 142. 
3SM, Add. Mss. 48,014, fOe 383. 
4BM , Add. Mss. 48,084, fos. 142-144. 
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of which almost one million consisted of del-ts to the army) seems to 
I have been challenged by Leicester as still too high. The fact that 
the list of debts included a sum of fl. 204,000 which the English 
treasurer maintained he had disbursed for the Dutch army -- a claim 
2 
which on other occasions the States refused to acknowledge -- suggests 
that this calculation also was a liberal one. 
It is not certain which of the statements submitted by Wilkes 
was accepted by Elizabeth. A letter which the former wrote to Norris 
3 
suggests that it was the one over the six months' period. That letter 
further shows that the information served not only to increase her 
concern about Leicester's administration, but also to intensify her 
weariness with the alliance. "Her Majesty and her Council", thus Wilkes, 
"do greatly stagger at the excessive charge of those wars under his 
Excellency's government for the six months passed, affirming (as it is 
true) that the realm of England is not able to supply the moiety of 
that charge; notwithstanding, the necessity of the defence of these 
countries is so conjoyned with her Majesty's own safety, as the same 
is not to be abandoned; but what she will do I know not." What she 
would do was not to become apparent to anyone until the early months of 
the following year, when the States submitted their formal request for 
the continuance and increase of her subsidy. 
ICal. For., XXI, ii, p. 326. It is possible however that he referred 
to the earlier statements given to Wilkes. 
2Neale, Essays, pp. 176f. 
3eal. For., XXI, 11, PP. l63f. 
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11 
It would be interesting to know whether the States of Holland 
contemplated the possibility that by their disclosures to Wilkes and by 
their general opposition to Leicester they overshot their mark and 
increased Elizabeth's doubts about the practicability of her intervention. 
Many in the country, including people who would have been happy to 
dispense with Leicester if it had not been for his central position with 
respect to the alliance, undoubtedly did, and looked askance at Holland's 
procedures. Elizabeth had agreed to give aid on condition that she 
received political influence, and it was considered worthwhile to suffer 
the inconveniences of this arrangement if the alliance could thus be 
kept together. If English aid had not yet b~ought the expected military 
relief, it had certainly been instrumental in checking Parma's offensive 
after the capitulation of Antwerp. It was possible that circumstances 
would conviftce the Queen of the need to continue her aid regardless of 
the effectiveness of Leicester's government and of the treatment he 
received, but the risk that she would leave the provinces was present, 
and the failure of her political intervention increased It. The Armada 
was still to come, and guarantees that the peace negotiations would not 
lead to a conclusion which England would consider acceptable, were 
lacking. If Philip promised to accept the Queen's terms he might 
succeed In effectuating her withdrawal, at least temporarily. The 
military and political consequences would be disastrous. 
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It Is probable that Holland was aware of this risk and realized 
that by accommodating Leicester It would be diminished. But its States 
also appear to have felt that his and their endeavours would not in the 
long run prevent Elizabeth from concluding her peace if she was 
determined to do so, and that the purchase of a period of grace at the 
cost of allowing Leicester to continue his government on the old foot 
constituted too high a price. If Elizabeth should withdraw, the 
maritime provinces would be able to weather the storm for some time, 
until international prospects improved. Under Leicester's government 
it had been difficult to prepare for such a contingency. His policies 
had tended too much to the preservation of the generality as a whole, 
and thereby interfered with Holland's own defensive preparations. His 
emphasiS on "national defence" was of course acceptable so long as there 
was a possibility of withstanding the enemy on every front. Holland 
knew that its safety depended on that of the inland provinces. Faced 
however with the possibility that it would have to fall back upon the 
unaided defence of its own territory it felt the need to make the 
necessary preparations. 
In order to do so it was not absolutely essential that Leicester 
disappear from the scene, but it was imperative that his independent 
authority cease and that the settlement of January be changed accordingly. 
Although Elizabeth's help was indispensable for such a rearrangement, 
the States of Holland did not rely on the indirect method only. During 
or shortly after Wllkes' embassy they had begun to prepare an official 
1 
l 
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remonstrance containing a list of their various complaints. l This 
document was presented to Leicester on November 11th. By that time his 
intention to leave was known, a fact that probably caused them to hasten 
the presentation. They planned to use the opportunity provided by his 
absence to redress, where possible, their own grievances, but it would be 
preferable if Leicester did it for them. After the Queen's exhortations 
there was a chance that he would introduce the required reforms, or else 
authorize the States themselves or the Council of State to do so. 
Before submitting the remonstrance Holland had discussed it with 
Zeeland and Friesland. The States of both provinces agreed to join in 
the presentation. Zeeland had at least since July formed a united front 
with Holland, and its adherence had been a foregone conclusion. 
Friesland's was not surprising either. Its States had been outvoted in 
January, when the allies had decided to give Leicester his absolute 
authority in civil affairs~2 Irritation about Holland's and Zeeland's 
attitude at that time, and about their later attempts to force 
J Friesland into ceding its domains to the central government, was 
probably among the reasons why they had kept aloof in July, when the 
maritime provinces had presented Leicester with their remonstrance against 
the trade edict. That remonstrance itself had no doubt had their approval, 
lRes. Ho. 1586, session August 26 - October 11, pp. 472f. 
2 See above. p. 100. 
3' .. . .. 
Re8 0 St. Gen,. V. 216, 225, 377f, 413f. 
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for Friesland, which depended on the export of dairy- and other 
agricultural products, also had objected to Leicester's commercial 
policies. l 
Economic considerations then made a closer cooperation with 
Holland and Zeeland advisable. Political developments at home had the 
same effect, for the centralists were creating difficulties also in 
Friesland. It has been seen that this group was formed by the 
provincial Council under president Hessel Aysma's leadership, by the 
2 
eleven towns, and by a number of delegates from the Quarter of Oostergoo. 
The last group appears to have been the most active one in attempting to 
promote the centralists' programme, both in and outside the provincial 
diet. Although there were other questions in the course of 1586, the 
disagreements centred around the amount of authority Leicester was to 
have over Friesland. The issue had been discussed at a number of 
pr~vincial assemblies. It seems that by May the States as a whole had 
been prepared to accept the States General's Act of Authority to 
Leicester, but that a number of opponents, no doubt in cooperation with 
the College of States' Deputies, had obstructed the execution of these 
3 
resolutions and once more succeeded in gaining control of the diet. 
Neither the central government, nor the centralists of Friesland itself, 
1 Pierius Winsemius, Chronique van Vrieslant (Franeker, 1622), fOe 776; 
Van Reyd, p. 122. 
2 See p. 91f.above. 
3 Winsemius, fOe 779; ~, XXXIV, 40-46, 65-71. 
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were willing to acquiesce in the province's separatist attitude and the 
matter served again at the diet of October. At this time the States 
resolved that Friesland would accept the Act, on condition that it 
retained control over its domains. However, if Leicester and the States 
General could not be persuaded to agree to this condition, Friesland's 
deputies to the national assembly were to accept the Act of Authority 
"absolutely".l 
The delegates of Oostergoo expected that this resolution also 
would remain unexecuted. They were further annoyed by the fact that in 
the States General Friesland's deputies had sided with Holland in the 
2 question of the offer of sovereignty to Elizabeth. Anxious to redress 
the situation they resolved to take matters into their own hands. Early 
in November a legation was sent to Leicester, informing him that Oostergoo 
was willing to accept the Queen as its sovereign on the terms the States 
General had submitted in 1585, and that it intended to confer upon 
Leicester himself such powers as the governors of Charles V had possessed. 
The offer was accompanied by the request that he introduce some reforms 
In Friesland's government: the lnfluence of the College of States' 
Deputies was to be ended and executive functions were to be entrusted, 
3 instead, to the stadholder and the provincial Council. 
1 Winsemius, fos. 779f. 
2 See above, p. 208. 
3~, XXXIV, 65-71~ 
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Realizing that the instructions of the States General's legation 
to England would not contain this request,Oostergoo was to decide 
shortly after Leicester's departure from the Netherlands to send a 
separate embassy to the Queen. Its instructions, which were drawn up 
on January 5th, were similar to the November message to Leicester. 1 
For a time the towns appear to have kept themselves aloof from this 
2 
movement, but on January 10th they also decided, after consultation 
with the deputies of Oostergoo, to send delegates to London. This 
embassy was to offer the Queen "the sovereignty of the towns of 
Fries1and", again on the conditions of 1585. 3 It does not appear whether 
the towns planned to suggest a change in the provincial government. They 
promised that nothing would be attempted that went against previous 
resolutions, but they also stated that they intended to have their 
legation's commission and instructions examined by the stadholder and 
the provincial Council, rather than by the stadholder and the College 
4 
of States' Deputies. The stadholder, Wll1iam Louis of Nassau, tended 
to cooperate with the College, but the Council undoubtedly agreed with 
Oostergoo's instructions. 
1 Winsemius, fos. 780f. 
2~, XXXIV, 69. 
3pRO , SP Ho. 84, XI, no. 92; Winsemius, fOe 781. 
4 PRO, SP Ho. 84, XI, no. 92. The rendering of this paper in Cal. For" 
XXI, ii, P. 291, is defective. 
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By this time Holland and Zeeland had probably begun to appreciate 
Friesland's hesitation in accepting the Act of Authority, and they 
sympathized with the States' opposition to the centralist and pro-English 
group. The difficulties in Friesland could not be blamed on Leicester's 
direct interference however, and this was probably one of the reasons 
why the matter was not included in the remonstrance. Another issue that 
remained undiscussed, although it undoubtedly constituted a grievance 
against Leicester, was his religious policy. Among the church's 
complaints against the government were, as will be remembered, the States' 
hesitation to allow a national synod and their refusal to ratify the 
synodical Church Order. Leicester, who had no reason to fear the church's 
political competition and whose attitude towards the Calvinists had from 
the beginning been more accommodating than that of the States, was 
prepared to meet their wishes, and in the summer of 1586 a national synod 
1 had been called by him. Because he had been given full authority in 
religious matters, and probably also for fear of cementing the alliance 
between him and the Calvinists, the States had not opposed the measure. 
They instead resolved upon a policy of passive resistance; in spite of 
Leicester's repeated requests the States General never ratified the 
Church Order, and only three of the six provinces, Zeeland, Gelderland 
and Overijsel, appear to have introduced it without limitations or 
2 
conditions in their own territory. 
1 
-Bor, 11, 718f, 790ff. 
2 Reitsma, Gesehledenls van de Hervorming, pp. 155-160. 
---
233 
Apart from these two issues the list of complaints submitted on 
November 11th was an exhaustive one. The remonstrance dealt with 
Leicester's military administration and some aspects of his military 
policy, his activities in Utrecht, his financial and economic measures, 
and his reliance on southerners and other people objectionable to the 
States. Several of these controversies have earlier been discussed, but 
the remonstrance and the conferences held with Leicester after its 
submission throw some additional light on his poliCies, and their high-
I lights must therefore be mentioned. 
The first section contained, among other matters, the States' 
grievances about his "indiscriminate and unlicensed levying of soldiers", 
one of the complaints that had been repeate~ by the Queen. The objections 
were based on constitutional grounds (the treaty forbade the governor to 
levy foreign soldiers without the States' consent) and on financial 
considerations. There were more soldiers than could be supported. When 
in December the Council of State tried to proceed with muster and 
reduction it appeared that fl. 450,000 was necessary for one month's 
2 pay. The cost of soldiers exceeded, in other words, the normal 
contributions by fifty per cent,3 and because the extraordinary grants 
had been more than needed for additional expenditure the numbers were 
lSee for the remonstrance and the discussions Bor, 11, 760-763 and 763-767. 
On November 20th and 24th Leicester put his answers in writing. The first 
set of these "apost111es" occurs in ARA, SG 3781, st. 118; the second has 
been printed in ~, XXXIV, 72-80. 
2 ...... _...... .. 
Res~ Ho. 1586, p. 413. 
3 Considering that pays were made every forty-eight days. 
too high from a financial point of view. If the military requirements 
are taken as the criterion they had, nevertheless, scarcely been 
adequate. The muster in questi~n appears to have been the first one 
since the dissolution of the camp. The numbers to be paid consequently 
represented those employed for the autumn campaign, at which time the 
size of the States' army had, in comparison with Parma's, not been 
excessive. The fact remained, however, that for the larger part of the 
recruitments no special consent had been asked, and the States eventually 
succeeded in convincing Leicester of the illegality of this procedure. 
He promised that henceforth he would abide by the treaty and ask their 
1 
approval for foreign levies. 
Another grievance was that on a nwnber of occasions Leicester 
had established military governors without States' nominations or 
supplied them with a new commission without States' consent. Four 
2 
specific instances were mentioned. Three had to do with the commanders 
of local garrisons, those of Vianen, Oudewater and Gorcum. The fourth 
case, and the one that aroused the States' gravest objections, concerned 
Diederik Sonoy. Sonoy, a German nobleman of strong Calvinist leanings, 
had served the Prince of Orange since the early years of the war and 
was now employed under Maurice as military governor for the Northern 
Quarter of Holland. Leicester however appointed him as his own 
1 Bor, II, 763. 
2 . 
Ibid" pp. 763f. 
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"lieutenant", with poli tical as well as mill tary authority, over the 
area. He did so ~y renewing a commission which Sonoy had possessed 
during the first years of the Revolt when, as a result of the Spanish 
hold on Haarlem and Amsterdam, North and South Holland had been 
separated and when Sonoy had been Prince William's deputy-stadholder 
for the northern parts. After the reunification of the two areas, which 
took place in 1578 by Amsterdam's entry into the Revolt, his authority 
appears to have been restricted primarily or exclusively to military 
matters. 
Sonoy's too militant Calvinism was probably one of the reasons 
why the States objected to his promotion by Leicester. Another concerned 
the political ambitions of the Northern Quarter itself. the region had 
not always belonged to the County of Holland, and the consciousness of 
its former separate identity, combined perhaps with the feeling that its 
economic interests were best served under a form of self-government, 
caused it to strive for a loosening of the ties which bound it to the 
rest of Holland. The existence of a local College of States' Deputies 
already gave it a semi-autonomous status. It considered this only a 
partial victory however and tried to introduce other "provincial" 
institutions, such as a separate mint, one of the attributes of 
1 provincial sovereignty. Although Sonoy himself was not highly 
1 Res. St. Gen., V, 474, 483f. 
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acceptable to the States of the Northern Quarter, the establishment of 
a special governorship nevertheless emphasized the region's semi-
independent status and might encourage it in its separatist tendencies. 
The main reason of the States of Holland's indignation at Leicester 
procedure was not, however, that the appointment threatened the unity of 
their province, but that it procured Leicester undue influence in its 
political affairs. Sonoy would consider himself directly responsible 
to the central government and not, like Maurice, to the provincial 
States. Leicester himself was aware of this advantage. He seems to 
have considered his control over the Northern Quarter one of his chief 
political victories. Early in July he had told Elizabeth that he hoped 
to get into his hands some towns in North Holland, by means of which 
she would be able to bridle the States and make war or peace as and 
1 
when she wished. He of course did not advocate an enforced peace and 
knowing Sonoy he must have realized that the latter would never cooperate 
in any such scheme. Elizabeth however did not know this, and might 
applaud the acquisition. 
There seems to have been another reason for Sonoy's appointment. 
Both the contents of his instructions and the occasion on which ha first 
used his new commission suggest that they may have been granted at the 
1 Cal. For., XXI, ii, p. 63. 
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request of the Reformed ministers of the Northern Quarter. l In this 
still strongly Roman Catholic area the Calvinists felt that they 
received insufficient support from States and magistrates, and they 
had been in the habit of looking to Sonoy for support. One of the 
current controversies between the church and the local governments 
concerned the administration of the church goods in the rural areas of 
North Holland. At one time this administration had been in the hands 
of a certain Guillaume Mostard, a CalVinist and a protege of Sonoy's, 
but later the magistrates had taken control. Apparently this change 
was to the disadvantage of the churches, which were entitled to part 
of the revenue. The ministers informed Sonoy that insufficient money 
was paid out for the maintenance of the churches, and Sonoy brought the 
complaints to Leicester's attention. With the advice of his Councillor 
Willem Bardesius, the former burgomaster of Amsterdam, who had once been 
Sonoy's lieutenant and was probably still one of his supporters, Leicester 
2 
reinstituted Mostard. When States and magistrate refused to acknowledge 
the appointment and forbade the villagers to deposit the revenue with 
Mostard, Sonoy stepped in. In a letter of September 27th he ordered, as 
Leicester's lieutenant, those villages that had followed the States' 
direction to recognize Mostard's receivership. The local College of 
lHis commission and instructions, which were dated June 13th and 
August 2nd respectively, are printed by Kluit, 11, 508-510. 
2 Bor, 11, 759. See for Bardesius' earlier relations with Sonoy, Jan 
Vagenaar, Vaderlandsche Hlstorie, VII, 205. 
States' Deputies sent the letter on to the States of Holland. These 
had not yet been Informed of SonoY's new rank and demanded a copy of 
his commission and instructions. Sonoy allowed his secretary to read 
the documents to them but refused to provide them with a copy. Repeated 
orders by the States remained ineffective. Before long he added insult 
to injury by threatening to send a contingent of soldiers to the three 
1 
villages that still refused to recognize Mostard. 
Developments had reached this stage when the remonstr&lCe was 
submitted. The States of course demanded the revocation of SonoY's 
commission. Leicester's determination to maintain him was equally 
strong. Wearied by the States' persistent requests he eventually 
Informed them that they could change his lieutenant's commission if, 
as they maintained, it violated Maurice's rights or the country's 
2 privileges, and that he would abide by such a change. This promise 
was only made to gain time however, and to shift the responsibility to 
Sonoy's shoulders. The commission was not revoked, nor was Sonoy told 
to submit it to the States for examination. In the absence of such a 
command he felt that he was still bound by his oath to Leicester. That 
conviction sufficed to make him persevere in his opposition after 
Leicester had left the country. Another Leicesterian stronghold had 
been created. Throughout the following winter, and throughout the 
I Bor, 11, 759f; Res. Ho. 1586, pp. 438f t 448, 453. 
2 Bor, 11, 764. 
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year 1587, Sonoy was to cooperate closely with the centralists of 
Utrecht and Friesland. 
There is no need to give any detailed attention to the section 
of the remonstrance which was devoted to Utrecht. The catalogue of 
complaints about Leicester's policies there did not contain much that 
was new, and neither did the discussion. Special attention having been 
given by the States' to the burgher captains' interference with the 
offer of sovereignty, to the imprisonment of Buys and to the banishment 
of the politicians, Leicester reaffirmed his innocence in the last two 
procedures.but implied that in his opinion they had been neither illegal 
nor unjustifiable. He nevertheless agreed that attempts should be made 
to end the domestic divisions in Utrecht, and suggested that in his 
absence the States General take the matter in hand. When the States' 
deputies asked him to authorize the Council of State to secomd them in 
I these endeavours, he promised to do so. Another request made in this 
connection was that he, or else the Queen, help to restore the political 
union between Holland and Utrecht by establishing Maurice's authority 
over the latter province. Leicester had no intention of forcing this 
union on Utrecht and intimated that his or the Queen's arbitration in 
the matter should be asked in the last resort only. Holland should 
begin by referring the question to the States General, to see whether 
1 Bor, 11, pp. 765f; ~, XXXIV, 76f. 
that body might not be able to suggest and enforce an acceptable 
1 
solution. 
the States' complaints about Leicester's policy of promoting 
southerners to political fUnctions were also ineffective. throughout 
their remonstrance they had implied that whatever had gone wrong under 
Leicester's government was to be blamed on the influence of his SJuthern 
advisers, and they asked him to refrain, at least in matters concerning 
the three remonstrating provinces, from "llstening or giving credence 
to any people who had been members of the government of Brabant, 
Flanders and other disunited provinces". Leicester replied by asking 
the States to mention the names of those whom he had allowed to meddle 
in the affairs of Holland, Zeeland and Friesland. Prouninck and his 
friends in Utrecht had not been given power to do so. Reingout had 
received that authority, but he was no longer in office. After his 
dismissal there were only two people from the South who held influential 
positions in the central government, the Councillor Van Meetkerke and 
Leicester's secretary Daniel de Burchgrave. they were Flemings however, 
and Flanders was not, Leicester argued, one of the "disunited" provinces. 
It had treated with the Queen, continued to belong to the confederacy, 
and was consequently entitled to have its representatives in the central 
government. the States' deputies left the argument about Flanders' 
1 ' ARA, SG 3781, st. 118. 
rights of representation unanswered. They admitted that Van Meetkerke 
and De Burchgrave were among the people they considered objectionable 
and asserted that the two men had, among other things, introduced 
1 Reingout and his circle to Leicester. Leicester ignored the accusation 
and informed the States that as governor of all the provinces he intended 
to continue lending an ear to all those who were willing to advance the 
common cause.
2 Although destined to be eliminated by the States after 
Leicester's departure, for the time being Van Meetkerke and De Burchgrave 
remained in office. 
The last of the States' grievances to be considered here concerned 
Leicester's trade policy. The edict of August 4th, drawn up with the 
help of Holland and Zeeland, had allowed the export of victuals to 
neutral countries except those areas in France and Germany that were 
3 
close to enemy territory. On August 28th Leicester had, at the 
instigation of some "turbulent spirits" as the remonstrance asserted, 
4 introduced certain restrictions in this decree. Although Zeeland also 
objected to the innovations it is possible that its own complaints had 
helped to rouse the prohibitionist spirits. It had been uneasy about 
Holland's suggestions that the export of victuals to forbidden neutral 
territory be allowed. By this time Zeeland favoured a reop~ning of trade 
1 Bor, 11, 763, 767. 
2ARA , SG 3781, st. 118. 
3 See p.155 above. 
4 Bor, 1I, 762. 
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with Spain and Portugal, but it was still opposed to feeding the enemy 
in the southern Netherlands. Its States also seem to have been concerned 
abou~ the effects of the licents upon the price level at home, especially 
in the case of dairy products. Later in the autumn they were to ask 
Leicester that he temporarily forbid the export of these products until 
1 prices had gone down to the accepted ceiling. The fact that they joined 
with Holland in opposing the restrictive measure of August 28th suggests 
however that they did not consider a change in the decree itself 
desirable. The States' complaints were for once effective. Having 
painted a gloomy picture of the disadvantageous effects produced by the 
various changes in the regulations, and a still darker one of the 
financial damages suffered as a result of the first trade edict, they 
found Leicester almost apologetic. He told his Councillors to remember 
in his absence that the countries existed and were to be maintained by 
commerce; and ordered them to take the measures necessary for the 
preservation of trade and navigation, although care had to be taken that 
2 the public good was not subordinated to considerations of private gain. 
The States of Holland and the States General were to relieve the Council 
of this particular duty not long after LeIcester had left. 
1 Kernkamp, I, 202f. 
2Bor, 11, 762, 766£; ARA, SG 3781, st. 118. 
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III 
Although they had made it clear to Leicester that they found 
little to commend in his government, the States dld not seem anxious to 
have it immediately discontinued. Early in November Leicester had come 
to The Hague to make the arrangements necessary in connection with his 
visit to England. Shortly after his arrival, on November 10th, and 
again towards the end of the month, the States informed him that his 
departure was regretted and that they would appreciate it if he cancelled 
I his plans or at least postponed his trip. The request was probably more 
than a poll te gesture.' There were reasons that made a prolongation of 
his stay advisable. The States needed his help for the settlement of 
many of the problems mentioned in their remonstrance. They further 
realized that his absence would create a void in the military command, 
a situation that was particularly dangerous because there was little 
agreement, and a great deal of rivalry, among the various army chiefs. 
An additional problem was that his departure would cause an unfavourable 
popular reactlon~ In the opinion of the people Leicester remained the 
symbol of the alliance; if he left they might despair of further English 
ald~' What made the situation even more disagreeable was that they would 
probably blame the development on the States' uncooperative attitude. 
I ......... " 
Res. St. Gen,', V, 428f, 430f, 435f; Res. Ho~ 1586, p. 511; AM, Index 
Bogaers, 11, fOe 6l6verso~ 
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Leicester's partisans were already spreading tales to this effect. 1 
The fear of political unrest was strong enough to induce the States to 
ask Leicester that he send letters to all the provinces and towns 
declaring that he went to England to serve the countries' cause and 
2 that in time he would resume his charge in the Netherlands. 
In the meantime Leicester had found occasion to acquaint the 
States with some of his own requests and proposals. On November 21st 
he submitted a list of questions concerning the "state of the country", 
the replies to which were to serve him as a guide in his discussions 
with Queen and. Privy Council. He wanted to know, among other things, 
whether they would offer to augment their own contributions and continue 
them for a number of years in case the Queen should resolve to increase 
her aid. Another question, which was probably inserted at Elizabeth's 
order, was that they state their opinion regarding possible peace 
3 
negotiations with Spain. 
The States' answer to this memorandum contained no startling 
revelations. With respect to the first issue they declared at some 
length that they were not really in a position to augment their 
contributions or to promise them for a number of years in advance. 
However, if England should decide to double its subsidy the States 
promised that they would try to persuade their principals to offer an 
I Bor, 11, 778. 
2 1586, 511; ARA, SG 3781, st. 159. Res. Ho. p. 
3 Bor, 11, 781. 
extraordinary grant of some fl. 200,000 per year, for a period of three 
years.l Peace negotiations were of course out of the question. The 
States could never join these, and Leicester was urged to ask the Queen 
that she also refrain from entering into negotiations with Spain. The 
argument was that such preliminaries, innocent as they might seem, would 
have dangerous political consequences in the Netherlands. Many among 
the people failed to realize the present impossibility of a composition, 
2 
and among them the negotiations would create a false sense of security. 
They might, in other words, relax in their efforts, refuse to continue 
paying their taxes, or try by other means to force the States to enter 
the disastrous paths of peace. 
Another point on which Leicester desired information was whether 
the Dutch offer of sovereignty to the Queen would be repeated. It has 
been seen that in October the three western provinces had resolved to 
3 leave this matter in abeyance. Leicester had hoped to induce them to 
a more positive resolution, and his failure caused him concern as well 
as annoyance. Convinced that ultimately the decision lay with Holland, 
his irritation was directed in the first place at the government of 
that province. When during one of the November conferences he broached 
the matter the members of the States General attempted to convince him 
IARA, SG 3793, fos. 56f. Bor's statement (11, 783) that they promised 
an extraordinary contribution of fl. 200,000 per month for a period of 
three years is of course erroneous. 
2 Bor, 11, 782f. 
3p • 208 above. 
that the delay was not a result of an anti-English attitude among their 
members. It was still their wish, they declared, to have the Queen as 
their sovereign, and the main reason why they had not yet decided about 
Leicester's proposal that the offer be repeated was lack of time. It 
remained a matter of some consequence that merited mature deliberation. 
The States of Holland, for example, had found it necessary to refer the 
question to their principals and until their opinion had been received 
1 
no final decision could be given. 
2 Lelcester's suggestion had been made early in October, and he 
had reason therefore to be concerned about the delay. The problem was, 
as he undoubtedly knew, that not all the towns of Holland were 
enthusiastic about the idea. Few If any of the opponents would have 
objected to making the offer for the sake of civility, but there was a 
possibility that Elizabeth, moved by Leicester's eloquence, parliamentary 
pressure, or by the consideration that in proceeding against Mary Stuart 
she would cross her Rublcon, would accept it. A transfer of sovereignty 
would imply the institution of a central government with semi-independent 
powers, and the man chosen to head that government would most likely be 
Leicester himself. Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Gouda and the towns of the 
Northern Quarter hesitated to incur this risk and had withheld their 
approval when on October 8th the nobility and the-other towns had 
I Bor, 11, 7BOf. 
2 Res. Ho. 15R6, p. 446. 
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agreed that the legation could make the offer on the conditions of the 
previous year, if upon its arrival in England it considered this 
1 
adVisable. Holland's negative advice in the States General's meeting 
of October 15th suggests that the opponents had been able to sway the 
majority of the provincial States to their opinion. 
There remained a group that favoured a renewal of the offer, 
however. It was led by Dordrecht, always a pro-English town and one 
that formed the chief Leicesterian enclave in South Holland. Religious 
factors were among the causes of this attitude; the Calvinists held an 
2 influential position in the magistrate. Dordrecht was also on the side 
of the prohibitionists and agreed with Leicester's trade policies. 
Although a maritime town it shared in many respects the outlook of the 
inland provinces, partly because it was situated near the frontier, 
but also because it expected, unlike places like Amsterdam, few 
advantages from a protracted war. It depended primarily on the river 
trade and faced the prospect that it might be deprived of its major 
outlets so long as part of its hinterland remained under enemy control. 
Still another reason why it was willing to press Leicester's 
suit was that it needed the help of the central government in protecting 
1 R@s, Ho. 1586, p. 446. 
2 Dordrecht seemS to have been the only town in Holland to declare itself 
in favour of accepting without restrictions the Church Order drawn up by 
the national synod of 1586. Ibid •• p. 406. 
its economic privlleges against encroachments by its neighbours. 
Dordrecht was the oldest town of Holland and had during the Middle Ages 
collected a large number of urban privileges, including toll and staple 
rights, which made not only the surrounding countryside but also the 
smaller urban centres of South Holland, such as Rotterdam, Schoonhoven 
and Gorcum, its economic dependencies. It had received these privileges 
from the Counts and had depended on the central government for their 
maintenance. That dependence had grown stronger when the neighbouring 
towns, weary of their inferior position, combined to attack its 
monopolies. Untll the revolution of 1572 ·its government had consequently 
been strongly royalist. The attacks had not ceased after the removal of 
royal authorlty, and the post-re~olutionary magistrate also felt the need 
of external support. An immediate problem was created by the fact that 
one of its privileges would expire in 1587. Rotterdam and the other 
towns would obstruct the attempt to have it renewed. Dordrecht had 
asked, and was soon to receive, Leicester's help in continuing this 
privilege, but it could have few illusions about the effectiveness of 
his decision so long as his influence in the government remained as 
1 limited as it was. 
lH. C. M. Moquette, "De strijd op economisch gebied tusschen Rotterdam 
en Dordrecht", 1!£. XLI (1926), 40-63; J. C. Boogman, "Oe overgang van 
Gouda, Oordrecht, L.iden en Delft in de zomer van het jaar 1572", .!YQ, 
LVII (1942), 93f. 
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Dordrecht then had continued to advocate a repetition of the 
offer'of sovereignty, not only in the States of Holland,l but apparently 
2 
also in the States General. It was no more able to hasten the decision 
than the other pro-English groups or than Leicester himself. It was not 
until January 12th that the States General finally decided on the issue, 
and its resolution was hardly an improvement on the earlier one. The 
legation was ordered to offer the sovereignty, but it was not allowed to 
submit any conditions. If the Queen wished to treat she was to be asked 
to give her opinion on the terms offered in 1585. Her suggestions were 
to be sent on to the States General; the deputies were not permitted to 
conclude, even provisionally, on these articles until they had received 
further directions. If they were asked why their commission had thus 
been restricted they were to reply that since the earlier presentation 
and during Leicester's government various innovations had been introduced 
to the country's prejudice, and that the States wished to consider with 
the Queen the ways and means by which the situation might be redressed. 3 
Leicester's discussion with the States General on this question 
had been held on November 23rd. On the 24th, the day before h 1& 
departure from The Hague, he made the final arrangements regarding his 
succession. The form of the interim-government to be established had 
1 Res. Ho. 1586, p. 507. 
2 BM"Cotton Hss., Galba,C VIII, fos. 248-251. 
3' Res, St, Gen" V, S30f. 
been under consideration for some time. On November 11th Leicester had 
asked the States for their advice. l The question had that day been 
discussed by both the States General and by those of Holland. The 
latter considered su~gesting Maurice as Leicester's successor and they 
thought of nominating Hohenlohe as commander in chief, presumably for 
both armies. Such an arrangement would have concentrated most of the 
political and military powers in Holland's hands, but it was unlikely 
that the other provinces or Leicester would have favoured it. Later in 
the day, perhaps after a conference with the States General, Holland 
dropped the idea and suggested instead an establishment approaching that 
which had existed before Leicester came. Both military and civil 
authority were to be entrusted to the Council of State, but Maurice was, 
together with one of the Queen's representatives, to have a position of 
some distinction in the Council; they were to sign the dispatches that 
normally went under Leicester's personal signature. 2 
After the proposal had been accepted by Zeeland and Friesland 
it was submitted to Leicester. He did not object to the idea of giving 
the executive functions to the Council but thought that there should be 
a general chief for the two armies. He had considered Sir John Norrls, 
Sir William Stanley and his field marshal Sir William Pelham for the 
function, but found it difficult to choose. Stanley would be 
I Res. St. Gen" V, p. 431 •. 
2Res • Ho. 1586, P. 497; Res, St, Gen., V, 432. 
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1 
unacceptable to the States, who already distrusted him, and to Sir John 
Norris, one of his rivals. Norris would probably also refuse to serve 
2 under Pe1ham, whose promot~on by Leicester had earlier aroused his ire. 
Norris himself, although his rank, ability and experience in Dutch 
affairs undoubtedly qualified him for the position, was also too 
controversial a figure to be an ideal candidate; a considerable number 
of military chiefs were opposed to him and might object to his appoint-
ment. l The causes of these dissensions are not entirely clear. During 
the first months of the alliance, when Norris was supreme commander, he 
or else one of his brothers appears to have alienated some of the English 
chiefs. 4 In other cases the feuds were older; that between Norris and 
Sir William Stanley, for example, dated from the time they had both 
5 
served in Ireland. Leicester's own growing dislike of Norris and his 
policy of promoting hls opponents had no doubt encouraged the factionism, 
although it is perhaps true that it would have been difficult for him to 
maintain an entirely neutral attitude in the conflict. Capable officers 
were scarce, and to risk sacrificing the goodwill of Some of these to 
gain Norris' cooperation would have solved one problem and created 
others. 
1 Bor, II, 753. 
2· . 
Cat. Hatfield Mss., Ill, 168f; Cat. For" XXI, il, PP. 137f. 
3For a description of these rivalries see Motley, 11, 86f. 
4 Cal. For., XX, PP. ix!, 156f, 159f, 163f, 192. 
5 
.. John Stow, Anna1es (London, 1605), p. 1232. 
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Norris' appointment as general chief would be frowned upon not 
only by a number of his own compatriots, but also by the Count of 
1 Hohenlohe, another of his enemies. He had rights of seniority however, 
and eventually Leicester resolved to nominate him. Perhaps he feared an 
unfavourable reaction from England if Norris were bypassed, although 
Elizabeth herself had been concerned about the rivalry between Norris 
and Pelham and had thought of sending Lord Gray as a replacement for 
Leicester. 2 Another reason for his decision may have been his 
expectation that Norris, who had long enjoyed the confidence of the 
3 Dutch, would be the most likely candidate to be accepted by the States. 
In this expectation he was dlsappointed; the Dutch politicians made lt 
clear that they were opposed to both his plan and his choice. Drawing 
attention to the disagreements between Hohenlohe and the Norris circle 
they informed Lei~ester that it would be the safest course to leave the 
matter In the hands of the Council, which could choose a chief if and 
when the occasion arose. Leicester submitted, and decided to appoint 
4 Norris as head of the English army only. The States seem to have 
1Bor, 11, 779; Bruce, pP. 391f. 
2pRO, SP Dom. XII, 195, no. 3. 
3The appreciation of him was general. When upon Leicester's return in 
the early summer of 1587 Norris was recalled, not only the States General 
but the government of the city of Utrecht also risked Leicester's 
displeasure by sending Elizabeth a letter in recommendation of Norris. 
BL, St. Amand IX, fos. 52, 1. 
4 . Bor, 11, 779. The commission was dated November 28th 1586. ARA, 
R. v. St. 1524, fOe 137. 
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agreed, but Norris' enemies did not. Five of them. Sir William Stanley, 
Sir Rowland Yorke. Colonel Morgan, Sir William Russell and Sir Roger 
WUl1ams informed Leicester that if Norris were appointed they would 
I 
offer their resignations. This new problem he appears to have tried 
to solve by supplying Stanley,an'd Yorke. and probably the other 
remonstrants as we~l, with a special commission which made them directly 
responsible to him and released them from their obedience to Norris. 2 
Having sacrificed the idea of an English generalship over the 
combined forces Leicester prepared his Act of Government. According 
. to the States' suggestionS. supreme military and civil authority was 
thereby given to the Council of State. which was to execute it in his 
name. 3 This Act was signed on November 24th. On that same day he 
proceeded to limit the Council's powers by means of his secret Act of 
4 Restriction. !hat measure intended first of all to prevent drastlc 
changes in the military establishment. It was to be expected that in 
, Leicester's absence the Council would be tempted, or forced. to follow 
not the governor's but the States' directions in such questions as the 
reduction of the English forces and their disposal into garrison. and 
also in the choice and continuatlon of Dutch and English military 
officers. Lelcester tried to prevent this by ordering the Council that 
IBM. Egerton Ms~. 1694.,fo. 51. 
2cat • For., XX~. li, pp. 234. 333; BM. Egerton Mss. 1694, fos. 66, 68. 
3 . 
The Act is in Bor. 11. 784f. 
4" , 
Ibid., p. 786. 
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in the matter of the reduction and disposal of the English soldiers it 
1 follow the lists prepared under his direction, and by forbidding it to 
dismiss or appoint any military governors without his consent. The Act 
further contained a number of provisions regarding the political 
government, one of which restricted the Councillors' powers also in 
this field. they had been ordered to help the States General to procure 
a settlement of the domestic divisions in Utrecht. Leicester did not 
intend that in the case of the exiled politicians and of Buys the 
solution should be imposed upon Utrecht against his partisans' wishes, 
and by his secret instructions he therefore forbade the Council "to 
ordain or dispose regarding the release of any prisoners [and regarding] 
people exiled by any towns, except by means of ordinary justice and 
according to the appointments made". Apparently this vague order meant 
that the judicature was to be entrusted to no other judges than those 
of Utrecht. The Council of State interpreted it in this light. When 
early in January It took the matter of Buys' trial in hand, it ordered 
the court of Utrecht to institute the proceedings. 2 
The Act of Restriction was not the cause, as the States were to 
assert, of the loss of Deventer and the Zutphen forts. Stan1ey and 
Yorke would have committed their treason regardless of the CounCil's, 
or for that matter Sir John Norris', authority or lack of authority 
ISee for these lists Bor, 11, 786f. 
2' ARA, Index Bogaers, Ill, fOe 410. 
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over them. It nevertheless did create a potentially dangerous power 
vacuum in the military field. Leicester's desire to safeguard the 
position of his own appointees and of the English army is understandable, 
and he probably expected to act in conformity with the Queen's wishes 
as well. Elizabeth had objected to the appointment of Maurice as head 
1 
of the government, and the fact that she considered dispatching Lord 
Gray to the Netherlands shows that she also preferred to keep affairs 
of government under English control. But as it turned out, Leicester's 
secret instructions could not guarantee the preservation of the 
establishment built up by him, while in time they were to provide the 
States with one of the most effective weapons to attack his government • 
. 1She objected to him because he was "a stranger, interested in the state 
of Flushing", and because he was led "by such as she [fancied] not". 
PRO, SP Dom. XII, 195, no. 3; Davison to Walsingham, November S/1S, lS86. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE StATES ASSUME CONTROL 
I 
The history of the first months of Leicester's absence is largely 
that of the attempts of the States to regain mastery over their own 
affairs. The aim of the present chapter is to describe these attempts, 
at least insofar as they proceeded from Holland, which was the leader 
of the movement. It was also the province that was to reap the greatest 
political benefits from the reorganization. The States' success in 
changing the settlement of the previous year led ineVitably to Holland's 
hegemony in the confederacy and its leadership of the national government, 
a position which it retained throughout the Republican era. The Council 
of State continued to exist, but henceforth it depended on the States 
General, and that body was, in turn, dominated by Holland, the strongest 
and wealthiest partner in the confederacy. 
The attempts to restore States' authority were inspired in the 
first place by distrust and fear of Leicester and by the intention to 
prevent him from resuming his former powers if he should return. They 
also constituted a reaction against centralism in general. That reaction 
would have come if the experiment in centralization had been made by 
another than Leicester. An independent federal government was by 
definition incompatible with the States' system, and the experience of 
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the past year had merely underlined this truth. Neither Leicester's 
final departure and resignation nor the defeat of his partisans could 
consequently induce the States to make another attempt at unification. 
A third factor, which has been mentioned in the discussion of Holland's 
stand against Leicester in the autumn of 1586, was what might be called 
a "defensive particularism", an attitude that was fostered by the 
difficult domestic and the insecure international situation at the time. 
Holland had no intention to leave its allies unaided, and it did not do 
so during these months, but it demanded the freedom to limit its 
responsibilities and to concentrate its efforts upon ha-e defence. 
Another aspect of this period, which was of no far-reaching 
consequences with respect to the country's political development but 
which at the time gave rise to considerable controversy, was the States' 
policy of restricting English military influence. Many of the measures 
introduced were aimed at clearing Holland from English soldiers and at 
reducing the English element within the army as a whole. In December, 
when the first plans for a reduction of the army were made, It had been 
decided to keep 4,500 English volunteers in the States' pay.l This was 
2 
only 500 less than Leicester had intended to retain. On February 9th 
however It was resolved to remove all Englishmen from the Dutch army by 
transferring them to the Queen's auxiliary, which was seriously 
I Brugmans, I, 308. 
2 According to his Act of Restriction; Bor, 11, 787. 
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I depleted. Although that auxiliary itself was to be retained, the 
States were no longer anxious to have it increased. The legation to 
London had been ordered to ask Elizabeth that she double her army, but 
on February 17th the States General informed their delegates that it 
would be preferred if she converted whatever additional aid she might 
decide to give into a monetary grant, which could be used for the levy 
2 
of German mercenaries. There were no doubt practical reasons urging 
a limitation in the number of English soldiers. Their poverty and 
disorganization made them unwelcome to towns and rural areas alike, 
while Stanley's and Yorkels treason contributed to the ~mpopularity of 
the English. The presence of a strong English army was considered 
dangerous also for political reasons, however. It protected and 
encouraged the militant anti-States' groups, it might be used as a 
means to reinstate Leicester, and it could be employed by Elizabeth to 
force a peace upon the country. This third factor constituted one of 
the States' arguments in defending their measures in the face of 
3 
criticism by the Leicesterians of Utrecht. 
Prouninck and his partisans were not alone in objecting to the 
States' anti-English and decentralizing policies. They were seconded 
lRes. St. Gen~, V, 604f. 
2ARA , SG 3793, fOe 170. According to a document submitted to the Privy 
Council by Sir Roger Williams the States had around this time informally 
inquired into the possibility of the Queen's converting her entire aid 
into a monetary subsidy. Cat. For., XXI, ii, p. 382. 
3 Bor, 11, 910. 
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by the Council of State. The Councillors' opposition was not, it is 
true, very effective; with the exception of the English member Thomas 
Wilkes they usually ended by accepting Holland's direction. This does 
not necessarily mean that their protests were perfunctory only, or 
merely inspired by fear of the Queen's reactions and of Leicester's 
wrath. Councillors like the Fleming Adolf van Meetkerke, the Seigneur 
van Brakel, representative for Utrecht, and Hessel Aysma, who for a 
short period represented Friesland, were centralists and anxious to see 
not only Leicester's but also the Council's authority preserved. Neither 
can Leoninus and Or. Oorrius, the members for Gelderland and Overijsel, 
have been indifferent about the attempts to make the central government 
wholly dependent upon the States and upon Holland. The Hollanders 
Van Loozen and the Seigneur van Brederode, and the Zeelanders Valcke and 
Teellnck, also give the impression to have been in favour of an 
independent Council, or at least of a reasonable division of authority 
between States and central government. Membership in the Council 
appears to have produced a less narrow provincial outlook than membership 
in the States. Even the Amsterdammer Willem Bardesius, who is usually 
considered the chief protagonist of the States and who in 1587 cooperated 
1 
with the anti·Leicesterian groups in Holland, had during Leicester's 
government seconded at least some of his policies that went against the 
States' wishes. In matters that concerned Holland Leicester had tended 
I Brugmans, 11, 165. 
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to make use of his services, and in questions like the appointment of 
Mostard in the Northern Quarter,l and the reorganization of the Admiralty 
2 College of Hoorn, he had given his cooperation to Leicester. There 
are of course also instances of his opposition to the governor, and it 
is possible that collaboration was the exception rather than the rule. 
Unfortunately only part of the Council's resolutions for the Leicester 
period has survived and the attitude of Bardesius, as well as that of 
the Council as a whole, towards Leicester's policies remains in some 
respects a matter of conjecture. 
This is also true of the Council's opinions regarding the States' 
decentrallzing measures after Leicester had gone. Most of the Councillors 
doubtlessly felt that Leicester's approach, and the circumstances of the 
moment, warranted at least some of the changes that were introduced. 
They also realized that in cases of innovations which could not be 
justified on these grounds protests tended to be useless. The Council 
depended financially upon Holland, and that even more so than it had 
done formerly. Apparently Zeeland and Friesland contributed little in 
3 these months, while Utrecht, whose countryside was despoiled by English 
and, since Stanley's and Yorke's treason, by Spanish soldiery, did for a 
time not even take the trouble to sUbmi t a financial "Consent" to the 
1 See above, P. 237. 
2See P. 267 below. 
3B~lG, XXXIV, 176; Brugmans, 11, 458. 
1 central government. The Council could achieve little without the aid 
of Holland, whose States were therefore in a position to enforce their 
policies. 
One of Holland's immediate goals was to regain control over the 
disposition of its financial and military means and so to provide for 
the security of its own territory. The removal of the Council's power 
to administer these matters, the liberalization of the trade regulations, 
the strengthening of the navy, and the safeguarding of the frontiers --
which implied the need to gain control over Utrecht, its chief eastern 
bulwark __ were among the measures attempted. It achieved all these 
goals, except the last one. To bring Utrecht fully into Holland's 
orbit it was necessary not only to restore the anti-Leicesterians there, 
but also to bring the province under Maurice's government. Meurs' 
attitude towards Holland was friendlier now than it had been, but he 
refused to collaborate in the liquidation of his own stadholdership.2 
The centralists themselves were still firmly established. They enjoyed 
the protection of an English garrison, and they had the moral support 
of Wilkes and Sir John Norris, who especially in these months hesitated 
to alienate Leicester's partisans. After the treason there seems to 
have been a fairly general conviction that English influence would have 
lCabala slve Scrlnla Sacra (London, 1691), 11, 33; Res, St. Gent, V, 
635, 697f, 
2 To retain his friendship Holland eventually agreed that for the time 
being it would approve of his continuatlon as stadholder of Utrecht. 
Res. Ho. 1587, p, 70. 
been far more drastically reduced, if not totally excluded, had it not 
been for the opposition offered by the pro-English groups in such 
1 Leicesterian strongholds as the Northern Quarter and Utrecht. 
The centralists of Utrecht were unable to prevent Holland from 
re-establishing its hegemony, but they did not cease their attempts to 
obstruct its policies, and the divisions between the two provinces 
deepened steadily. A violent quarrel had broken out in January, in 
connection with the release of Paul Buys. Knowing that the Council of 
State lacked the power to free him, Holland had given its adherence to 
a proposal that the States General take the matter in hand and order 
2 Buys' guardian to free his prisoner. The order was obeyed and by 
the end of January Buys arrived in Holland. The rulers of Utrecht 
objected to the extension of the powers of the States General, both 
because it competed with the Council and because it was dominated by 
Holland. They concluded that by ordering Buys' release the deputies 
had exceeded their authority, and reacted by requesting Meurs to call 
a national assembly to their own city. The expectation appears to have 
been that once the delegates were removed from direct contact with the 
States of Holland they would behave in a less revolutionary manner. 
TI1e assembly was called, and deputies from Gelderland came, b~t the 
3 
western provinces refused to play Utrecht's game. The attempt had to 
IGroen van Prinsterer, Archives ou Correspondence In;'dite de la l-laison 
d'Orange-Nassau (Utrecht, 1857), 11, i, PP. 44, 52, 65; Cal. For., XXI, 
ii, p. 420. 
2Kluit, 11, 146. 
3 Bor, II, 907f. 
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be abandoned, but for more than a month, from the middle of February 
until the 31st of March, Utrecht neglected to send representatives to 
the States' assembly in The Hague. When through Noel de Caron's 
mediation the province resumed relations with the western allies it 
provided its deputies with a restricted commission; they were allowed 
to vote only on those matters that had been listed in the States General's 
convocation, and that had therefore been discussed by the magistrates and 
1 the provincial assemblies. This procedure also aimed at limiting the 
States Generalis executive powers. It was at the same time the practical 
application of the political theories which, as will be seen later, the 
centralists were advancing in these months. 
Until the middle of February Utrecht had been represented by 
Buth and Moersbergen, deputies of the first two estates. The centralists 
had tried to recall these since the time that Prouninck had been refused 
2 
admission, and eventually the summons were obeyed. The delegates sent 
on March 31st were commissioned by the ruling group. Presumably they 
were ordered to try and stem the anti-Leicesterian legislation, but they 
arrived too late. By the end of March most of the measures Holland wished 
to introduce had already been passed. On the whole the States General 
seems to have been cooperative. Zeeland and Frlesland usually agreed 
with Holland. Buth and Moersbergen undoubtedly refrained from giving 
1 ~ , 
Res. St. Gen., V, 715, 743f, 494-497. 
2 . 
Ibid., PP. 242. 493f. 
strenuous opposition to its proposals, and the deputies of Gelderland 
appear to have acquiesced in the direction given by the allies. 
Overijsel was still absent from the States General. 
On January 26th the national assembly had drafted a new decree 
regulating the country's trade. It allowed the export of imported 
merchandise, except munitions of war, to any country that stood not under 
the obedience of Spain. In fact only the southern Netherlands were 
meant to be excluded; the States proceeded to free trade with Spain and 
Portugal. The decree was sent to the Council of State with the request 
that it publish it in Leicester's name. The Council objected and 
commissioned Leoninus, Bardesius and Aysma to try and dissuade the 
States. The three men admitted that financial and'economic considerations 
made a more liberal trade policy advisable but thought that the domestic 
situation did not warrant the introduction of drastic changes. Their 
main argument was the possibility of an adverse popular reaction. The 
people were convinced that increased exports would cause a steep increase 
in prices at home, and they also continued to believe in the military 
effectiveness of a prohibition. If it happened that farma made a 
successful attempt in the field they would blame it on the States' 
policy of relieving the famine in the South. The Council therefore 
suggested that the matter be left in abeyance until Leicester's return. 
If the States nevertheless insisted on publishing the decree they should, 
it argued, at least reinstitute the prohibition of trade with Calais and 
1 Emden. 
The States made some vague promises with respect to the last 
point. They further warned that the regulations would be published in 
the States General's name, if the Council refused to do it in Leicester's. 
The Council submitted and on January 30th it published the decree. It 
was done under protest however, and Wilkes refused to sign it. The 
moderations were not introduced. Although Dordrecht, Gorcum, Arnhem 
and Utrecht opposed the decree, and although Zeeland would have preferred 
a solution along the lines suggested by the Council, the States General 
decided to allow trade with Calais and Emden. The reintroduction of 
licents for the export of victuals and other merchandise to the southern 
Netherlands soon followed. The desperate financial situation provided 
the first occasion to change the new regulations in this respect. Once 
the custom was reinstituted it remained in force. Only when there was 
a direct military threat to the northern provinces was the export 
2 
temporarily ended. 
After the introduction of its commercial measures Holland made 
an attempt to reorganize the naval administration. Leicester had left 
his marks also in this field. When he arrived in the Netherlands there 
were three separate Admiralty Colleges, one at Hoorn, serving the 
Northern Quarter, one at Rotterdam, and one at Middelburg. In all these 
1· ... 
Res. St. Gen., V, pp. 755-758. 
2 Ibid., p. 758; Kernkamp, I, 204f, 212-217. 
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the personnel was recruited. in part or in whole, from the respective 
Colleges of States' Deputies. Until the summer of 1584 the adm~istration 
had been purely provincial. but upon the Prince of Orange's death some 
centralization was attempted. Maurice and the Council of State were 
given the superintendence over maritime matters and received the power 
to re-establish the Admiralty Colleges. Apparently the Council of 1584 
had left the matter once more to the provinces, but Leicester, who had 
been given the same authority as the previous government, did institute 
new administrative bodies. The system of the three Colleges was retained, 
but the personnel was appointed by and received its instructions from the 
central government. The ordinance to this effect was issued on July 26th. 
It outlined, among other things, the area of the Colleges' jurisdiction. 
That of Hoorn would cover the Northern Quarter, Amsterdam (which had 
formerly fallen under Rotterdam but preferred to be joined to North 
Holland). Friesland, Utrech.t, and the Quarter of Arnhem. The Admiralty 
of Rotterdam was to have charge over South Holland and the area of Waal 
and Maas, and that of Middelburg over Zeeland and the coasts of Brabant 
and Flanders. Maurice, the admiral, would be head of each College 
separately and of the combined Colleges. 
The reorganization at Rotterdam does not seem to have caused 
strenuous opposition, but the States of Zeeland objected to the new 
regulations. Leicester had agreed to continue the members of the College 
of States' Deputies as members of the Admiralty, but the fact that these 
would have to serve the central, rather than the provincial government. 
was considered too prejudicial to Zeeland's interests. Leicester's 
threat that he would send people of his own choice eventually induced 
the province however to acquiesce. Hoorn and the College of Deputies 
of the Northern Quarter also felt that the administration should remain 
unchanged and refused to admit the newly appointed Admiralty members. 
Bardesius was sent to bring them to terms and in the second half of 
September the States finally agreed to accept the College. Their decision 
came too late. Amsterdam was anxious to have an Admiralty of its own and 
offered to accept Leicester's appointees, who left Hoorn to settle in the 
former town. Hoorn protested but was unable to dislodge the College from 
Amsterdam. The Northern Quarter refused to submit to Amsterda~'s 
jurisdiction and the local College of States' Deputies continued to 
administer naval matters for its own territory. Henceforth Holland was 
1 
served by three Admi ral ty Colleges. 
The traditional explanation that Leicester's measures were 
responsible for the decentralization of the naval administration in the 
Netherlands has been exposed by the naval historian, Dr. Elias, as 
erroneous. 2 The three separate Colleges existed, and although the measure 
led to a further split, this had not been the central government's 
intention. In view of the ambitions of Amsterdam and the Northern Quarter 
lARA, J. de Hullu, De Archieven der Admiraliteltscol1eges (in manuscript), 
PP. 10.18, 23-30; Johna E. E1ias, Schetsen uit de Geschiedenis van ons 
Zeewezen (The Hague, 1916), I, 29-34. 
~Uas, oP.c! t., p. 33. 
263 
it would no doubt have occurred sooner or later. So long as they 
remained under central control there were, moreover, no reasons to object 
to the existence of several local units. 
Although the ordinance of July 26th did not aim at a prolifera-
tion of Colleges, a later decree by Leicester did threaten to have this 
effect. Late in November he established an Admiralty at Ostend in 
Flanders. By the terms of the provisional treaty for Antwerp, Ostend 
had been offered to the Queen as a cautionary town. It continued to have 
an English garrison, which was commanded by Sir John Conway. Ostend's 
economic condition was no better than that of other coastal towns in the 
southern Netherlands. Its inhabitants were impoverished, its harbour 
empty, and its maritime defences in a state of serious disrepair. The 
cost of defending it devolved on the allies, but neither the Queen nor 
the States were anxious to spend a large amount of money for its 
improvement. It was probably in the hope of strengthening the town's 
economic and thus its military position that Leicester introduced the 
1 Admiralty College. He was unable however to make the institution 
lThis is suggested by a memorandum, written at a somewhat later date by 
an Englishman familiar with Ostend's state and situation. In this 
memorandum attention was drawn to the strategic importance of the town, 
but also to the need that something be done for its improvement, and 
one of the measures suggested was the establishment of an Admiralty. 
By this means trade would revive, "the costome of all things gOing in 
and out with the impost and accyse, and with the concourse of people, 
would sone enriche the place, and yield benefitt sufficient being well 
collected and disposed to quite her Majesty of manie charges and to 
repare the haven, the Sluces, the Sea breaches and all other things 
amisse lt • PRO, SP Ho. 84, XIX, no. 47. 
permanent. Holland and Zeeland refused to acknowledge it and after 
some months it was forced to cease . 1 operation. 
The establishment of an Admiralty College in Ostend was no doubt 
one of the reasons why Holland, which at first does not seem to have 
2 
objected to the Admiralty Act of 1586, came to oppose it later. Another 
reason appears to have been Leicester's policy of chOOSing the Colleges' 
3 personnel without, or even against, the States' advice. Holland did 
recognize the need for more uniformity in naval matters however, and it 
tried to retain this principle. Unification was possible by plaCing the 
Colleges under the central government's superintendence, but it could 
also be achieved by putting them under the control of the admiral only. 
This was the arrangement which Holland now contemplated. The States 
General was again cooperative and passed, on January 31st, a new Admiralty 
Act.4 That Ac't did not explici tly remove the superintendence over naval 
matters from the central government, but this was implied in the provision 
that the Colleges were to keep correspondence with and obey Maurice, the 
admiral; neither the governor general nor the Council of State were 
mentioned. It further provided that Maurice would henceforth be served 
by a special executive body or Admiralty CounCil, consisting of six 
lARA, De Hullu, Pp. 36f. 
2 Cf. ibid., p. 26. 
3 This complaInt was made by the States General in the summer of 1587. 
See Bor, 11, 989. 
4 ' Res. St. Gen., V, 597-600. 
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members, three from Holland, two from Zeeland, and one from Friesland. 
In order to provide for the navy's maintenance, the admiral and his 
Council were to have power to borrow money on the security of future 
convoys and llcents, and if the revenue of these duties was insufficient 
to repay the loans the residue was to be taken from the contributions 
granted by Holland and Zeeland for the land war. They were also allowed 
to grant, apparently without reference to the Council of State or even 
the States General, licents for the export of victuals and other products 
to enemy country. 
Although the States General had given Its adherence to the 
proposal, it does not seem that the new Admiralty Council was established. 
If it was, it did not survive, for after Leicester's resignation Holland 
was to come wi th a similar proposal. A "Superintendent College" was 
then apPOinted, but Zeeland refused to cooperate and after some years 
the executive College disappeared from the scene. Later attempts to 
achieve unification were also ineffective, and the principle of regional 
control remained in force for the duration of the Republic. l 
Another of Holland's goals was to resume control over military 
matters. This was accomplished in stages. The first step was taken 
on December 5th, when the Council of State requested the States General 
to provide money for the muster and reduction of the army. Of the 
extraordinary grants and of the normal contributions that would become 
1 .. 
ARA, De Hullu, PP. 40ff. 
due on December 10th an amount of fl. 180,000 was still owing, and the 
Council requested that the four contributing provinces pay this sum and 
advance the fl. 200,000 payable by January 10th. The States promised 
to do so, but on condi tion that for the next three months the garrisons 
of Holland, Zeeland and Friesland would be changed only after the consent 
I 
of the stadholder and the provincial States had been received. 
This condition was made before the States were aware of the Act 
of Restriction. That Act was not discovered until December 16th, when 
members of the States General visited the Council to submit a plan for 
the reduction of the army. The plan had been prepared in cooperation 
with Bardesius and Teelinck, and under the direction of the Count of 
2 Hohenlohe. The Council itself had asked for Hohenlohe's advice, although 
in doing so it had undoubtedly acted against the wishes of Thomas Wilkes. 
Wilkes resented Hohenlohe's interference, for Hohenlohe and Holland were 
hand in glove during these months. The States needed his help in order 
to regain control over the military establishment, and Hohenlohe was 
prepared to give it. His services to the States were hardly less 
valuable than those of Maurlce, and his role was a more active one. 
Maurlce was of course indispensable; much of what seemed of questionable 
legality in the States' innovations could be jusltfied with a reference 
to Maurice's commission, or else to the powers possessed by his 
I . 
Res. Ho. 1587, PP. 414.416. 
2 Brugmans, 11, 432f. 
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1 predecessors. Maurice cooperated, but there is not much evidence of 
personal initiative on his side. Hohenlohe however, who had long been 
tired of his subordinate position under the English governor, became 
one of the central figures in the anti-English and anti-Leicesterian 
2 
movement. 
Since Leicester's departure Hohenlohe had, as Wilkes informed 
Walsingham, been busy strengthening his own and weakening the English 
3 position by assuring himself of the frontier towns. The plans for the 
reduction of the Dutch and German companies, made after his "fantasle 
and mynd" were, still according to Wilkes, highly selective; pro-EngliSh 
companies were assigned to be dismissed and companies at Hohenlohe's and 
4 
the States' devotion retained. These plans were concerned not only with 
the reduction of the Dutch and German troops but also with their disposal 
into garrisons. In a number of cases they were aSSigned to towns which 
Leicester had reserved for the English army. The Council therefore had 
to oppose the plans and it produced the Act of Restriction. The 
disclosure had no other effect than annoying the States' deputies, and 
especially Oldenbarnevelt, who "entered into choller and envayed 
indiscreetly against the said acte". The plans were not drastically 
changed and the Council, which had been warned that no money would be 
I Res. St. Gen., V,.535. 
2 Brugmans, 11, 429. 
3 Cal. For., XXI, 11, p. 253. 
4 Brugmans, I, 310. 
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forthcoming unless it followed the States' lists, accepted these. Wilkes 
1 
and Norris alone seem to have voted against acceptance. 
The Act of Restriction provided the States with one argument to 
justify their procedures in limiting the Council's powers. Another and 
more potent one was provided by Stanley's and Yorke's treason. Ihe 
danger of an adverse popular reaction to the States' anti-Leicesterian 
measures, and the fear of unduly annoying the English government had 
so far been restraining influences. The first possibility had now been 
removed, and the second seemed greatly diminished. Disastrous as the 
loss of Deventer and the IJsel forts might be from a military point of 
view, the treason by Leicester's nominees and favourites served a highly 
useful political purpose. 
The surrender took place in the morning of January 29th, but it 
had been expected for some time. Rumours that one of Yorke's lieutenants 
was in correspondence with De Tassis at Zutphen had become current less 
than a month after Leicester's departure, and the magistrate of Deventer 
2 
had long expressed its distrust of Stanley's intentions. The plans may 
well have been made when Leicester returned to England, leaving his 
governors to the charity of States and Council who, as they knew, had 
objected to their appointments. The two garrisons were ill-paid, but 
they were probably no worse supplied than others. Poverty was general 
1 Brugmans, I, 311f; 11, 432f. 
2 Brugmans, I, 290, 302, 305f, 312f, 338f; 11, 436f; Bor, 11, 878f. 
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among the soldiers, Dutch as well as English. The last payment from 
England had been received in November and had in large part been used 
to cover arrears and to help finance the autumn campaign. The next 
1 
shipment of money was to come in March, but already in February wants 
among the English soldiers were such that with Norris' consent some of 
them entered the confines of Holland, where they prepared to organize 
a raid on The Hague to demand payment. Wilkes was forced to borrow 
money from the States of Holland for distribution among the soldiers to 
2 help prevent their design. 
The Council of State had been promised a month's payment to the 
soldiers in the States' charge, to which the garrisons of Deventer and 
3 the. Zutphen forts belonged. A promise did not necessarily mean, however, 
that the money would be disbursed without lengthy delays or without 
important deductions. The Councillors complained, as Leicester before 
them, that the contributions were "paid in paper" instead of ready money.4 
Towns refused to receive the ill-provided garrisons, mutinies threatened, 
and rumours about intended treason were heard from many sides. On 
January 17th the French captain Marchant, whom Hohenlohe had put in 
command of Wouw castle after Leicester's departure, made his peace with 
the enemy. Hohenlohe had tried to prevent Marchant's surrender by 
1 Neale, Essays, p. 189. 
2 Bor, lIt 886f; Brugmans, 11, 452f. 
3 Bor, Il, 787. 
4 .. 
Res. St. Gen s ' V,667f; Brugmans, I1, 19, 441f. 
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1 force. Norris contemplated using the same procedure with respect to 
Yorke and Stanley, but the Council of State, fearful that a show of 
force might induce the two men to admit Spanish troops, restrained him. 2 
The anti-English reaction which followed Stanley's and Yorke's 
treason increased in violence when English companies in Zwolle, Arnhem 
and Ostend deserted to the enemy and when it was rumoured that Englishmen 
3 in Bergen op Zoom were in correspondence with Parma. Stories were spread 
that Stanley's and Yorke's action was the result of a concerted plan, 
inspired by the Queen or by Leicester himself, and for a time all 
4 Englishmen were distrusted. The soldiers were even less welcome to the 
towns than they had been previously, and their increased vagabonding in 
the rural areas served to intenSify the anti-English feelings among the 
Dutch population. Even the city of Utrecht, where Norris had hoped to 
find lodging for part of his roaming soldiery, for a time refused to 
help him out. When presenting Norris' patent the captain of a company 
sent to that town was advised by Brakel to go and lodge his unreliable 
5 troops elsewhere. 
The States made no attempt to stem the frenzy. Oldenbarnevelt 
had in fact helped to set the tone when during a visit to the Council 
IBor, 11, 878; Brugmans, 1, 303. 
2 Bor, 11,.879, 886. 
3 . 
Ibid., p. 925. 
4 . 
Cal. For., XXI, ii, p. 382; XXI, iii, pp. 43f. 
5BM, Cotton Mss., Galba C XI, fOe 89; Cal. For., XXI, ii, p. 359. 
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he attacked not only Leicester, but the entire English nation. On that 
occasion Van Loozen, Wilkes and George Gilpin, English secretary in the 
1 Council, had defended the English and counselled moderation. There 
were others who objected to the accusations levied at the ally. Prouninck 
2 
wrote a defence of the English, and at Wilkes' request the Council issued 
a decree forbidding the "defamation of the English nation".3 Because it 
was in defence of Leicester the Council published it not on hiS, but on 
its_own authority. The States of Holland objected to this solution and 
refused to publish the decree on the ground that it should have been in 
4 Leicester's name, or else in that of the States General. It is not 
clear whether they came back on their refusal. Late in April the College 
of States' Deputies was to allow the publication of another "placard" in 
defence of the English, but this second one contained a provision aiming 
5 
at the suppression of libels against the States as well. By that time 
the political divisions of pre-treason days were reasserting themselves. 
IBMHG 
-' 
XXXIV, 149-153. 
2 Bor, I1, 883f. 
3 Res: St: Gen: , V, 535. 
4 Bor, 1I, 882f. 
5Res • Ho. 1587, pp. l24f. The States General itself had in fact asked 
for the publication of such a decree, and the document in question, 
although published in Leicester's name, had been drafted by the 
Advocate of Holland. ARA, Index Bogaers, 11, fOe 598. 
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In the intervening period Holland had been able, however, to 
conclude its reorganization. Its States began by repeating their earlier 
decision that the Council was not to have any power over the garrisons of 
Holland. l Attention was also given to the removal of suspected elements 
from the Dutch army. The pro-English commanders of Muiden and Gorcum 
were replaced and the garrison of Woerden, which also seems to have been 
2 distrusted, was changed. The States were unable however to reduce the 
governor of the Northern Quarter to their obedience. Sanoy refused to 
relinquish the commission given him by Leicester, and attempts to dislodge 
3 him by force were unsuccessful. 
One of the major changes introduced after the treason was 
Maurice's Act of Authority. It was passed in the course of February 
with an almost unanimous vote, only Dordrecht and Gorcum oPPosing it.4 
By this Act all power over the military establishment in Holland and 
Zeeland was given to Maurice and Hohenlohe. Every officer serving there 
was to accept a commission from the stadholder and to take a new oath of 
obedience to him and to the provincial States, and no soldiers would be 
admitted, or allowed to pass through the two provinces, unless they had 
Mauriee's patents. Before Leicester or the Council could introdUce any 
measures affecting the military situation in Holland and Zeeland they 
1 Res. Ho. 1587, p. 34. 
2 Bor,.II, 893. 
3 . 
Ibid., pp. 895ff. 
4 Bor, 11, 894; Res, Ho. 1587. pp. 90f. 
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had, in other words, to ask Maurice's permission. 
The States intended to have the Act of Authority effectuated and 
proceeded to incorporate it, together with the new Admiralty regulations, 
into their Act of Consent for the renewal of the contributions. l This 
Consent, which was given on March 9th, at the same time deprived the 
Council of the power to administer Holland's money. It provided that 
Holland would continue payment of its share in the fl. 200,000 per month, 
but on condition that a number of deductions were made. The most 
important of these were: (1) Holland's share of Leicester's salar~ as 
well as the salaries of Maurice, Hohenlohe and other officers serving in 
Holland, (2) the money needed for the payment of garrisons in Holland 
and in those frontier towns for which it had assumed financial 
2 
responsibility, (3) the sums needed for the victualling of frontier 
towns and the money required to pay the debts made in providing these 
towns the previous year, and (4) whatever sums might be considered 
necessary to help provide for the maintenance of the navy. If any money 
was left after these deductions had been made, it would only be paid on 
lSee for Holland's Act of Consent Res. St. Gen., V, 679-689. 
2At least since January 1585 Holland had agreed to pay the garrisons 
of a number of towns that formed an immediate line of defence around 
its own territory (ARA, SG 3780, fOe 26). These included in 1587 the 
Zuiderzee and IJsel towns of Staveren, Blokzijl, Kampen, Zwolle, Elburg 
and Hardewijk, as well as Bommel, Tiel, Buren, Willemstad and a few 
other places on or near its south-eastern frontier. Res. St. Gen" 
V, 680. 
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condition that Leicester's "apostUles" on the November remonstrance 
were carried out, that Holland was relieved of vagabonding soldiers, 
and that the military administration was reformed in such a way that the 
soldiers could be paid at least every forty-eight days. The Council 
lacked the money and the authority to fulfil these conditions and so 
forfeited the right to administer Holland's contributions. The 
reorganization at the provincial level had been completed. 
II 
By this time the States had also succeeded in reorganizing the 
central government. The Council's term of office had ended on February 4th. 
On that day the States General had renewed its commission for three months 
and it had reappointed the members for Holland, Zeeland, Gelderland and 
Overijsel. The Seigneur van Brakel however, whom Leicester in the summer 
of 1586 had appointed to represent Utrecht, was dismissed. His place was 
to be taken either by Paul Buys or by such other person as the States 
General would choose from a nomination submitted by the provincial 
States. The Fleming van Meetkerke also lost his office, and in order 
to reduce the influence of his compatriot Daniel de Burchgrave, one of 
Leicester's secretaries, it was decreed that henceforth no "outsiders" 
would be admitted to the Council's discussions. l The two members for 
Friesland, Hessel Aysma and Yelger Feitsma, had left the Council a few 
days earlier. They had recently been chosen by Leicester, the first 
1 . 
Res, St. Gen" V, 712f. 
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as candidate of the towns of Friesland and the second as Westergoo's 
1 
nominee. The States General however had refused to acknowledge the 
appointments. Its arguments were that it had not yet been informed of 
Friesland's decision to submit itself to Leicester's government by 
accepting the Act of Authority, and that it was not certain whether the 
2 
nomination for Councillors had indeed been legal. In fact neither of 
the two men seems to have been interested in the office. 3 Feitsma had 
anticipated the national assembly's verdict by offering his reSignation. 
Meetkerke and Van Loozen remonstrated with the States General about its 
refusal to admit Aysma, but he also appeared willing to accept the States' 
4 decision. 
At this time, and in the months to come, most Councillors would 
probably have been grateful to have a similar excuse as the Friesian 
representatives. Membership in a Council that was deprived of its 
authority, troubled by creditors, and unable to introduce order into the 
political, financial and military chaos, was not an agreeable function. 
On February 6th Wilkes, Brederode, Loozen, Bardesius and Buys, the only 
Councillors present at the time, had told the States that the rearrange. 
ment of February 4th was unacceptable to them, in the first place because 
not enough members were left, and in the second because the Act of 
l~, XXXIV, 71. 
2 Bor, 1I, 927. 
3ARA, Index Bogaers, Ill, fOe 411. 
4 . 
Res, St, Gen., V. 710f, 
Continuation had not been accompanied by a monetary grant. Without 
sufficient personnel and without money the government could not function, 
and they therefore offered their resignation. The States promised to 
consider the objections and at their request most of the Councillors 
agreed to serve for another month. 1 Buys however resigned his membership. 
Holland's Act of Consent of March 9th deprived the government of whatever 
financial independence it had possessed, and no increase in membership 
took place. At Wilkes' suggestion the Council asked the States General 
2 to appoint a member for Flanders, but the States refused this request. 
3 Friesland and Utrecht neglected to submit a nomination; the latter 
province on the ground that the right to appoint Councillors belonged 
4 to Leicester. Seeing no improvement, the Council repeated its offer of 
5 6 
resignation. For a while Bardesius retired from the government, but 
somehow the States succeeded in inducing the other members to continue 
in office until Leicester's return. 
If the Dutch Councillors had their problems, Wilkes was in an 
even less enviable position. So long as it was not certain that Leicester 
1 Res. St. Gen" V, 713f. 
2ARA , Index Bogaers, Ill, fo. 645f. 
3 Res. St. Gen" V, 719, 722. 
4 Bor, 11, 965. 
5· . 
Res. St. Gen., V, 717, 721; ARA, Index Bogaers, Ill, fos. 4l5f. 
6·· . 
Cat. For., XXI, ii, p. 428. Under Buckhurst h. was back in function; 
Bor, 11, 969. 
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would resign, Wilkes would be considered responsible for the maintenance 
of the governor's authority, and that in the first place by Leicester 
himself. Wilkes knew that by his reports of the previous autumn he had 
incurred Leicester's wrath, and recent intelligence from England had 
I informed him that his hostility continued. Although he was innocent 
of the innovations in the Netherlands, it was nevertheless to be expected 
that they would be put to his account. Another of his problems was that 
there were no guarantees of the Queen's willingness to resign herself to 
the situation in the provinces by agreeing to a change in the treaty. 
Until this happened he was bound to try and uphold the treaty regulations, 
which provided for the maintenance of the Council's power. 
As a result of illness Wilkes had been absent from the Council 
2 during part of the critical month of February. Apparently he had not 
neglected to issue written remonstrances against the States' measures, 
and upon his recovery he resumed his verbal protests. Eventually the 
States decided to give him an official hearing. In March, during one 
of his frequent visits to the Council, Oldenbarnevelt suggested that 
Wilkes inform the States of his objections to their policies. They were 
prepared, he promised, to answer his complaints and capable of defending 
themselves against the accusation that they had in any way encroached 
3 
upon Leicester's rights. The challenge resulted in a lengthy discussion 
I CaI. Dom., Addenda 1580.1625, P. 203. 
2 Brugmans, 11, 450. 
3 ~, p. 454. 
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1 wherein Wi1kes, seconded by Leoninus, Loozen and Tee1inck, mentioned 
the ways in which the treaty, Leicester's prerogatives and the Council's 
authority had been violated. The discussion in question derives its 
Importance not so much from this catalogue of grievances as from the fact 
that it led to the submission of a written remonstrance by Wilkes, in the 
concluding section of which he questioned the legality of the manner in 
which the States exercised their authority. Hereby he invited the States 
of Holland to produce their famous "Deduction", a document that 
constitutes the first official declaration regarding the basis of States' 
authority and States' sovereignty. 
The argument of March centred around the question to what extent 
the States were justified in acting as the country's sovereigns. On a 
number of occasions during Leicester's government they had referred to 
their sovereign rights. As Professor Fruin has pointed out, this 
practice grew as a result of the circumstances. 2 When Elizabeth objected 
to the grant of "sovereign authority" to Leicester, and when Leicester 
used his powers in a manner unacceptable to the States or considered 
them to be more extensive than they had intended them to be, the States 
had defended their actions and opposition with the argument that the 
sovereignty was and remained theirs. During the discussions on the Act 
of Authority for example, when Sldney asked whether the governor general 
1 BM, Add. Mss. 48,083, fOe 15. 
2 ... 
Verspr, Geschr., Ill, 191. 
• I 
might freely dismiSS and appoint local governors, the deputies had replied 
that this was the prerogative of the provincial States, tlwho now possessed 
the sovereignty of the country,..l Reference had further been made to 
States' sovereignty, as has been seen, in the course of the conflict 
2 
about Brabant's confiscations and ecclesiastical goods. 
When after Leicester's departure the States were not merely 
trying to keep his authority within the bounds of his commission but 
rather to reduce it, they did this again on the strength of their 
sovereign rights. They had emphasized this fact during the discussions 
3 
with Wilkes and his supporters in the Council. In his remonstrance 
4 Wilkes objected to this practice. In the absence of a prince, he told 
them, the sovereignty of the country did not belong to the States -- and 
the context shows that he referred to the deputies to the assemblies 
but to the people, whose "servants, ministers and deputies" the States 
were. That the States' deputies could not be called sovereigns was 
evident from the fact that their commissions were limited to a certain 
time and that they were bound by instructions. Sovereign powers, on the 
other hand, could not be but absolute. He went on to argue that the 
1 Brugmans, I, 48. 
2 p. 123 above. 
3 Brugmans, 11, 455. 
4 The remonstrance has been printed by Bor, 11, 918-921, and in part by 
Jan Hughes, Het leven en bedri1f van Mr. Franchois Vranck (The Hague, 
1909), pp. 69f, who used a copy of the French original. Quotations are 
from the second source. 
States did not even represent the sovereignty, because the people had 
given the administration of it to Leicester, and this right continued 
to belong to him until the people recalled it. Wilkes summarized and 
concluded his argument with the words, "Joinct que suivant la regle du 
droict commun (quo Jure quid statuitur eodem Jure tolli debet) voz 
Seigneuries ont est~ plainement auctorisez par les provinces, par les 
villes, ou pour mieulx dire par voz Maitres et Sup~rieurs de defferer 
ce Gouvernement a son Exce, s'ensuit que est besoing de semblable povoir 
et auctorisation pour le luy oster ou du tout ou en partie. Et si voz 
Seigneuries n 'ont eu ceste commission pour luy rentrancher de son authori ta 
ou du Conseil d'Estat ••• s'ensuit de deux choses l'une, ou que voz 
Seigneuries n'ont pas bien entendu ce qu'ilz ont faict ••• ou plustost 
que voz Seigneuries ont encourru le crime de desobeissance, puisque si 
solemnellement vous luy avez jure et promis ob8issance". 
The States' Deduction was drawn up by Franchois Vranck, pensionary 
1 of Gouda. It opened with an exposition of the States' functions before 
the abjuration of Philip 11. The substance of this introductory section, 
which was based more on legend than on historical fact, was that for 
eight centuries the Counts of Holland and Zeeland had received their 
sovereign rights from the nobility and the towns, representing the 
estates of the country; that until Philip's accession the Counts had 
tended to rule In conformity with the States' advice; and that, in the 
lFor the Deduction see Bor, 11, 921-924. 
• 
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temporary absence of a ruler, the States had either administered the 
sovereignty or else established a special governor (a ruwaard) to take 
the prince's place. 
Vranck went on to inform Wilkes that the thirty or forty deputies 
to the assemblies were indeed not the States. Whoever said so was 
ignorant of their actual function. The situation was as follows: the 
Counts having received their government from the people (the landzaten) 
had been obliged to rule with due regard for the people's interests. To 
prevent tyranny on the prince's part, it had been necessary that the 
people supervised him. It was impossible for them to do so directly, 
and therefore they had divided themselves into two estates, the towns, 
governed by their vroedschappen, and the nobility. The magistrates and 
the nobles, who "represented the entire state and the whole corpus of 
the landzaten", sent their deputies to the States' assemblies to represent 
the estates of the country before the prince. These deputies, it was 
emphasized once again, were "not in their persons or because of their 
own authority the States, but they merely represented, on the strength 
of their commission, their principals". It followed that if any deputy 
acted or resolved otherwise than according to his instructions, he 
committed an offence. But any such imputations, the States concluded, 
would have to be substantiated. He who accused the deputies without 
cause played a d~gerous game, and this was particularly true in the 
case of a prince, who could not expect to achieve much wi thout the "good 
correspondence of his subjects". The ruler who took hls stand against 
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the States did not merely oppose the people's representatives but the 
people themselves. 
Both Wilkes' and Vranck's arguments have been given in Some 
detail because of the misconceptions that have arisen around the 
Deduction, the remonstrance, and the political theories of Dutch centralists 
like Prouninck and his associates, a group that had been in the habit of 
voicing similar objections to the States' practice as Wilkes had done 
and that may have inspired Wilkes' exposition. One of these errors, 
which has been exposed by Professor Huizinga and later by Professor 
Geyl, was that by their Deduction the States should have proclaimed 
I their independent sovereign authority. As the two historians have 
pointed out and as has become apparent from the preceding paragraph, 
this was not implied in Vranck's statement. The emphasis was on the 
representative character of the States' sovereignty and on the fact 
that it was derived from the people. Such a theory did not necessarily 
have any democratic implications. Professor Kossmann has shown that 
the principle of popular sovereignty could be and was used as the 
theoretieal foundation for most forma of government, including the 
lJ. Huizinga, Verzamelde Werken (Haarlem, 1948), 11, 48f; p. Geyl, ~, 
XII (1957), 44-48. Both historians objected particularly to the 
presentation of the argument by Fruin (Verspr. Geschr., Ill, 202), who 
seemed to imply that the Deduction intended to give a justification of 
the oligarchic practice and neglected to mention Vranck's emphasis on 
the fact that the States claimed no absolute, but only a derivative 
sovereignty. 
2GB 
1 
aristocratic-oligarchic one established by the States. But although 
the people had no means of asserting their rights and few of preventing 
their rulers from behaving as independent sovereigns, the States' own 
admission that there was no justificatlon for such absolutlsm nevertheless 
served as a safeguard. In future centuries advocates of popular rights 
were to refer to the Deduction in their attacks upon the oligarchic 
2 
system. 
Another and more general misunderstanding is that Wilkes' 
political theory was basically different from that of the States. In 
the publication just cited Professor Kossmann has drawn attention to 
this error, and to the fact that it has persisted in spite of attempts 
by the early 19th century historian Kluit to rectify it. 3 It had been 
Kluit's intention to refute Wagenaar's interpretation of Wilkes' 
remonstrance as a democratic document. Kluit did not admit that either 
Vranck or Wilkes had based their arguments on the principle of popular 
sovereignty. He rather seems to have attempted to exonerate the latter 
from the imputation of having done so by suggesting that throughout his 
remonstrance he must have equated people or gemeenten with urban 
lE. H. Kossmann, "Bodin, Althusius en Parker, ofl over de modernltelt 
van de Nederlandse opstand", Opstellen door vrienden en collega's 
aangeboden aan Dr. F. K. H. Kossmann (The Hague, 1958), pp. 90f. 
2p. Geyl, OPe cit., pp. 47f. 
3 E. H. Kossmann, Ope cit., p. 85. See also his review of Professor 
Geylts article on the Deduction; Revue du Nord, XXXIX (1957), 261. 
magistrates. l He convincingly showed, however, that Wilkes did not 
oppose Vranck's view that the "effective" sovereignty belonged to the 
two estates, rather than to the masses. Wilkes had stated that the 
right to give instructions was the clearly recognizable attribute of 
sovereignty, and that this right belonged to the nobles and the 
magistrates. These were the States' deputies' masters, to whom they 
were to go for further instructions if they wished to introduce measures 
for which no authorization had yet been given. 2 
Later historians have tended to ignore these arguments. 
Dlsregarding or minimizing the States' own reliance on the idea of 
popular sovereignty they have implied that Wilkes introduced either an 
entirely new political concept, or else that he propounded a more direct 
kind of popular sovereignty than the Deduction had done. Fruin, for 
example, referred to the ideas held by Wilkes and by Leicester's 
partisans as a "novel doctrine", advanced by a "revolutionary party 
which wanted a popular government with a dictator at its head".3 
Professor Huizinga implied that there was a difference in theory by 
suggesting that in the argument between Wilkes and Vranck only the latter 
represented the Calvinist principle, which pOinted to the lower 
IVranck's biographer, Mr. J. Huges, has rightly objected to this 
interpretation (Het leven en bedrijf van Mr. Franchois Vranck, pp. 70-72). 
Huges failed to notice however that Vranck also had based his argument on 
the princlple of popular sovereignty, and that consequently the latter's 
theory was no less democratic (if that term must be used) than Wilkes'. 
2 Kluit, 11, 285f, 310-313. 
3- .. 
Verspr. Geschr., Ill, 201, 203. 
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magistrates, that is to a representative aristocracy, as the successors 
I 
of a lawfully abjured prince. According to Professor Geyl the States 
had "in opposition to Wilkes (and the Calvinists of Utrecht behind him) 
f I i "2 rejected the theory 0 popu ar sovere gnty ••• Additional examples 
3 
could be given, but the preceding ones sufficiently indicate the manner 
in which the ideas of the Deduction and the remonstrance have been 
juxtaposed. 
It is true that Wilkes put greater stress on the people's rights 
than the States had done, but there were practical reasons for this 
difference in emphasis. Wilkes' problem was to keep Leicester's and 
n 
the Council's authority in tact, and the politically vocal part of the 
population shared this aim. He wished to warn the States that they 
should consider the people's wishes, and he probably also intended to 
remind the people of their political rights. Popular pressure upon the 
magistrates might have some beneficial effects. The fact however that 
Wilkes and the States disagreed on such practical matters does not 
disprove the similarity in their political theories. 
I J • Huiziga, Ope cit., p. 49. 
2p. Geyl, Ope cit., p. 44. 
3See e. g. P. J. Blok, Geschiedenls van het Nederlandsche Volk (3rd ad.; 
Leiden, 1924), 11, 254, 255; 1. H. Gosses and N. Japiks., Handboek tot 
de Staatkundige Geschiedenis van Nederland (3rd ed.; The Hague, 1947), 
P. 420; and J. C. H. de Pater in Algemene Geschledenis der Nederlanden 
(Utrecht, 1952), V, 301f. 
291 
It is also questionable whether Prounlnck and other Dutch 
centralists demanded the introduction of democratic reforms in the 
national constitution. The two publications mentioned by Professor 
Fruin in proof of the revolutionary character of Prouninck's theories 
1 do not touch upon the question of direct or indirect popular sovereignty. 
2 One of these is a letter to Leicester, written on May 22nd 1587. In this 
epistle Leicester was told that the estate of the country was democratic, 
and that the sovereignty belonged not to the States but to the people. 
Prouninck neglected on this particular occasion to define the term 
ttdemocratic", but he had done so In another letter to the governor. 
Therein he suggested that the States be bidden to answer the question 
whether in the absence of a prince the State was aristocratic or 
democratic. "Si arlstocratlque", thus Prouninck, "u ny a qung membre 
de leur estat, asscavoir les nobles out Optimates, et alors est 
impertinent de dire Les Estatz, au lieu qu'on debvrolt dire LtEstat. 
Mais se trouvant entre les estatz plus dung membre, asscavoir en telle 
province deux, les nobles et les villas, en telle trolx, Clerg., nobles 
3 
et villes l'estat du pays est democratiqu.... To have a democratic state 
it was evidently not necessary, in Prouninck's opinion, that the sov.reign 
people be allowed direct influence upon the establishment of their 
1 Fruin, Verspr. Geschr., Ill, 201. 
2 Part of this letter was quoted by Motley, 1I, 231. It is printed in 
full in ~, XXXIV, 218-229. 
3BM, Stowe Mss. 163, fo. 11. See also the Appendix. no. Ill. 
2S2 
government. 1 
The assertions made by Prouninck in his letter of May 22nd, 
seditious as undoubtedly they would have appeared to the States, could 
nevertheless have been footnoted with a reference to the Deduction 
itself. This is also true of the pamphlet which he wrote in the early 
2 
months of 1588, the second publication mentioned by Professor Fruln. 
Herein Prouninck objected to the States' habit of referring to themselves 
as the nation's sovereigns. One of his arguments was that it would create 
a strange impression in foreign countries if "Hans Brewer, Hans 
Cheesemerchant, Hans Miller" etcetera, "being the instruments of 
sovereign pensionaries", compared themselves to princes and potentates. 
Another reason was that the system of multi-headed sovereignty had not 
worked. For that very reason the States had given Leicester and his 
Council the right to administer the sovereignty, excepting only such 
matters as by the treaty and the Act of Authority had expressly been 
reserved to the States themselves. This centralized authority was, 
lCf. the definition of the terms "aristocratic" and '·democratic" in 
another centralist paper, which was unSigned but may well have been 
written by Prouninck. "Comment et par queUe. ralsons", the author 
of this document asked, "[ peut-on] prouver que cet Estat est arlstocratique 
" d" " et non democratlque; atten u que, • faute de Prince legitime, la 
souverainlte est retournee au peuple, et que les Estats ne sont que 
d~putez pour se trouver en l'as~emblee et traitter des affaire. de 
l'estat avect limitation et reces a leurs vllles, vroetschappen et 
colleges, et qu'ils peuvent estre revoquez et desavouez, quand 11 
plaist a leurs malstres ••• ? Groen van Prinsterer, Archives, 11, i, p. 39. 
2 Bor, Ill, 205-207. 
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according to Prounlnck, the only solution to the country's constitutional 
and practical problems. He therefore advised the States that they uphold 
the central government's powers and that they refrain from asserting 
their own authority and sovereign rights. He did not imply however that 
in the absence of such an arrangement the States were not entitled to 
exercise the sovereignty on the people's behalf. After the abjuration 
of the King of Spain "the direction and use of the sovereign powers", 
he stated, tlhad come to those who as States represented the people of 
the coun try" • 1 
Similar arguments as those used by Wilkes and Prouninck appear 
to have been brought forward by the Professor of Theology Adriaan Saravia, 
another critic of the States' practice, who was to be exiled in connection 
with the pro-Leicesterlan coup attempted in Leiden in the autumn of 1587. 
In a letter written a year after his banishment Saravia stated that in 
the early. months of 1587 he had openly criticized the habit of referring 
to the members of the States' assemblies as sovereigns, and as such the 
superiors of Leicester. He had based his objections on the fact that 
the deputies were no more that ''Estats representatifs", bound by the 
instructions of their principals. Whil. maintaining that the people 
were sovereign and that the country's constitution was clearly a 
I 
"Want door de verlatinge des Koninks van Spangien ••• is wet de beleydinge 
en het gebruyk van de souveraine magt gekomen aen den genen die het volk 
van den lande staets-gewijsde zyn representerende ••• " ~, p. 206. 
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"popular" one, he also referred not to the masses but to the nobility 
and the "corps des villes" as the deputies' masters. 1 
Prouninck's declaration about the States' representative 
sovereignty, which was in agreement with the States' own theory, did not 
contradict Wilkes' remonstrance. Wilkes had denied the States' deputies 
this title, but only because the power to administer the sovereignty had 
been transferred to Leicester. The admission that the assemblies would 
resume their former rights once the Act of Authority was legally withdrawn 
was implied in the statement that they were the delegates of the local 
sovereigns. 
There indeed seems to be no reason to assume that either Wilkes 
or the Dutch centralists would have disagreed with the constitutional 
theory given in the Deduction. Their quarrel with the States was rather 
that these forgot their theories and acted in the assemblies as an 
independent aristocracy, by passing their decrees and resolutions without 
definite authorization by their principals. A related complaint was that 
the assemblies were dominated by a small, closely-knit group of men, 
mainly pensionaries, who were regularly deputed to the States' meetings. 
This group included people like Oldenbarnevelt, Franchoia Vranck, 
Dr. Maelson, pensionary of Enkhuizen and leader of the States of the 
Northern Quarter, Florls Thin (before his exile), and the Friesian 
IBM, Cotton Mss., Calba DIll, fos. 227-229. Saravia's argument also 
has been given in extenso in the Appendix. (No. IV). 
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deputy Care I Roorda. Because of their ability and experience, their 
power of patronage, and their association with politically, economically 
and militarily influential circles, these members had been able to set 
themselves up as the actual policy makers and to impose their will upon 
1 the country. 
In these critical months the tendency was of cours particularly 
strong to push measures through the assemblies without reference to the 
local governments. One of these measures, which was to create a major 
political storm, had been taken shortly after the loss of Deventer and 
the IJsel forts. On February 4th it had been decided to send a letter 
containing information about the treason by Leicester's appointees, 
together with an exhaustive list of the governor general's own 
misdemeanours, to Leicester himself and to the Queen. The letter in 
question had been drawn up by the Advocate of Holland, accepted by the 
provincial assembly without reference to the towns, and sent out in the 
name of the States General again without consultation with the prOVincial 
assemblies. Care seems to have been taken instead to keep the measure a 
2 
secret from the towns and the prOVincial States. 
The States did not leave this argument entirely unanswered. In 
their Deduction they pointed out that no deputy could make decisions on 
ISee in this connection the suggestion made by a member of the opposition 
that it would be better if the deputies to the States' assemblies were 
replaced every six or twelve months. Groen van Prinsterer, Archives, lIt 
i, p. 40. 
2 Fruin, Verspr. Geschr., Ill, 198. The letter occurs in Bor, 11, 943-945. 
his own authority; he was bound by the instructions of his principals. 
This did not mean however that he had to refer all new business to 
them. In war time the delegates were "generally authorized" to resolve 
on matters concerning the conservation of the country, the privileges, 
and similar issues. Wilkes could of course have objected that a deputy 
might interpret such a general authorization in a broader sense than 
his principals had intended. At the meeting which decided about the 
letter of February 4th the representatives of Gelderland and Zeeland 
had assumed that it allowed them to approve of this measure. The States 
of Zeeland seem to have agreed, but those of Ge1derland, informed by 
Utrecht of the contents of the letter, disavowed and threatened to 
I 
recall their deputy. 
The centrallsts were correct in asserting that there was a 
discrepancy between the States' theory and practice, but they were 
fighting for a lost cause and their ideas were consequently unrealistic. 
They would be practicable only under a centralized system, and the 
dominant group in the States had already decided in favour of decentrali-
zation. The confederacy was to remain a confederacy, and powers of 
government were destined to be held by the States,General. If that 
system was to be at all workable it was essential that a limited group 
of men took control of affairs and forced measures through. Attempts 
to obstruct this development, by wielding the popular weapon or by 
1 Bor, 11, 960; Res. St. Gen" V, 496. 
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other means, were bound to be ineffective. Wi1kes came to realize 
this and before long turned into an eloquent defender of the States' 
1 rights. Prouninck however continued his policy of attempting to 
paralyze the States General as an executive body and of inciting the 
populace against the States. 
As a political outlaw and as an exile who had found a champion 
of the southern cause in Leicester, Prouninck had of course more to 
lose by Holland's political victory and the governor general's defeat 
than Wilkes. It is clear however that he was not alone in objecting 
to the course followed by the States General; to many in the country 
that course seemed a desperate, if not an irresponsible one. There 
were no guarantees yet that the States' system of government would work 
where formerly it had failed; it remained probable that the States 
General's approach constituted a risk with respect to the English 
alliance; and it was also likely that Holland, if England should 
withdraw, would be forced to leave the other provinces largely to their 
own resources. If Prouninck and his fellow-exiles were the most 
desperate of the States' opponents they were able to enlist support 
for their programme among the native population, both in the inland 
and in the maritime provinces. 
I Brugmans, 11, 398-402. 
CHAPTER VII I 
THE SECOND YEAR OF THE ALLIANCE 
AND OF LEICESTER'S GOVERNORSHIP 
I 
While the States were reasserting their power and curtailing 
English influence, an official Dutch embassy in England was offering 
the sovereignty of the countries to Elizabeth, asking her for Leicester's 
speedy return, and imploring her to enlarge her aid. The States felt in 
fact no longer any anxiety to stress the first point and they would have 
preferred leaving out the second, had it not been for fear of irritating 
the people and the English ally, but they continued to hope for a liberal 
increase in the English subsidy. Englishmen in the Low Countries shared 
their hope. Although WIlkes and Norrls found it necessary to cooperate 
1 
with and even to encourage the opposition groups, they both realized 
that In the long run the English pOSition in the Netherlands depended 
on the States' attitude, and that that attitude would to a large extent 
be determined by Elizabeth's own. If she should refuse to increase her 
aid and if she continued her peace negotiations, the only solution for 
the English would be, as on February 14th Norris told Wilkes, that they 
resign themselves to the situation in the Netherlands and stopped striving 
I . Calf For" XXI, li, pp. 353, 405f, 415, 420. 
299 
1 
with the Hollanders. In Norris' own opinion and in that of other English 
observers such a capitulation would mean that English influence In the 
provinces would be still further reduced and that the frontier regions 
2 
would be abandoned by Holland. On the other hand, if Elizabeth agreed 
to accept a larger share of the responsibility for the country's defence, 
it might yet be possible to preserve the confederacy and the alliance. 
The results of the negotiations in London, which were awaited 
with such general anxiety, did not become known until the middle of 
3 March. The embassy had arrived in stages. Jacques Valcke and William 
van Zuylen van Nijevelt had left in November or December; the departure 
4 
of the other members was delayed until the end of January. Their first 
5 
meeting with Elizabeth took place on February 5th. It was not an 
encouraging one. The Queen was obviously ill.prepared to make a decision 
on the Dutch issue. The intervention in the Netherlands and other 
defensive measures were placing a heavy financial burden on England. 
Partly as a result of the war situation the country was suffering, 
lCal. For" XXI, ii, p. 353. 
2Ibid., p. 412; Cabala, 11, 11, 15, 33; BM, Cotton Mss., Galba D I, 
fOe 49verso. 
3 Res. Ho. 1587, p. 83. 
4 These were Josse de Menin of Dordrecht, Nicolaas de Sille of Amsterdam, 
and Wytze van Kamminga, deputy of Friesland. 
5The following discussion has been based largely on the official report 
of the negotiations which the Dutch legation submitted to the States 
General. A copy of this report is in ARA, SG 3793, fos. 203.349. The 
larger part of it has been printed by Bor, 11, pp. 872.878, 929f and 
940.953. 
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moreover, from a severe trade and industrial depression, and poor 
harvests aggravated the economic and social problems. Unemployment 
and high prices caused unrest among the poorer classes, who in a number 
of instances reacted by demonstrating against Dutch and other continental 
1 
refugees living in England. There were other problems. When the Dutch 
legation arrived the Queen was preoccupied with the affair of Mary 
Stuart, whose execution -- which seemed inevitable although Elizabeth 
had not yet signed the death warrant -- might lead to difficulties with 
France and Scotland and would bring the war with Spain closer. These 
problems and threats increased Elizabeth's anxiety to find out whether 
a composition might not be possible, and in the meantime to concentrate 
her resources on home defence. 
The fact that under these circumstances the States should suggest 
that she increase her aid annoyed her, and Menin's speech of February 5th, 
wherein he asked her to double her auxiliary, to grant an additional loan 
of fl. 600,000 for a field army, and to reconsider the States' offer of 
sovereignty, elicited an irritable reply. Stress was laid not so much 
on her incapacity to increase her responslbllities as on the ingratitude 
of the States towards herself and their ill-treatment of Leicester, whom, 
contrary to the hopes the Dutch had entertained since Wilkes' embassy, 
she now found it opportune to defend. There is no doubt that the 
1.1. D. Could. "The Crisis in the Export Trade, 1586-87", E!!" LXXI (1956), 
212-222; Acts Privy Council, New Series, XIV, pp. xxx!; Werken der Marnlx 
Vereeniging, Ill, 1,(1873), 143. 
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anti-English measures irritated her and that the States' opposition to 
her lieutenant increased her aversion to the alliance, but these factors 
also provided her with a welcome excuse for her delays or refusals. 
While awaiting the results of the negotiations with Farma she wished her 
aid to the Netherlands to be as inconspicuous as possible, but she 
realized the dangers of a too negative attitude. It would be interpreted 
by the States as an indication of her intention to leave them and to 
force a peace upon the provinces. They might reply by expelling the 
English army and by trying to reach a separate peace with Spain. This 
was to be prevented; so long as there was no guarantee that the war 
could be ended it was necessary that the Dutch remained convinced of 
England's loyalty. Having displayed her grievances she therefore told 
the legation that she intended to continue supporting the Low Countries, 
that she would not negotiate a peace without their consent, and that 
their request for additional aid would be considered. No definite 
reply would be given however until the States had answered her complaints 
I 
and given her satisfaction. The deputies were told to explain their 
requests to the Privy Council, and the following weeks were spent in 
negotiations with Burghley, Walslngham, Leicester, Davison and other 
2 Councillors. The possibility that these discussions would lead to a 
positive decision appeared slight from the beginning. 
I Bor, 11, 872-874. 
2 Ibld" PP. 874-878. 
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Although the deputies were probably right in suspecting that 
the Queen's outspokenly critical reaction was partly a result of 
I Leicester's complaints about the States, he tried in these weeks to 
repair the damage he had done by strenuously seconding the Dutch demands. 
It seems that Stanley's and Yorke's treason for a time convinced him, 
moreover, that the States had some reason for their annoyance. Informed 
of the event he sent Noel de Caron, who upon the conclusion of an embassy 
to Denmark had come to England, back to The Hague. De Caron carried what 
amounted to a message of peace and goodwill to the States General, 
Maurice, Hohenlohe, Meurs, Buys, and the exiles of Utrecht, who were 
promised that all outstanding questions would be promptly and satisfactorily 
2 
settled upon Leicester's return. A separate letter was aent to the 
Advocate of Holland, whom Leicester by this time recognized as the leader 
of the anti-English movement, Leicester informed Oldenbarnevelt that he 
had always appreciated his loyalty to the common cause and asked his 
help in removing the misunderstandings that had arisen under his 
government. Although denying that he himself was to blame for the 
difficulties, he nevertheless expressed the hope that in judging him 
the Dutch politicians would consider how difficult it was for a foreigner 
to become acquainted with their affairs, to choose the right advisers and, 
in short, to govern to the contentment of all. He promised that henceforth 
1 Bor, 11, 874. 
2 BM, Cotton Mas., Galba DIll, fos. 22-24. The State. General's reply 
is in Brugmans, 11, 121-125. 
303 
he would follow the advice of the States, who might rest assured that 
I he would continue supporting the Dutch cause. 
By the middle of February the deputies had been informed that 
for the time being there was little prospect of an increase in the 
English subsidy, and they made plans to leave with Noel de Caron. 
2 Leicester however persuaded them to stay for a while. He hoped that 
the execution of Mary Stuart, which took place on February 18th, would 
induce Elizabeth to a change of policy and to accept a parliamentary 
subsidy for the Dutch war. Parliament was willing to make a considerable 
grant; according to Orte11 it had offered to maintain an army of 13,000 
3 footsoldiers and 2,000 horsemen in the Netherlands. Before long it 
appeared however that by tying the offer to the suggestion that the 
Queen accept the sovereignty over the Low Countries Parliament overshot 
its mark. Elizabeth objected to its attempt to dictate foreign policy 
and refused to accept the offer of a subsidy even after the condition 
4 had been withdrawn. 
The deputies had other reasons to regret the fact that they had 
postponed their departure. Until the end of February there had not been 
IBM, Cotton Mss., Galba DIll, fOe 58. 
2ARA , SG 3793, fos. 259, 266. 
3 S. p. Haak, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, beschelden betreffende zljn 
staatkundlg beleid en zijn familie (The Hague, 1934), I, 123. 
4 . 
Neale, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments, 11, 183. 
a great deal of official information about the changes in the Netherlands 
since the treason, but on March 1st Sir Roger Williams arrived from the 
1 Netherlands with an up-to-date report, and during the following days 
the legation was confronted with complaints about the political and 
military innovations and about the treatment of the English army. One 
week after Sir Roger's arrival the legation received the States General's 
letter of February 4th to Elizabeth and Leicester, with the message that 
It was to be delivered immediately. The deputies obeyed, although expect_ 
ing that thereby "a great fire and discontent would be kindled on every 
side". The effect was indeed disturbing. Leicester was particularly 
annoyed that a copy had been sent to the Queen, and Walsingham and 
Burghley accused the States of gross ingratitude towards their governor. 
Elizabeth soon joined the chorus of disapproval. The letter gave her 
another excuse meanwhile to postpone her decision about the States' 
requests. She told the legation that an ambassador would be sent to 
investigate the situation. If he were able to get satisfaction for her 
she would allow Leicester to return and let the States know whether they 
could expect additional support. Pending the investigation she planned 
to continue her normal aid, but on condition that the States in the 
meantime also ttdid their duty". With this message the legation left. 
Leicester's parting promise was that within four days after receipt of 
lARA, SG 3793, fOe 290. Roger Willlams's report is in Call For., XXI, 
11, pp. 38lf. 
305 
the ambassador's report he would return to the Netherlands. l 
England could not afford to lose the Dutch ally, and the ambassador 
was sent not merely to investigate the situation in the Netherlands, but 
also to remove some of the causes of the disagreements between the 
allies. The man chosen for this task was the scholar-politician Thomas 
Sackville, Lord Buckhurst, a member of the Privy Council and a relative 
of the Queen. He belonged to Burghley's political Circle, but appears 
2 to have enjoyed Leicester's confidence. Leicester was to learn that 
he had mistaken himself in his man, as he had done earlier in Wilkes. 
Buckhurst, who in course of time became the most outspoken of Leicester's 
critics, sympathized from the beginning with the States' position. This 
inclination determined the manner in which he went about his task. Rather 
than insisting upon the satisfaction required by Elizabeth he tried to 
heal the Anglo-Dutch breach and the rift between the States and Leicester 
by compromise. His approach was the only feasible one, and the failure 
of his mission was less a result of his lack of inSight into the problems 
than of the circumstances under which he had to work. The difficulty was 
that by its very nature his task was impossible, and that not merely 
because of the States' wish to loosen their political ties with England, 
but also because of Elizabeth's refusal to satisfy the Dutch in the 
matter of the negotiations with Spain. Rather than promising them that 
t Bor, 11, 941-953. 
'. . 
2 . ," 
Ibid,t p. 952. 
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these negotiations would cease, she ordered Buckhurst to require their 
collaboration in a peace conference. As it was, Holland had small 
intention to restore English influence, and it was utterly disinclined 
to do so when prospects increased that this influence might be used to 
the advantage of Spain. Other causes of Buckhurst's lack of success 
were the Queen's delays in implementing her monetary promises, and the 
fact that these promises were less SUbstantial than had been expected. 
The ambassador's problems were still further increased as a result of 
Leicester's attitude. Leicester demanded the restoration of his former 
authority, but although in his parting message to the legation he had 
repeated his pledge to follow the States' advice in his government,l 
the agitation of his partisans, and his own correspondence with 
2 Prouninck, Sonoy.and others, made It appear questionable to the States 
that he would keep this promise. 
Insofar as his mission was intended to restore Anglo-Dutch 
relations and to prepare the road for Leicester's return as governor 
general, Buckhurst's attempts were destined to fail. He did succeed 
however in temporarily easing the domestic problems. The legation's 
lack of success and the fact that Leicester's return remained questionable 
had caused disquiet among the pro-English groups. The discontent was 
kindled by a letter sent to the Netherlands by Buzanvalle, Navarre's 
I Bor, .11, 952. 
2 . 
Ibid" pp. 985f. 
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1 
agent in London. In this message the Frenchman blamed Elizabeth's 
negative attitude on the States' anti-English and anti-Leicesterian 
measures, and especially on their letter of February 4th. Parliament, 
he wrote, had offered to subsidize an army of 20,000 men, and the Queen 
would have accepted the grant and returned Leicester had it not been 
for the fact that just at that time the States' letter, and reports 
about the treatment of the English soldiers, had arrived in London. 
2 Copies of Buzanvalle's letter were spread throughout the prOVinces, 
and the version given in it was widely believed. The reformed ministers 
3 
of Holland and Zeeland stirred; the population of Amsterdam and other 
towns of Holland loudly proclaimed their discontent with the States' 
4 procedures, and the magistrate of Utrecht wrote letters to the other 
provinces in an attempt to procure a general disavowal of the letter 
5 
of February 4th. 
It was obviously in the States' and in the country's interest 
that these rumours be contradicted, and Buckhurst lost no time in doing 
IThe letter seems to have been addressed to Dr. Hugo Donellus, Professor 
of Civil Law at Leiden University. BM, Add. Mss. 48,014, fOe 460. 
Donellus, whose English and Leicesterian sympathies had earlier made 
him suspect to the magistrate of Leiden, and who appears to have earned 
the hatred of Paul Buys and Hohenlohe as well, was dismissed in April 
1587. ~,XXXIV, 207f; Res. Ho. 1587, pp. 128, l82f, 189. 
2 Bru~ans, 11,.459. 
3R• s • Ho. 1587, p. 141; Notu1en Zeeland 1587, pp. 92, 122. 
4 Cabala, 11, 9; Cal. For., XXI, ii, pP. 405, 426. 
5 Bor, 11, 958f. 
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so. On the 14th of April he had presented the States General and the 
1 Council of State with a list of the Queen's and Leicester's grievances. 
2 The Council made "a very honest, modest, wise answer", but the States 
either contradicted the imputations or eXplained them with a reference 
3 
to the circumstances. In a number of instances Buckhurst suggested 
that the replies were not entirely satisfactory, but he ended by accepting 
the States' defence. Hereupon he sent a letter to the provinces and 
towns, explaining that whatever measures had been taken after the 
treason had been necessary for the country's preservation. It was his 
firm hope, he added, that both the Queen and Leicester would be 
satisfied by the States' explanation, that Elizabeth would not merely 
decide to continue her aid but even to increase it, and that she would 
4 
allow Leicester to return. 
5 The message quieted the disturbances in the country as a whole, 
but Utrecht needed separate treatment. The city magistrate had been 
continuing its attempts to have the letter of February 4th disavowed. 
These attempts had been successful In the case of Gelderland, whose 
States resolved to recall Wijnbergen, their deputy to the States General. 
1 . 
Cal. For" XXI, ili, pP. 6-8. 
2 Ibid. t P. 16. 
3 A copy of abstracts of the States'. replies and the English arbitrators' 
rejoinders is in BM, Add. Mss. 48,014, fos. 291verso_303. 
4 Brugmans, 11, 208-210. 
5 ... 
Cal, For., XXI, Ill, PP. 15, 19. 
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Buckhurst, Leoninus, Sir John Norris and Oldenbarnevelt assured Gelderland 
that no such drastic measures were necessary because the letter had been 
accepted in England in the right spirit and would have no disagreeable 
results. 1 Gelderland then allowed itself to be convinced, but the 
city of Utrecht, which was visited by Buckhurst in April or May, was 
less easily satisfied. Realizing that the ambassador was in agreement 
with Holland's policies, the magistrate rapidly lost confidence in him, 
and Buckhurst's attempt to solve the divisions within the province failed. 2 
The government was willing however to. await the result of Buckhurst's 
negotiations with the States, and for the time being it ended its direct 
agitation against Holland and the States General. 
Buckhurst knew that if.the pacification was to last his promises 
regarding the monetary aid and regarding Leicester's return would have 
to be implemented without delay. The financial discussions were begun 
immediately after the States General had replied to the Queen's 
grievances. On April 16th and 17th Buckhurst, Norris, Maurice and 
Hohenlohe came together with members of the States General and the 
Council of State to draw up a defence budget, the so-called "State of 
War". It was estimated that for the current year a sum of just over 
five million florins would be necessary if for a period of four to five 
months a camp was to be established. In addition to the States' normal 
lsor, 11, 960; 962-964; Res. St. Gen., V, 546f. 
2 Bor, 11, 965. 
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contributions and the Queen's subsidy an amount of fl. 1,500,000 was 
needed. The States agreed to pay two-thirds of this amount, on condition 
1 that England provided the remainder. Buckhurst thought that the Queen 
would agree, but it appeared that he had been too optimistic. Elizabeth 
refused to increase her subsidy by more than £15,000,2 and the State of 
War had to be reduced accordingly. It nevertheless remained necessary 
to levy additional soldiers for the summer months, and this matter waS 
to cause another problem. Buckhurst saw no harm in attracting English 
soldiers and seems to have suggested to the Privy Council that a certain 
3 number be levied. The States objected to additional English forces and 
later refused to accept or pay the new recruits. In spite of the 
disappointment of the previous year, when the German levies had failed, 
they renewed the attempts to recruit mercenaries in Germany. Part of 
the extraordinary grant was sent to Bremen as security for the payment 
4 
of these soldiers. 
In the meantime the endeavours to pave the way for Leicester's 
return were continued. In the last resort his return depended on the 
Queen's decision, and Elizabeth was not yet certain whether it would be 
advisable to send him back. It was possible however that his services 
1 Bor, 11, ,p. 957. 
2 ' Cal. Fort, XXI, iii, p. 50. 
3 According to Leicester. ARA, SG 3793, fos. 426f. 
4' . 
Res. St. Gen" V, 643. 
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would.again be needed, and it was therefore one of Buckhurst's tasks to 
arrange a formal reconciliation between the absent governor and his 
opponents: the States, the stadholders and other military chiefs. The 
States, who on April 20th sent a formal invitation to Leicester, promising 
1 to restore his former authority, did not seem uncooperative. Among the 
stadholders and military leaders special attention was given to Maurice 
and Hohenlohe. The former submitted a list of complaints about 
Leicester's government to Buckhurst, but promised that he would obey 
2 Leicester upon his return. Hohenlohe made a similar pledge, but shortly 
after Buckhurst had sent a report of this diplomatic success to England, 
the Count asked for another interview in the course of which h. repeated 
3 his objections to Leicester. In the eyes of both Buckhurst and Wilkes 
Hohenlohe formed one of the most serious obstacles to a pacification. 
A number of incidents made them wonder whether his hatred and distrust 
of Leicester was not too deepseated for a reconciliation, and they 
considered the possibility that upon. Leicester's return Hohenlohe 
might revenge himself by making his peace with Parma. It was saId that 
he was removing his property from Holland to Geertruidenberg, and it was 
also rumoured that he was already in correspondence with the enemy.4 
1 Brugmans, 11, 185-187. 
2 - . 
Ibid., PP. 195-198. 
3BM, Cotton Mss., Galba C XI, fOe 318. 
4BM, Cotton Hss. 48,078, fOe 145; Cal. For., XXI, ii, pp. 426f; iii, 
pp. 36, 41. 
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He had, as a matter of fact, received a letter from the Count of 
Mansfelt, but had delivered it to the States. l Apparently this step 
did not fully exonerate him in the eyes of the English. Trying to 
explain why the Dutch politicians paid so much attention to the Count, 
whom a year earlier they would have been happy to dismiss, Wilkes 
suggested that they were moved not only by the wish to use him as a 
2 
counterpoise against Leicester, but also by the fear of alienating him 
and thereby risking his desertion. 3 
The prospect that Leicester's return might be followed by 
Hohenlohe's treason, or else by a private war between the governor and 
his former lieutenant-general, was a discouraging one. Discouraging 
enough, in the Queen's opinion. to warrant the Count's arrest. and 
orders·to this effect were sent to her agents in the Netherlands.4 These 
realized that such a high-handed action was too hazardous to be contem-
plated, and upon receipt of the Queen's order Buckhurst hastened to 
inform the English government that the suspicions might be unfounded. 
and that the only means to regain Hohenlohe's collaboration was by 
5 
catering to his wishes. Although care had been taken to keep the order 
1 . 
Res, St. Gen ••. Y. 509f. 
2BMt Cotton Mss., Calba C V, fo. 83. 
3 . Cal. For" XXI, ii. 426. The suspicion was a persistent one; in August 
Robert Beale held the same opinion. BM, Add. Mss. 48,014, fOe 574verso. 
4 ...... . 
Calf For" XXI,iii. PP. 19f. 
5 .. 
Ibid" pp. 35, 41. 
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a secret, Hohenlohe seems to have been aware of the fact that he was 
distrusted by the English, and in April or May he spread the tale that 
Leicester intended to kill him. Wilkes was careful enough this time 
not to send the news to England, but Leicester's secretary Athy did. l 
Leicester replied by informing the States and his own partisans that so 
long as the charge was not thoroughly investigated and his honour 
cleared it would be impossible for him to return. 2 Buckhurst, Wilkes, 
the States and the Council spent the necessary amount of time trying to 
settle this new problem. The magistrate of Utrecht, concluding that 
the accusation had been trumped up by the anti-English groups to prevent 
Leicester from returning, reacted by calling another general States' 
3 
meeting to its city. The armistice between Utrecht and the States 
General had ended. 
The failure of Buckhurst's embassy was by this time becoming 
evident to all. His initial promise regarding a subsidy of fl. 500,000 
had not been realized and the Queen delayed paying the £15,000 she had 
in the end agreed to give. Just as disconcerting was the fact that she 
refused to avow the political negotiations and kept insisting on an 
apology for the anti-English measures taken since Leicester's departure.4 
1 . 
Cat. For" XXI, iii, p. 89. 
2Brugmans, 11, 253; ~, XXXIV, 212-214; Cat. For., XXI, iii, pp. 39f, 47. 
3 Bor, II,?55. 
4' , 
Cal. For., XXI, ili, PP. 47, 48; Res. St. Gen., V, 547f, 550f. 
The States had refused to make that apology in April, and they were 
even less inclined to do it as time wore on. Buckhurst tried to convince 
Elizabeth of this fact but was forced, in the end, to tackle the matter 
once more with the States. The result was a new "explanation", which 
contained an even sharper criticism of Leicester's government than that 
1 given in the letter of February 4th. 
Another factor interfering with the success of Buckhurst's 
mission was the order to inform the States that England was investigating 
the possibility of formal peace negotiations with Spain. The news did 
perhaps not come as a great surprise to the States, for since January 
1587 it had been evident that the danger of an Anglo-Spanish composition 
was increasing. This revelation came not as the result of an English, 
but of a Danish step. Lutheran Denmark had generally been considered 
a potential ally, and during the early months of the alliance it seems 
to have made a vague offer of military assistance to Leicester. When 
the offer was not realized Leicester had sent Noel de Caron to Denmark, 
to find out about the King's disposition and to discuss the matter of 
Danish aid. 2 Caron's mission had had no positive effects, and before 
long it appeared that King Fr~derik -- succumbing, as Wi1kes thought, 
to the influence of a pro-Spanish party at his court3 -- had set himself 
1 It is in Bor, 11, 986-991. 
2 BM, Cotton Ms •• , Ca1ba DIll, fos. 19-21. 
3 Brugmans, I, 291f. 
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up as mediator between England and Spain, and had taken the preliminary 
step of sending an embassy to Madrid and Brussels. It was more or less 
by accident that the States became aware of this. Late in January the 
Danlsh ambassador, Rantzou, who travelled incognito through Brabant, 
was arrested by the garrison of Bergen op Zoom. The States allowed him 
to return to Copenhagen, but not until they had read and copied his 
papers. They found out that Frederik had given a list of terms to 
Phllip, that Philip had refused the demand for religious freedom offhand, 
and that subsequently Rantzou had been sent to Brussels to open discussions 
I 
with Parma. 
The embassy does not seem to have been undertaken at Elizabeth's 
2 
request or with her prior consent. Th. States may have thought that it 
was. They in any case feared that the Danish initiative would bring an 
Anglo-Spanish conference perceptibly closer, and they urged Elizabeth 
3 
not to accept the mediation. It is not clear whether the Queen approved 
of the Danish attempt. She assured Frederik that she was anxious to 
4 
accept his offers, but yet seems to have maintained a somewhat reserved 
attitude •. After some months of negotiation she informed the Danish King 
that in her opinion an assured peace was possible only if Philip granted 
IEar, 11, 893, 945; Van der Essen, V, 77-80. 
2 Van der Essen, V, 77. 
3 Bor, 11, .945-948. 
4 .. , 
Ca!. For., XXI, i, PP. 323f. 
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religious toleration. If he refused this the war would have to be 
continued, and Denmark would have to consider the question whether it 
was not obliged to support England and the Netherlands. l Perhaps 
Elizabeth preferred to keep the matter as much as possible in English 
hands, for her own negotiations, which were entrusted to the Flemish 
merchant Andrea de Loo, continued. Although the information which she 
herself received regarding Philip's attitude on the religious question 
2 
was no more encouraging than Rantzou's had been, she resolved to go 
forward with the preparations, and an order was sent to Buckhurst to 
3 discuss the question with the States. 
Buckhurst himself was active in the negotiations and regularly 
4 
corresponded with De Loo. He appears to have had his doubts about 
Philip's Sincerity however, and in the course of his embassy he further 
learned that the issue was a particularly touchy one in the Netherlands. 
He consequently was not enthusiastic about the Queen's order, and upon 
receipt of the letter he warned her not to put too much trust in 
Phi lip's pacifism and not to relax in her own war efforts; money and 
soldiers should be sent in abundance, because the safest introduction 
ICal. For" XXI, i, p. 370. 
2 . Cal,',For., XXI, Ui, p. 28. 
3 Brugmans, 11, 263-265. 
4 Ibid., P. 263; Cal, For., XXI, ii, pp. 388f; lii, P, 185; BM, Cotton 
Mss., Galba C XI, fOe 306. 
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1 to a peace conference was a "mighty war". Having sent this advice, 
he began wi th the execu t i on of the Queen's command. The ques t Ion was 
first discussed with the Councillors of State Leoninus, Brederode and 
Valcke, and thereafter with Oldenbarnevelt and Van der Mijle, president 
2 
of the Court of Holland. In two lengthy reports, written when these 
negotiations were being held, Buckhurst tried to give the Queen some 
3 idea of the reactions to be expected from the Dutch. In the second 
of these letters Elizabeth was told that the majority of the people 
were willing to join a conference with Spain. According to Buckhurst 
the three Councillors were in favour of a composition, and the same 
could be said of "sundry good Protestants, in a manner all the Nobllity 
and Gentlemen, the greatest part of the best Patriots, divers of States 
and Magistrates, all the Papists and Anabaptists, and the Spanish hearts, 
which [were] no small number". Among the people only "the Puritans and 
a great part of the Protestants" opposed it and these groups constl tuted, 
4 
as he had written earlier, no more than one-fifth of the population. 
He added the warning, however, that this minority was an 
influential one, that it had the support of the army, and that it 
cooperated with certain violently anti-Spanish members of the States. 
I Brugmans, 11, 237-239. 
2 Cabala, II, 37. 
3 . . 
Ibid., PP. 37-39; 40f. 
4 lbid., p. 37. 
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Those States' members were, on the whole, "Men of meanest Weal th and 
Calling, but most subtlle and ctmnlng", who were determined to prevent 
a reconciliation with Spain for no other reason than that they wished 
to keep the sovereignty and the government in their own hands. These 
three groups would never SUbmit voluntarily, and a peace conference 
would cause dangerous divisions and probably rebellions. The people 
in favour of a peace were likely to refuse obeying their magistrates 
and paying their taxes, while the military leaders might decide to 
make a settlement with Parma on their own terms. It was therefore 
essential that England enlarge Its aid, both to make Its preliminary 
mighty war and to prevent serious political and military alterations In 
I the provinces. 
The effect of Buckhurst's revelation upon the States was 
comparable to that produced by Stanley's and Yorke's treason. Disagreeable 
as the news was, it did clarify the situation, and it provided the States 
with another piece of anti-English and anti-Leicesterlan propaganda. 
Oldenbarnevelt's reaction was not nearly so violent as it had been in 
February. He and Van der Mijle played a more subtle diplomatic game 
this time; too "subtUe and cunning", indeed, for the inexperienced 
ambassador. They began by warning Buckhurst that publication of the 
news might cause a popular and military revolt, so that secrecy was 
necessary. Nevertheless, because it was the Queen's wish to have it 
I Cabala, 11, pP. 37f, 40. 
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discussed, they were willing to lend their cooperation, but for the time 
being only from behind the scenes. Buckhurst himself was to break the 
ice. His first step would be to speak to one of the principal magistrates 
in each of the chief towns, and ask them that they try to persuade their 
colleagues to accept the Queen's proposal. The names of these magistrates 
would be suggested to him by Oldenbarnevelt c. s., and it may be assumed 
that the Advocate took care to select men upon whom the disclosure would 
have a beneficial effect. For Dordrecht he expressly recommended the 
violently anti-Spanish but pro-English pensionary Josse de Menin. It 
was further agreed that within a week Buckhurst would make his proposal 
to the States General, but only after he had received the members' 
pledge that they would keep it a secret. When all this was accomplished 
he and the members of the States General would work together in 
recommending the peace to the various local governments. l 
"Now though it may seem to your Majesty", Buckhurst concluded 
the description of this scheme in his report to Elizabeth, "that when 
so many Persons shall be privy to this Purpose, that it will be a thing 
impossible to have it held in secret; yet thus it is by some of the 
gravest and chiefest of them devised and desired ••• ,,2 Buckhurst appears 
to have held the impression that the States themselves were interested 
In keeplng the matter as long as posslble from the people. The bellef 
I Cabala, II, 37f. 
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that the promise of secrecy would be- kept comforted him when on June 12th, 
shortly after he had his first interview with the three Councillors, he 
heard that England, by allowing Drake to sail out and "s inge the King 
of Spain's beard", had taken a step seriously endangering the Anglo .. 
Spanish negotiations. Informed of this event Buckhurst suggested to 
the Queen that it might be better if for the time being he let the 
matter rest. That same day it appeared however that some of those whom 
he had taken into his confidence had broken their promise and that the 
States General had already been informed of his message. l Before long 
the news was common knowledge. 
The outcome could have been predicted, and those who still hoped 
for the success of Buckhurst's mission regretted or criticized his step. 
Elizabeth also concluded that the communication had been premature and 
2 
severely reprimanded her ambassador. Her annoyance was perhaps 
chiefly a result of the fact that she had just decided to send Leicester 
back to the Netherlands, and that by executing her order Buckhurst had 
placed another obstacle on the way of Leicester's re-acceptance as 
governor general. 
II 
The Queen's decision regarding Leicester's return, which was 
taken in the end of May, came as a surprise to her agents in the 
1 Cabala, II, 40f. 
2Ca1 • For., XXI; 111, p. 95. 
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I Netherlands. They probably received the news with mixed feelings. 
Few if any regarded a renewal of the experiment without misgivings, 
and Buckhurst and Wilkes in particular had often warned that the political 
and military consequences were likely to be negative, and might well be 
2 disastrous. On other occasions however they had asked for his return, 
or at least suggested that his reappointment might be the best solution 
after all. 3 Fear of annoying Leicester, whom they knew to be dissatisfied 
4 
with their negotiations, was perhaps one ot the reasons why this latter 
advice was given, but they also appear to have held the opinion that his 
continued absence might create as many difficulties as his presence 
would. They had both been unable to divert the States from their anti-
English and decentralistic course and it was possible that Leicester 
might succeed. An additional reason was that the centrallst OPPOSition, 
which England could not afford to alienate so long as relations with the 
States and Holland remained unsettled, needed his protection. The people 
also clamoured for his return, and new commotions might take place if 
they were disappointed. Still another consideration was that his return 
lThe message did not become known in The Hague until June 15. Cal, For., 
XXI, iii, P. 102. 
2Cabala, 11, 22, 29, 33f; BM, Cotton Mss., Galba C XI, fOe 326; Galba 0 I, 
fOe 49; Add. Mss. 5935, fos. 23f; Add. Mss. 48,078, fOe 233. 
3 . 
Cal. For., XXI, ii, pp. 363, 424, 427; iii, pp. 10, 18f; Cabala, 11, 
9, 10f, 13, 15, 20t. 
4 . 
Cal. For., XXI, iii, pp. 37-40. 
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would at least have the merit of ending the suspense in which Elizabeth's 
indecision held States and country. an indecision that became daily more 
1 
embarrassing to the English arbitrators. The impression was unavoidable, 
they felt. that Elizabeth postponed taking a resolution because she 
wished to await the results of the negotiations with Parma, and that the 
Dutch would be kept on the leash with empty promises until certainty had 
been reached on that point. 
Apart from the fact that such suspicions dld not help to improve 
the political climate, there was the problem that the delays were 
unfortunate from a military point of view. The loss of Deventer and the 
IJsel forts had not been followed by an enemy offensive, partly, it was 
thought, because of the extreme dearth in the southern provinces,2 but 
largely, as later appeared, because Parma had been ordered to concentrate 
on the preparations for the English enterprise. His passivity would have 
given the allies a chance to open the attack, even if it were only by 
raids in Brabant and Flanders to destroy the enemy's harvests. Until 
June, that Is until Parma had begun his own belated offensive in 
Flanders, no major raids were organized. The English army remained 
Incomplete and most of it was used as a defensive force on the frontiers 
or for the protection (almost as much against the Hollanders and 
Hohenlohe as against the Spaniards) of the cautionary and other towns 
1 Cabala, 11, 21, 30, 36; Cat. For., XXI, iii, pp. 67, 90f. 
2 Brugmans, 11, 306; Cal. For., XXI, iil, 80; Cabal., 11, 34. 
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at England's devotion. Whatever forces the States had at their disposal 
were similarly used for defensive purposes only, and in their case also 
I 
about as much care was given to the allied as to the Spanish threat. 
It is true that the States planned to establish a camp, even if 
Elizabeth should withhold her extra subsidy, but progress was slow. By 
the middle of June Buckhurst expected that it would take some weeks 
before an army would be complete. The preparations had begun too late. 
"If they had raised an army but one month ago in the feld", Buckhurst 
wrote, "they might have impeached and endamaged the enemy so much by 
this time, as he should have little hurt them this yere; for they might 
have gon where they had wold, and doon, what they had wold, yea, the 
dearth and necessity of Zutfen, Numegen and Deventer was than so grete 
as the only fa~e of an army wold have made them yeld. But now I wold 
our army, when we have him, cold but defend us from hurt, so as we 
2 forbare to hurt the enemy." 
The States' ability to prepare for the emergencies appeared small 
and there obviously was room for .a general governor. I t nevertheless 
remained true that the problem was aggravated by the uncertainty in wh ich they 
were kept by the Queen. So long as there was no definite decision whether 
she would return Leicester, replace him, or allow the States to establish 
ISee Wilkes' letter of May 25th to Walsingham, In Cabala, 11, 32-34. 
2 Brugmans, 11, 306f. 
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an alternate form of government, it was difficult to make arrangements. 
Eventually, by the middle of June, States and Council tried to settle 
at least the question of the military command by resolving that until 
Leicester's return the field army would be under Maurice's leadership.l 
2 Buckhurst, Wilkes and Norris withheld their vote, although the ambassador 
3 a~itted that the settlement was the only logical one. It was nevertheless 
questionable whether the arrangement would solve the military problem. 
Parma had already begun his offensive in north-western Flanders, and 
Maurice's influence upon the States was not such that he could force 
them to hasten their preparations and concentrate upon the immediate 
Spanish threat. 
The fear that the States would leave Ostend and Sluys to their 
own resources was one of the reasons why Elizabeth decided to send 
Leicester back. Another was pressure by her Councillors. Leicester 
himself appears to have been in favour of returning, provided that 
Elizabeth complied with his requests for monetary aid and allowed him 
4 
adequate support. Burghley and Walsingham agreed that he should resume 
5 his charge. Their support does not indicate that they had been 
lRes. St. Gen., V, 640. 
2Ca1 • For" XXI. lil, P. 103. 
3 BM, Add. Mss. 48,078, fOe 99. 
4BM, Cotton Mss., Galba C XI, fos. 292, 294, 297; Harl. Mss. 6994, fOe 70. 
S For Burghley see FRO, SP Dom. XII, 200, no. 21; 201, no. 40; for 
Walsingham BM, Cotton Mss., Galba C XI, 294f, 296f; Harl. Mss. 6994, 
fOe 68. 
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impressed by his previous performance. There is evidence that especially 
Yalsingham's attitude towards Leicester's policies had been a sceptical 
one. Yilkes and Buckhurst considered him as their ally and freely 
acquainted him with their objections to and outspoken criticism of 
1 Leicester and his government. The fact that after Leicester's reappointment 
Yalsingham sent his secretary Francis Needham to the Netherlands indicates 
that he himself had his misgivings about Leicester's policy. It appears 
to have been Needham's task to gain impartial information about 
Leicester's government and to help direct his policies. He was ordered 
to warn Leicester particularly against a "course o~ revenge" and to 
2 
advise him that he adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the States. 
Yalsingham did the same by personal letters to the governor.3 When 
after the loss of Sluys the struggle between the States and Leicester 
was renewed he was one of the first to suggest to Leicester that he 
4 
ask for his recall. 
Burghley's attitude towards Leicester's government is not 
so clear. He had from the beginning considered it advisable that 
the English governor possessed some political influence in the 
Netherlands. He continued to support Leicester, not only when the Queen 
1 BN, Cotton Mss., Galba D I, fos. 49, 93-95; Cal. For., XXI, li, 
PP. 322-324, 365; iil, pp. 67f, 117f. 
2BM, Har1. Mss. 287, fOe 37; Harl. Mss. 1582, fOe 54. 
Cotton Mss., Galba D I, fOe 230. 
Cotton Mss., Galba D I, fOe 232. 
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objected to his acceptance of the governorship, but also when the States 
began to challenge his authority.l During Leicester's second term, 
particularly when upon the loss of Sluys Elizabeth once more overwhelmed 
her lieutenant with her criticism, Burghley continued to defend his 
actions. 2 In the course of this year he came also around to Leicester's 
side in the matter of Elizabeth's peace policies. Burghley had always 
desired an "assured" peace, and he had long considered it advisable to 
keep contacts with Spain open, but he realized the dangers of unduly 
forcing the issue. From his letters to Walsingham, written in the 
summer and autumn of 1587, it appears that he strongly objected to 
Elizabeth's policy of trying to arrange a formal conference so long as 
there was no certainty that Philip would accept her conditions, and so 
3 long as the States refused to join the negotiations. 
lBurghley approved, for example, of Wilkes' March remonstrance to the 
States. "I have", he wrote to \lalsingham on April 22nd 1587, "considered 
an large wrytyng exhibited to the States Generall by Mr. Wylk. on the 
behalf of hir Majesty, and my L. of Leistar as hir Majesty's lieutenant, 
and Governor of those Contreys. \lherin he hath in my opinion both wisely, 
clearly and yet modestly, expressed the offences committed by the States 
generally ageynst my L. Authoritie, and in the end he pre.seth them with 
a sharp argument, taxyng the States with ther challendge of soverayntle, 
wher the same properly belongeth to the whole Contrey and people of whom 
they have ther authoritie. This argument Is somewhat bytyng, and I long 
to heare what will be answered, for it is a matter questionable, and full 
of absurdities." PRO, SPDom, XII, 200, no. 21. 
2BM , Cotton Mss., Galba D I, fos. 231, 245, 248; Harl. Mss. 1582, fOe 53. 
3pRO, SP Dom. XII, 202, no. 56; 203, nos. 34, 37. The first two of these 
letters have been printed by Read, Lord Burghley, pp. 398f. See further 
Burghley'. "Arguments upon the matter of the offer to treat of a peace" 
in Cal. Fort,-XXI, ili, PP. 466f. 
327 
The fact that Burghley agreed with some of Leicester's aims 
again does not prove that he was, any more than Walsingham, an admirer 
of his particular approach. Their insistence upon Leicester's return 
does suggest, however, that in their opinion there was no better solution. 
Parma's success in gaining control of one of the Flemish coastal towns 
might be followed by the long-expected naval attack upon England itself. 
In view of this threat it was more than ever necessary that some basis 
for Anglo-Dutch cooperation be found. Burghley and Walsingham seem to 
have felt that Leicester, because of his influence with Elizabeth and 
because of his prestige among the people of the Netherlands, might still 
succeed in keeping both Queen and States loyal to their treaty obligations. 
England had long considered the possibility of a Spanish attempt 
against Ostend and Sluys. Fearful of jeopardizing the peace and reluctant 
to spend extra money, the Queen failed to try to prevent an attack in 
Flanders by a timely offensive, but she had never ignored the danger. 
The Dutch legation in London had been told on more than one occasion 
that the States were to strengthen the defences of the two places and 
I to pay their garrisons. The States had even been threatened that 
England would withdraw its subsidy if they neglected their holds on the 
2 Flemish coast. Under the circumstances the threat could not very well 
be executed, and the States felt free to ignore it. Sluys and Ostend 
lARA, SG 3793, fos. 257, 273, 283. See also Buckhurst's instructions, 
BM, Add. Mss. 48,084, fOe 58. 
2 Bor, 11, 940. 
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received no more attention than other frontier towns. If the complaints 
of Wilkes, Buckhurst, Norris, and the governors of the two towns may be 
believed, they received considerably less, at least until the offensive 
I had actually begun. To them it was evident that the States would refuse 
to exert themselves unduly for the safety of the towns, so that England, 
if it cared for their preservation, would have to take the initiative. 
According to Sir Roger Williams the entire responsibility would devolve 
upon the English army; it was his conviction that the States were 
prepared to sacrifice the towns altogether. He based his suspicion on 
the fact that shortly before the siege started Maurice had tried to 
2 
withdraw some companies from Sluys, and on the report of a Spanish 
prisoner of war that the States had promised Parma a free hand if he 
3 
moved against Ostend or Sluys. 
Elizabeth was forced into action. Having long ignored the 
complaints about the incompleteness of her auxiliary, she ordered late 
in April or early in May that levies for the army in the Netherlands be 
made. 4 These levies were not quite completed by the end of May, when 
Leicester was commanded to return, but in the meantime the English 
began to prepare for the defence of the Flemish coast by means of the 
IBM, Add. Mss. 5935, fOe 23verso; Cabala, 11, 15f; Cat. For., XXI, Ill, 
pP. 15, 76, 80f. 
2BM, Cotton Mss., Galba D I, fOe 40. 
3BM, Cotton Mss., Galba C XI, fOe 98. 
4· Acts Prl~ Council. New Series, XV, 37f, 61. 
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troops they had in the Netherlands. Sir Roger Williams was transferred 
with some experienced English companies from Bergen op Zoom to Ostend, 
which for a time seemed to be the enemy's target. When on June 12th 
the Spanish forces settled down before Sluys he moved to that town. l 
Some weeks later, on July 6th, Leicester arrived in Zeeland. He was 
accompanied by 4,500 new English recruits, 1,500 of whom were meant to 
2 be at the States' charge. These troops were untrained and largely 
unprovided, but the English government hoped that they would be supplied 
and armed by the States and added to whatever forces Maurlce and Hohenlohe 
3 had at their command. 
Leicester's first task then was to coordinate the Anglo-DutCh 
forces for the defence of Sluys. It was not his only duty, however. 
Elizabeth expected him also to require the States' consent for and 
participation in a peace conference. Buckhurst's reports had given the 
impression that the majority of the people in the Netherlands desired a 
composition. They had also made it clear that the minority OPPOSing it 
was a powerful and determined one, which would probably risk the break_up 
of the alliance rather than submit. The dangers were great, but in the 
Queen's opinion those of continuing the war were more serious still. 
Something was to be done to bring the OPPOSition in line with her 
leal For XXI ili, p. 66; Bor, 11, 983. . . , , 
2 Bor, Ill, 8. 
3Ibid • 
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policies, and she thought that Leicester, his strained relations with 
the States and the anti pacific inclinations of his partisans 
notwithstanding, was the man best fitted to perform this duty. 
In order to facilitate his military and political tasks Elizabeth 
wanted him to assume an authority similar to that which had been offered 
him one year earlier, and she agreed that pressure be put on the States 
if they were unwilling to grant this authority. The procedure to be 
I followed was outlined in Leicester's instructions. He was first to 
treat with the States' deputies and to ask them that they "yield him 
the like absolute authority as they gave him at his first entry into his 
charge". If these refused to do so he was to inform the "several 
Provinces, towns and commonali ties" and warn them that the Queen would 
withdraw her aid unless her governor received the required powers. In 
attempting to gain Dutch approval for the peace negotiations the procedure 
was to be reversed. Leicester was to begin by. trying "to win by some 
private kind of dealing such as [had] best credit with the common sort 
of people to like and embrace peace, and to be content to be used as 
instruments to incline the said peoples' hearts to desire the same". 
That done he was to approach the States and tell them that if they 
refused to lend their cooperation England would be forced to conclude 
a separate agreement with Spain. 
Elizabeth's demand that he propose the peace was of course 
1 See for the instructions, which were dated June 20/30, Van Deventer, 
1, 164-167. 
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disagreeable to Leicester, who tried to conceal the order as long as 
possible. The command that he employ the aid of the opposition in order 
to regain his authority was in conformity with his own ideas however, 
and he lost no time in executing it. Before he left England he ordered 
his secretary Junius to prepare the ground. Junius was told to visit 
Leicester's partisans and "such as had charge over the people", inform 
them that the rumours about Elizabeth's peace negotiations were 
unfounded, and warn them that Leicester returned on condl tlon that he 
receiVe power sufficient to administer the sovereignty for the countries. 
He was to add that this was the will of the Queen, who had ordered 
Leicester to return to England if he should not be reinstated in his 
1 former authority. 
Little harm might have come from this preliminary attempt if 
Junlus had managed to keep his endeavours a secret from the States. He 
did not. Before he had had many interviews Oldenbarnevelt and a few 
other members of the States of Holland were informed of his activities, 
arrested him and forced him to provide them with a copy of his 
2 instructions. The discovery caused the necessary commotlon. The 
States saw their suspicions confirmed that Leicester would again follow 
the popular approach and complained to Lord Buckhurst. Buckhurst himself 
was no less indignant and decided to send Wilkes, who was anxious to 
lThe letter to Junius is in Brugmans, 11, 336f. 
2 See the "Verbal de Junlus sur la prinse de ses lettres", in ARA, 
Aanwinsten 1889, XXVII A. 
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~eave the Netherlands before Leicester's arrival, with a letter of 
1 
warnings to the Queen. Even some of Leicester's supporters criticized 
his action. Prouninck, who had often recommended the popular approach, 
now regretted that Leicester had followed his advice and thereby given 
cause of annoyance to the States. In his opinion only Elizabeth could 
2 have sent a similar message with impunity. 
Prouninck was wrong in assuming that the States were still 
willing to pay any price in order to satisfy the Queen. Leicester's 
ability to refer to Elizabeth's wishes and support scarcely affected 
their attitude towards him. I t did not induce them, for example, to 
second his military efforts. Leicester experienced this during the 
weeks that he tried to raise the siege of Sluys. Weapons for at least 
part of his recruits had been provided, but otherwise little help was 
giVen. 3 There was a shortage of munitions and provisions,4 and money 
to buy additional supplies was~cklng. The States had managed to save 
fl. 200,000 of their extraordinary contributions but had sent it to 
Bremen for the payment of the German mercenaries, shortly after they 
5 heard of Leicester's return. Eventually, on July 23rd, they voted 
IBuckhurst's letter is printed in Brugmans, II, 314-319. It was dated 
June 28/July 8. 
2~, XXXIV, 241. 
3 .. .. . 
Cal. For" XXI, iii, p. 204. 
4lli!!. 
5 .. 
Res, St. Gen" V, 643,646; BM, Cotton Mss., Galba D I, fo. 101. 
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fl. 100,000 for the relief of Sluys, but only part of it had been paid 
1 by August 5th, when the town surrendered. 
The governor's expectations that the States' forces would be 
joined to his English troops also remained unrealized. The soldiers 
available for field duty had been put under Hohenlohe's command and sent 
into Brabant. Hohenlohe declined Leicester's invitation that he join 
him with his army before Sluys, although he eventually agreed to send 
his English and Friesian companies. They came too late to be of service, 
and Leicester's attempt to relieve the town on the land side had to be 
abandoned because of lack of soldiers. Hopes to relieve It by means of 
a naval attempt were also frustrated, in spite of the fact that here the 
allies were clearly in a stronger position than Parma. A naval force 
was prepared, but the Admiralties maintained that either the entry into 
the harbour was too hazardous, or that the harbour itself would be unable 
to accommodate the fleet if It should succeed in entering. Reports from 
the besieged and assurances by sailors who knew the situation were 
ignored, and offers by private mariners from Zeeland to make the attempt, 
turned down. Despairing of relief, and unable any longer to man the 
2 breaches, the garrison and burghers of Sluys surrendered the town. 
The reports on the defence of Sluys leave little or no doubt 
I Res, St, Gen" V, 702; CaI. For., XXI, iii, p. 276. 
2 For accounts of the siege and of the attempts to relieve Sluys see 
Bor, Ill, 8f, 15-21; CaI. For., XXI, iii, pp. 206.208, 258-263, 274-278; 
BM, Cotton Mss., Galba D I, fos. 199-205. 
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that Sir Roger Williams' prediction was correct, and that the States 
did sacrifice the town. It is doubtful whether they did this primarily 
because of their rivalry with Leicester. A military debacle would of 
course hurt his prestige, but the States must have realized that he 
would have little difficulty in clearing himself of the blame and passing 
it on to his opponents, so that the device would boomerang. Moreover, 
the States can hardly have been willing to lose a strategic town like 
Sluys, which might well become a second Dunkirk, merely because there 
was a chance of reducing the governor's credit. 
It Is more likely that the town suffered its fate as a result 
of the States' animosity against England and their distrust of English 
policies in general. In a report sent to the Privy Council after the 
capitulation it was suggested that one of the reasons for the States' 
attitude was their fear that England, which already had both Ostend and 
1 51uys at its devotion, would gain too strong a position In the southern 
Netherlands. 2 This fear may well have existed; the establishment of an 
Admiralty College In Ostend had shown the dangers of English influence 
in Flanders. But another and more pressing consideration was no doubt 
the fact that the town would provide the enemy with a port from which 
to launch his forces for an invasion of England; in Farma's opinion the 
IOstend had an English garrison, and that of 51uys, which was commanded 
by the Seigneur de Groenevelt, an ardent Leicesterian, was also strongly 
pro-English. So was the population of the town. 
2 Cal. For., XXI, iil, PP. 258f. 
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conquest of Sluys was a necessary preliminary for the English enterprise. l 
If Elizabeth wished to prevent Parma from acquiring his port of embarkment 
it was, the States undoubtedly argued, up to her to act; for example by 
granting their request for additional subsidies, or else by employing 
-
/ 
her own navy for the relief of the town. This is not to say, however, 
that they regretted her failure to make a large-scale effort on behalf 
of Sluys. There is reason to believe that the Dutch leaders were not 
disinclined to see the Armada sail, or even to lend Parma a helping hand 
for this purpose. The best guarantee for a continuation of English 
support lay in an act of direct Spanish aggression against England 
itself. To see this accomplished it was worthwhile to risk England's 
discontent, the people's indignation, and the increase of Spanish control 
over the Flemish coast. 
As it happened Philip was unable to take immediate advantage of 
his conquest and for a time the States had reason to wonder whether they 
had not made a miscalculation. De Loo's negotiations were not 
discontinued, and the possibility remained that Elizabeth would induce 
Phillp to agree to a peace. The popular reaction also was disturbing, 
especially in Zeeland, the province that felt Itself immediately 
2 
threatened by the Spanish victory. In Flushing the magistrate needed 
the help of the English governor Sir Wllllam Russell to settle the 
1 . .. . . 
Correspondance Phili??e 11, 11, ili, p. 225. 
2-
Res. St. Gen., V, 726. 
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1 disturbances, and in the pro-English town of Middelburg, seat of the 
States General and the Council of State during the latter part of the 
siege, serious concern arose about the safety of the States' deputies. 
To ward off the popular threat the magistrate was forced to hire 
2 
additional soldiers. 
There also was the possibility that Leicester would try to 
revenge himself upon the States. Assured of the people's sympathy, and 
of the support of numerous groups within the army, particularly of those 
which had helped in the defence of Sluys, his position was strong enough 
to pose a danger. The States General realized the need to come to terms 
with him. The Council acted as mediator, and by the middle of August a 
formal reconciliation was arranged. The first step was a proclamation 
by Leicester aiming at the suppression of the popular agitation against 
the States. 3 States and Council had in the meantlme drafted their "Act 
of Satlsfaction", which Leicester accepted on the 16th of the month. 4 
Herein they promised to reinstate him in his former authority and to give 
him their full cooperation and support. Details would be settled by a 
new States' meeting, which was to be held at Dordrecht. 
Leicester himself doubted whether the agreement would have a 
lThomas Wright, ed., Queen Elizabeth and her times (London, 1838), 11, 
347-349. 
2 ," " . . . 
Notulen Zeeland 1587, PP. 156, 195-197. 
3 .Bor,~II, 26. 
4 '. 
Ibid., PP. 24£. 
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I great deal of effect, and before long it became clear that whatever 
the wishes of the States General, the States of Holland had no intention 
to implement the Act of Satisfaction. They had accepted it in order to 
gain a breathing space while waiting for the alternative solution to the 
domestic problem: the disclosure of Leicester's peace miSSion. It was 
no secret that Elizabeth pressed the negotiations and it was expected 
that eventually Leicester would be forced to come back on his denials. 
In the meantime Holland tried to prevent his reinstatement by delaying 
tacties and passive resistance. It began by boycotting the meeting of 
2 the States General at Dordrecht. A further step was taken in September, 
when the provincial Acts of Consent were submitted. Holland's Act showed 
that the States still refused to entrust their contributions to the 
3 governor and the Council of State. 
Without Holland's cooperation in political matters and without 
Holland's money nothing could be achieved, and the wisest course for 
Leicester would have been to accept the fact that he had been defeated 
and to ask for his recall. One of the reasons preventing him from 
doing so was Elizabeth's order that he gain the States' approval for a 
peace conference. It was of course possible to extend the invitation 
without further ado, but this would place the English ally in too 
1 .. 
Cal. For., XXI, lii, P. 226. 
2ARA , SG 3782, fos. 506f. On Holland's relations with Leicester after 
the Act of Satisfaction was granted see Kluit, 11, 333-344, 351-353. 
3 
Holland's Act of Consent is in Bor, 111, 52!. 
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unfavourable a light. Leicester preferred to throw the blame for 
Elizabeth's policies on the States' uncooperative attitude and the 
1 
country's financial incapacity, and this plan required preparation. 
He probably also hoped that he might be able to induce the Dutch to 
accept the Queen's invitation, or at least to give their consent to her 
negotiations. His own opinion on the question remained a negative one, 
but his hopes that Elizabeth could be persuaded to postpone her plans 
~~ 
had been dissipated by the military defeat in Flanders. A peace conference 
there was to be. If it should take place without Dutch consent a new 
anti-English revolt was likely to take place, and so long as England 
was threatened by a Spanish invasion it could not afford to lose its 
influence in the Netherlands. 
This factor needs to be stressed, for it helps to explain 
Leicester's later attempts, ill-advised and irresponsible as admittedly 
they were, to regain his powers with the help of the opposition groups 
and to strengthen the English military position in the Netherlands. In 
these months the distrust was mutual. The Dutch felt that they had 
reason to suspect the ally of false play, but England entertained similar 
doubts about the States' attitude, especially since the loss of Sluys. 
Holland's subsequent refusal to support Leicester's attempts for the 
2 defence of Zeeland, Gelderland and Overljsel increased these doubts. 
1 Cal, For., XXI, iii, P. 246. 
2 See Kluit, 11, 333-335, 351-353. 
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Not only Buckhurst, but apparently Walsingham also considered the 
possibility that some of the Dutch chiefs, exasperated by the procedures 
of Elizabeth, would try to forestall England and conclude a separate 
1 
agreement with Spain. The reality of these English misgivings then 
must be considered when an explanation of Leicester's policies is 
attempted. If it is ignored his final two or three months in the 
Netherlands give no other picture than the traditional, but oversimplified 
one, of a man prepared to risk civil war for the mere purpose of serving 
his own position or of revenging himself upon the States. 
III 
The final struggle between States and governor produced, as the 
earlier ones had done, an endless stream of remonstrances and counter-
remonstrances, and it gave rise to the equally inevitable reconciliation 
attempts by the Councillors of State, the members of the Courts of 
Holland, and other "moderates". There is no need to relate the story 
in detail, but some attention must be given to the more spectacular 
political events. Leicester's first set-back came with the disclosure 
of Elizabeth's order that he propose the peace. Two factors were 
responsible for his failure to keep it a secret any longer. One was 
that the States' agent in London, Joachim Ortell, was able to lay his 
hands on Leicester's instructions and sent a copy of it to the Advocate 
lpRO, SP Dom. XII, 197, no. 5. 
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1 
of Holland. Oldenbarnevelt was now in a position to contradict Leicester's 
disclaimers on the issue and to give a new basis to the persistent rumours 
that he had been ordered to resume his former powers merely to facilitate 
2 
the transfer of the Netherlands to Spain. 
The second reason was Elizabeth's insistence that the matter of 
the peace be broached to the States without further delay. The 
negotiations had not ceased during and since the siege of Sluys. Shortly 
after the siege began the Queen had informed Andrea de Loo that the 
3 
members of an English peace legation had been appointed. This communi-
cation did not induce Parma to remove his army from before Sluys, but 
Elizabeth thought that the presence of her embassy in the southern 
Netherlands might have this effect. On July 26th she considered sending 
her commissioners if Parma would promise that in that case a ceasefIre 
would be arranged. The decision appears to have been taken at the 
suggestion of the pro-Spanish Controller Sir James Croft. Burghley, 
who was also acquainted with the plans, doubted that Parma would be 
willing to jeopardize his chances of gaining Sluys by granting an 
armistice, and feared that the step contemplated by ElIzabeth would 
I Haak, I, 128. Ortell's letter was dated August 5th, but it does not 
seem to have reached Oldenbarnevelt until the end of August or the 
beginning of September. See Res. Ho. 1587, p. 241. 
2 Bor, III, 51. 
3 --Cal. For., XXI, ill, p. 161. 
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I 
needlessly complicate matters for Leicester. Apparently he was able 
to dissuade her, for two days later De Loo was told that no legation 
was to be expected until Parma had actually ceased hostilities. 2 Parma 
meanwhile kept the negotiations going. On August 6th, one day after 
the capitulation of Sluys, he prepared a safe-conduct for the English 
3 peace commissioners. Care seems to have been taken that the arrangement 
remained no secret from England's ally, for later In August Leicester 
told Burghley that copies of the safe-conduct were circulating in the 
4 
northern provinces. 
1 
In a letter to Walsingham, which was dated July 16/26, Burghley gave a 
report of his discussion with Elizabeth. "I am greatly incomberedlt , 
Burghley wrote, "wi th such direction as hir Majesty will have prosequuted 
upon Mr. Controller's report to hir Majesty of his mans mouth Norryce. 
He sayth, that the Duke of Parma is willyng to make a cessation of armes 
by treaty with my L. of Lecester before the Commissioners shall come and 
this she will have procede with spede. And yet by the very words of 
Andrea de Loos letter to the Controller ••• it manifestly appeareth that 
the cessation of armes to be made with the Erie of Lecester should be 
duryng the communication of our Commissioners. And so I have shewed hir 
Majesty the very words. But yet she will be persuaded by Mr. Controller 
to the contrary, upon his mans report. And so In all haste she will have 
the Controllers man to return with this answer, that the Commissioners 
shall Come without fayle, if he will assent to cese armes. I objected to 
this that It were necessary to know of my L. of Lecester, whyther the 
state of his affayres and the publyck cause will accord with this manner 
of proceeding and whyther it shall profitt or endanger his actions. To 
which hir Majesty answereth that she will undertake that my L. of Lecestar 
shall do herein what she will command. But I do reply to this, that yet 
it is not thereby resolved.whyther it be mete so to be commanded as a 
thyng good for hir Majesty. But I am answered peremptorily that so it 
shall be... • •• 1 am unfit to be an executor of these sodayn directions, 
speCially where the affects are so large and dangerous, but lords and 
ladyes command, and servants obey." PRO, SP Dom. XII, 202, 56. 
2 Cat. For., XXI, iil, p. 185. 
3BM, Cotton Mss., Galba D I, fOe 242. 
4 Cal. For., XXI, lii, p. 246. 
342 
The loss of Sluys strengthened the Queen's determination to have 
a peace. On August 18th the Privy Council informed Leicester that 
Elizabeth was writing him to this effect. The Councillors added that 
"for sundry reasons" they themselves also had cause to desire a 
composition. l Even Walsingham agreed that in view of the Queen's war-
weariness and the States' refusal to cooperate in their own defence 
Ua secure peace" was to be desired above anything else. Although 
doubtful whether such a composition could be arranged he advised 
Leicester to attempt to win the Dutch for Elizabeth's Plans. 2 Leicester 
replied by urging Queen and Council to postpone the dispatch of the 
commissioners and to give him a chance "to propound the matter of the 
peace [not] as a thing resolved by her Majesty to go forward, but only 
by way of admonition, that they would bethink themselves what her 
3 Majesty shall be forced to do unless they give her better contentment". 
Five days later, on September 2nd, he made his preliminary announcement 
to the States of Holland, taking care to explain the suggestion 
primarily in terms of the States' financial and military weakness, 
rather than of Elizabeth's own war-weariness. Assurances were given 
that the Queen would continue her aid if the provinces made it clear to 
4 her that they had the necessary means to wage war successfully. 
1 CaI. For., XXI, lii, p. 227. 
2 BM, Galba D I, fos. 244f. 
3 Cal. For., XXI, ili, p. 246; Leicester to the Privy Council, August 17/27. 
For his letter to the Queen see BM, Harl. Mss. 4111, fos. 219-227. 
4 Bor, Ill, 34. 
Leicester had reason to expect that if the States publicized 
his communication they would not overemphasize the second part of his 
message. He himself prepared to do this, and at the same time to make 
a public display of his grievances against the States. A lengthy 
remonstrance was drawn up for this purpose. It was addressed to the 
States General, but copies were sent, on September 9th, to the various 
provincial States, the towns, and the High and Provincial Courts of 
Holland. l 
The effect of this communication was not highly spectacular. 
Hoping to ascertain the strength of the English party, Leicester had 
asked for answers by the individual towns. The States of Holland wished 
2 to prevent this and decided to give a combined reply, a decision which 
only Dordrecht, Gouda, Medemblik and Hoom appear to have refused to 
follow. 3 The reactions from these towns and from the Courts of Holland 
were as might have been expected. All regretted the misunderstandings, 
all promised their obedience, and all, except Gouda, whose magistrate 
had long desired a composition, told him that a peace was unacceptable 
1 Bor, Ill, 39. The remonstrance and the accompanying letter are printed 
by Brugmans, Ill, 84-94 and 100.102. 
2 Res. Ho. 1587, P. 256. 
3 BM, Add. Hss. 48,129 (no, fo.). For a similar paper see Cat. Hatf, 
Hss., Ill, 30lf. Delft, Haarlem, Amsterdam and De Briel a180 
acknowledged Leicester's letter but these towns informed him that they 
referred themselves to the States of Holland's reply. 
I 
to them. Apart from Overljsel, which was willing to join the negotiations 
if there were assurances that the peace would not prejudice the country's 
2 privileges and the reformed religion, the various provincial States 
3 
also gave a negative reply with respect to the peace proposals. 
This near-unanimity made it clear to Leicester that it would be 
best to ignore the issue for the time being, but again Elizabeth 
frustrated his plans. Urgent orders continued to reach him from England, 
and on October 11th he made his second proposal to the States. This 
time it was expressed in more definite terms: Elizabeth was unwilling 
to postpone her conference any longer and the States were requested to 
Join her and appoint commissioners. If they refused or delayed their 
resolution she might be forced, it was implied, to proceed without them. 4 
The fact that they had scored a political victory over Leicester 
did not make the governor completely harmless to the States. The 
revelations about the peace failed to have the results that had been 
expected. 5 They undoubtedly cost Leicester part of his support, but 
many of his partisans refused to be convinced and still believed that 
ISorne of the replies occur, in abstract, In the document last cited; 
the answers of the Courts of Holland and of Dordrecht have been printed 
by Bor, Ill, 47-50, 56-59. 
2 According to the summary in Add. Mss. 48,129. A similar reply was made 
by the two froo.tier towns of Tiel and Bommel. 
.!.E.!!!. 
3 See for the replies of Friesland, Gelderland, Utrecht and Holland, 
Bor, Ill, 46f, 54f, 55f, 76.80. 
4Van Deventer, It 173-175. 
5-
Cal. For., XXI, ill, PP. 377, 380, 392. 
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the Queen's threatening desertion was the States' fault. Their 
agitation and activities were causing the government considerable 
anxiety. Suspicions about Leicester's own intentions also continued. 
The States seem to have considered the possibility that he contemplated 
a formal coup d'etat, although such a drastic measure was not even 
necessary for him to strengthen his position. All that was needed was 
to retain his control over the English strongholds in Holland, Zeeland 
and Utrecht, to increase the number of his partisans within the States 
(which might be done by seconding the opposition's attempts to change 
the magistrates. in a number of individual towns), and to eliminate some 
of his most dangerous enemies. 
One of the incidents arousing the States' suspicions was that 
during the first week of September English troops entered Holland and 
I 
were received, at Leicester's order, by four or five towns. Most of 
these appear to have belonged to the new English recruits whom the 
States refused to pay and whom Leicester was eventually forced to return 
to England. The measure was probably in the first place one of protest: 
the States were informed that Leicester would leave the soldiers In 
Holland until the States had decided whether or not they wished to keep 
2 them. Part of the troops however were meant to stay, although perhaps 
for no other than defensive purposes, that Is for the protection of 
I . . 
Res, Ho. 15R7, pp. 244f. 
2 . 
ARA, Res. R. v. St., 6, fOe I02verso; Cal, For., XXI, lil, 330f. 
34-6 
De Briel. The number of soldiers in the cautionary town itself was 
increased, while the neighbouring towns of Delfshaven and Maaslandsluis 
1 
were provided with an English garrison. Similar precautions were 
taken on the Island of Walcheren, where by means of special arrangements 
with their garrisons Vere and Arnemuiden were converted into English 
2 
strongholds for the greater security of Flushing. It is impossible 
to say whether or not Leicester contemplated more drastic measures. 
The States' fears that the English army would be used for an attempt 
against some of their towns were not realized, but it is not surprising 
that under the circumstances these fears did arise. 
The States also believed that an attempt had been made by 
Leicester to remove a number of his opponents. Shortly after the 
dispatch of the English soldiers into Holland he had, at the suggestion 
J 
of the Council of State, visited The Hague for an interview with the 
States of Holland, and it was rumoured that on this occasion he had 
4 intended to arrest Oldenbarnevelt and Maurice. Again it is uncertain 
whether or not the rumours were based on fact. If they were, Leicester 
acted in accordance with Elizabeth's suggestions. Furious about the 
Dutch "betrayal" of Sluys the Queen had made no secret of her wish that 
1 Res. Ho. 1587, p. 244. 
2 . . 
CaI. For., eds. Sophie Crawford Lomas· and AlIen B. Hinds (London, 
1931), XXI, iv, pp. xvi if. 
3 BM, Add. Hss. 48,014, fOe 597. 
4 Bor, Ill, 51. 
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Leicester dole out punishment to Hohenlohe, Maurice, and the uncooperative 
1 States' members. It further appears from a letter written on September 
11th by one of the Friesian centralists, who was then at Dordrecht, that 
at this time Leicester's partisans expected a "change for the better". 
The expectation seems to have been based on Leicester's garrisoning of 
Delfshaven and Maaslandsluis with English soldiers, his resolution to 
communicate directly with the provinces and towns, the apparent 
dissatisfaction of the Courts of Holland with the States' procedure, and 
on Leicester's decision to visit The Hague. 2 It remains possible however 
that nothing more was intended than a course of pressure and intimidation; 
no mention was made in the letter of any intention to use more rigorous 
means. 3 Walsingham had urged Leicester to ignore the Queen's suggestion, 
and a letter by Leicester to the Privy Council, wherein he assured his 
coUeagues that he had no intention to follow "some hasty course of 
revenge" sugges ts that he h imsel f ques tl oned the wi sdom of E 11 za be th 's 
4 proposal. Although sufficient opportunities had presented themselves 
5 for an attempt against Maurice, these had never been used. It is not 
IBM, Cotton Mss., Galba C XI, fOe 121; Galba D I, fOe 230vers o. 
2The letter, which was sent by Doeco Aysma to his brother Dr. Hessel 
Aysma, is printed in Van Deventer, I, 167-169. See also Bor, Ill, SI. 
3 
BM, Cotton Mss., Galba D I, fOe 230. 
4 . 
BM, Add. Mss. 48,014, fOe 570. 
5 
At Middelburg, just after the loss of Sluys, and at Dordrecht, shortly 
before Leicester's visit to The Hague. BM, Cotton Mas., Galba D I, 
fOe 228; Add. Mss. 48,014, fOe 592verso; Cal. For" XXI, lil, pP. 238, 
264. 
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impossible therefore that this particular suspicion, which may have 
arisen as a result of the States' awareness of the Queen's demands, was 
unfounded. 
If Leicester had intended to adopt a "forceful approach", it was 
probably his experience of the States' superior political strength which 
dissuaded him from doing so. He continued to have a considerable 
following, also in Holland. The feeling that a reconciliation between 
States and governor might solve the problem posed by Elizabeth's pacifism 
was not confined to militant Lelcesterians like Prouninck, Sonoy and the 
centralists of Friesland. The ministers of Holland held the same opinion 
and sent a delegation to the States with the request that they try to 
1 give Elizabeth and Leicester satisfaction. Their intervention was not 
followed by further pressure, however. Other members of the English 
party showed more initiative, but they also failed to accomplish their 
purposes. Attempts against the anti-Lelcesterlan members of the magistrates 
2 
of Leiden and Amsterdam were unsuccessful. SonoY's hope that with 
Leicester's help he might regain control of Enkhuizen, where he had 
recently lost his military influence, was also frustrated. Leicester 
duly came to the Northern Quarter. He visited and was reasted in Hoom 
and Medemblik, but the magistrate of Enkhuizenrefused to allow him to 
3 
enter the town. A similar message of refusal came from the College of 
I Bor, Ill, 73f. 
21 . ~, p. 63. 
3~, PP. 67-69. 
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States' Deputies of Friesland, to which province Hessel Aysma and his 
associates had invited him in the hope that the magic of his name and 
presence would help them to gain a victory over the College and other 
1 
anti-English groups. 
Except in one instance these intrigues and incidents had no other 
effect than sharpening the suspicions between the antagonists; no major 
political upheavals occurred and no blood was shed. The one exception 
concerned Leiden, where plans had been made for a military attempt against 
the magistrate. Although natives may have cooperated, the plot appears 
to have been organized primarily by refugees from Sluys and other 
southern exiles, many of whom had settled in this town. Among those 
who had been acquainted with the plans were the ex-Councillor of State 
for Flanders Adolf van Meetkerke and the Professor of Theology Adriaan 
Saravia, also a native of the southern Netherlands, while the Fleming 
Jacques Volmaer was one of the chief organizers. Military assistance 
was to be given by the companies of two officers who had served at Sluys, 
the Italian Cosmo de Pescarengis and the young Seigneur de Maulde. The 
attack had been planned for October 11th, but shortly before that day 
Cosmo was arrested, on charges unconnected with the plot. Hereupon the 
other conspirators decided to cancel their plans. The magistrate somehow 
received information about the affair however, and arrested Volmaer and 
De Maulde. Meetkerke, Saravia and a number of others who had received 
I Bor, Ill, 70. 
1 
I 
a timely warning, were able to escape. 
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After a hasty trial by a court made up of members of the magistrate 
and the provincial States the three prisoners were condemned to death. 
Appeals by Leicester, Maurice, the Council of State and the Courts of 
Holland were ignored, and on October 26th the execution took place. In 
accordance with the sentence passed the heads of Volmaer and Cosmo were 
put on stakes and displayed at one of Leiden's gates. One year later 
they were still there, as a grisly warning to the burghers that rebellion 
2 
against the magistrate would be ruthlessly suppressed. After the 
execution, which created considerable disquiet among the people, a 
general pardon was proclaimed to those who might have been involved in 
the plot. The one exception concerned the men who had fled the town; 
these were to suffer their exile and the loss of their possessions. 
The procedure was directed as much against Leicester as against 
the conspirators. When the tragedy had taken its course Leicester 
denied, at least by implication, that he had been actively involved, and 
rejected the imputation that he should have wished to attempt anything 
3 
"against the state of the country by force". It is clear however that 
he was aware of the conspirators' intention to change Leiden's magistrate. 
Volmaer andCosmo both told their judges that he had been informed of 
1 See for the story of the Leiden plot Bor, Ill, 93-106. 
2 BM, Cotton Mss •• Galba DIll, fo. 330. 
3 See his letter of November 26, 1587, to the States General. ARA, 
Loketkas Loopende 56. 
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and given his blessing to their plans. It is true that at least in 
I Cosmo's case this confession was extracted under torture, but it was 
later confirmed by the testimony of some of those who had escaped. That 
testimony appeared in a public defence, which was dedicated to Leicester 
2 himself. Whether the plans had been made at his suggestion is not 
certain. According to the pamphlet in question the initiative had come 
from the Leiden group, and Leicester had given his approval only on 
condition·that bloodshed be avoided. It is possible however that the 
authors' desire to whitewash the governor coloured their account, and 
that Leicester's responsibility for the drama of Leiden was greater than 
his supporters were willing to admit. 
The States' success in crushing the Leiden conspiracy served as 
a warning for other opposition groups. The one in Friesland was already 
meeting its doom. The invitation to Leicester that he visit Friesland 
was followed by the arrest of the centralists' leader, Dr. Hessel Aysma, 
3 
who lost his position as president of the Provincial Council. Sonoy 
and Prouninck were able to maintain themselves for the time being, but 
it was unlikely that they would long remain in power if deprived of 
England's, and especially of Leicester's, moral and material support. 
Leicester's resignation was indeed to seal their fate; less than a year 
I Bor, Ill, 104. 
2See ibid" pp. 98-103. 
3 . 
ARA, Aanwinsten 1873, B XXVI. 
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after the governor's departure the pre-Leicesterlan status quo had been 
restored in both the Northern Quarter and in Utrecht. It was this 
prospect, no less than the fear of losing England's support against 
Spain, that explains their desperate stand against the States during 
the concluding months of Leicester's second term. 
The probable fate of his supporters could not induce Leicester 
to prolong his stay after the series of defeats he had suffered in 
October. It had become obvious that his role in the Netherlands had 
been played out. On November 1st he sent an urgent request to the Queen 
that she allow him to return to England,l and in the first half of that 
month he went to Zeeland to await her reply. In conformity with his 
own demands he had been released of the task of procuring the States' 
approval for a peace conference. This duty was entrusted to the diplomat 
Herbert, who arrived in November. Although Elizabeth appears to have 
2 
recalled Leicester as early as November 17th, he for a time delayed his 
departure, partly because he expected a Spanish attack upon Watcheren, 
but also because he hoped that the States General would do him the 
3 honour of sending a deputation to Flushing. The Spanish attack did not 
take place, and the States did not take the trouble of travelling to 
Zeeland. Leicester swallowed the slight and took his leave, on December 
6th, with a lengthy letter of farewell to the States. 
leal. For., XXI, 111, p. 383. 
2· .. 
Ibid., p. 410. 
3· 
ARA, SG Lias Engeland 5880, Bundel 1587: Loozen and Valcke to the 
St. Gen., Dec. 6 and Dec. 7; Res. St. Gen., V, 733-737. 
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The letter was an extraordinarily moderate one and gives the 
impression that Leicester intended to resign himself to the situation, 
to give the Dutch his blessing, and at the same time to remove some of 
the obstacles that lay in the path of Anglo-Dutch cooperation. He 
regretted the fact, he told the States, that his government had not 
brought the success he and they had expected, and went on to suggest 
that the failure was partly caused by lack of means, but also by the 
States' neglect in giving him their full support. There was no need 
to stress his personal grievances however; his own case was of little 
importance, but he wished to urge the States that at least they cherish 
the queen's friendship and give her all possible contentment. He 
further warned them to remember the enemy's power, to reunite themselves, 
strengthen their defences and, once more, to try to keep the support of 
England and the goodwill of other possible allies. If forced to rely 
on their own resources there was no future for the provinces. Without 
foreign aid the country would be condemned to a defensive war, and this 
would work the ruin not only of the frontier prOVinces, but in the long 
run also of Holland and Zeeland. He closed with the assurance that he 
would continue to support them, by advocating their cause before the 
1 Queen, by prayer, and by every other means available to him. 
Leicester knew the Dutch cause to be so closely allied to 
England's own that it could not be abandoned ex:ept at England's peril, 
1 . The letter is printed by Bor, Ill, 140-142. 
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and there is no reason to question the sincerity of his professions of 
loyalty. It is nevertheless probable that they were received with 
considerable scepticism by the States, who were possessed by the fear 
that upon his return to England Leicester would revenge himself upon 
the provinces. l This fear was strong enough to induce some Dutch politicians 
to mention it to Leicester's secretary Athy, shortly before the governor's 
departure from Zeeland. Athy reported the interview to Leicester. The 
latter's reply to his secretary was not substantially different from his 
letter to the States General. It again showed his desire to allay the 
Dutch suspicions and to create some basis for future Anglo-Dutch 
cooperation. He once more had to give vent to his disappointment that 
the States were "so careless of her Majesty, and of such as love them 
and have done them good as [to] discourage all men from taking care for 
them", but his main concern was again wi th their relations wi th the 
English ally. Stress was laid on the fact that the best means to retain 
Elizabeth's aid was by showing her some gratitude and trust. The fear 
that he himself planned to wash his hands of the Dutch cause was said 
to be unfounded. He admitted that the States' anxiety to loosen their 
connections with England made him wonder whether they themselves were 
not plotting the provinces' ruin. He assured Athy however that if and 
so long as he "might take any hope of. them to do good to the publyck 
cause" they would find in him an ally. "As for the other doubt of 
1 
"Gedenkschrift van Joris de Bye", ed. by R. Fruin BMHG XI (1888) 
436f. • -' • 
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partycular revenge", the letter continued, "God doth know how farr I was 
from thought even toward the worst of them, and by his grace there shall 
no partycular matter nor man make me forgett my vowe to the furtherance 
of his service whatsoever become of me or how yll soever man shall deale 
with me. And therefore yf they wyll make yt probable to me any good 
course shall be taken by them for the general cause, they shall see what 
I wyll do, at the least my endeavour shall appear. "I 
It may be assumed, as suggested, that Leicester tried to keep 
his promises. It is also clear that while his subsequent policies with 
respect to Spain and the peace conference could curry the States' favour, 
their suspicions of his intentions in their own respect were never fully 
mitigated. A number of incidents, ranging from minor squabbles about 
2 financial matters to major disagreements about the support given to 
his partisans in the Netherlands, continued to cloud the relations 
between States and ex_governor during the remaining ten months of his 
life and, of graver consequence, to delay the restoration of Anglo-Dutch 
relations in general. 
I BM, Cotton Hss., Galba D 1I, fos. 233f; Leicester to Athy, December 3 
(131), 1587. 
2Some concern arose among the States because of Leicester's refusal to 
acquiesce in their delays in paying the remnant of his salary and 
other financial claims, and of h is threat to seek his "own remedy" .-
presumably by the arrest of Dutch goods in English ports. EM, Cotton 
Mss., Galba D 11, fos. 208, 233; ARA, SG Lies Engeland 5880, Bundel 1588: 
Ortell to the St. Gen., Sep. 2nd; Bundel 1588 "Ortell": Memoria Jan van 
der Warcke en Ortell. 
CONCLUSION 
By describing the circumstances under which Leicester accepted 
and executed his task as governor general of the Netherlands it has been 
attempted to give an explanation of his policies. To explain his approach 
is not to suggest that there was no possibility of a different and more 
successful one. While it is true that many of the problems, conflicts 
and failures characterizing his government were due to circumstances 
beyond his control, it is also undeniable that his own policies, his 
underestimation of the States' powers and his refusal to follow their 
direction aggravated the difficulties. 
Leicester's insistence on the grant and maintenance of independent 
powers was consistent with his attempt to centralize the system of 
government, the task which he had set himself and which initially the 
States also had recommended. It was at the same time his gravest political 
error. The States of Holland had in practically every remonstrance tried 
to convince him of thiS, usually with a reference to the better example 
given by the Prince of Orange. Others among his critics made the Same 
comparison. Thomas Wilkes, for example, did so in a letter to Elizabeth, 
wherein he tried to convince her that Leicester's anti-States approach 
must fail. The Prince, Wilkes wrote, "would never attempt anything of 
importance, until1 he had imparted the same to the States, and had 
obteyned their liking and al10waunce thereof; and the reason was, because 
357 
the nature of that people was and is to mislyke of the actions and 
attemptes of their governours, if they succeede not to the profytt of 
the contrey, howsoever they be disselgned with reason or probability. 
This prince had not the showlder of so great a monarche as Your Hajestie 
to countenaunce his governement, but dyd all by wlsedome and dexteritye. 
The States are the same people and of the same humor they were then and, 
to be plaine with Your Majesty, they doe not naturally love to be 
subiect to any monarchicall governement. I know, they have many other 
errors and imperfections irreformable in them, but their natures cannot 
be altered; and therefore Your Majesty - under most humble correction -
must in this case make a vertue of necessity, sithe your safety is so 
I 
contiguate with the preservacion of those contreys". 
Wilkes overemphasized the advantages of Leicester's relations 
with Queen Elizabeth; in trying to govern the Netherlands this connection 
was as often a liability as an asset. His analysis of the Dutch political 
situation was valid however, and it pointed to one of the main caUSes of 
Leicester's political frustrations. The problem was that there was no 
room in the confederacy for an independent central government. However 
strong the arguments in favour of centralization were, particularly in 
times of mill tary danger, those in favour of the confederate system had 
always prevailed. Ultimately each province and each town attempted to 
safeguard its own position before that of the generality as a whole. 
I Brugmans, 11, 401f (July 12/22, 1587). 
Leicester's failure to centralize the system was therefore not due to 
his English connections only; even a native governor could not have 
expected to succeed. The Prince of Orange, who had never doubted the 
military advantages of centralization, had realized that it was 
politically impossible and had been forced to content himself with 
fighting the most serious abuses of the existing system. His own 
government, and the country's experience in the following years, showed 
that no other approach was practicable. 
It is nevertheless possible to see why upon the conclusion of 
the alliance the States had been tempted to make the experiment, and 
also why Leicester demanded that he be given independent powers. When 
he came to the Netherlands the confederacy was in a state of serious 
poll tical disorganization. Particularism was rampantl the States 
General was unable to enforce its decrees, the Council of State was 
powerless, the military leaders were at loggerheads, and the provinces 
failed to pay their financial consents in spite of the imminent military 
threat. The inadequacies of the confederate system had never been more 
obvious than at th.is particular time, and the demand for a purposeful 
central authority was general. 
There was also a general conviction that centralization offered 
the only possible solution to the country's long-term military problems. 
The conclusion of the alliance followed a period of uninterrupted defeats. 
The southern regions had been lost, and Parma had gained enough bases 
north of the great rivers to complete the subjugation of the inland 
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provInces and to organize an offensive against the western ones. The 
rapId Spanish upmarch sInce the Pacification of Chent had been facIlItated, 
it was generally agreed, by the provinces' political disunIty and by the 
central government's lack of power to force the unexposed towns and 
provInces to an all-out effort on behalf of the exposed ones. It would 
have been unrealistic to expect that the English subsidy alone could 
have solved the military problem. A successful offensIve had been 
impossible, even In the north-eastern provinces, when Brabant and 
Flanders were still bearing the brunt of the war. Farma's successes 
in South and East had been accompanied by a steady decrease in the 
provinces' revenue, and the 126,000 granted by the Queen dld no more 
than counteract the loss in ordinary contributions that had been 
suffered in the one-year period preceding the conclusion of the 
alliance. l The grant of English aid would have to be followed, it had 
been agreed by the States, by an attempt to remove the obstacles that 
thus far had prevented effective polItical and military cooperation 
among the members of the confederacy. 
When these factors are kept in mind Leicester's approach and 
many of the events of the Leicester period become intelligible. These 
same factors also show that Leicester's government was not an unqualified 
failure, serious as the consequences of his anti-States approach were. 
He governed the provinces at a time of drastic financial exhaustion, 
1 Cf. ARA, Index Bogaers, I, fOe 341 (August 18, 1584). 
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acute military danger and -- the inevitable consequence of the military 
threat -- of widespread political unrest. He solved none of the 
problems confronting the country, but he at least prevented a further 
political and military disintegration. To have kept the confederacy 
intact, politically and territorially, was perhaps the most that could 
have been expected from any governor in this period of crisis and 
transition. 
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APPENDIX 
I 
ARGUNENTS AGAINST INTERVENTION IN THE NEnIERLANDS 
BM, Harlelan Mss. 168, fos. 102-105. 
March 18, 1584. Copy. An onymous. 
28 '5 
In a consultacion at the Lorde Tresurere Burleys house 
near the Savoie in Londne touchinge an aide to be sent 
into Hollande against the Kinge of Spaine, the 18 of 
March 1584. 
The matter brought in deliberacione is, whether the Queenes Hatie. 
should enter with forces into Hollande and Zeland to give aid to those 
provinces againste the Kinge of Spaine or noe. 
Wherupon these things are meete to be considered. 
1. Firste whether the enterprise be juste. 
2. Nexte for whome it shalbe taken in hand. 
3. Thirdly againste wham. 
4. And laste what is like to followe. 
Which beinge well and thoroughlie weyed will direct. men the better how. 
to give Advise. 
1. And touchinge the first.. The enterprise cannot be juste excepte 
ther be either title or cause given. Title her Matle. doth make none 
to those Countreys that is knowne. Cause of offence be alledged dlveres 
that shoulde move her; but non other then may receave some answer. by 
the adverse partie, and may be repelled with other which they take to 
be greater givene on this side. For yf wee alledge against. the King. 
of Spaine his nourishinge of Rebelliones in England and Ierlande and 
also an invasione by the Pope into Ierlande maintained underhand by 
him; hee will thinke it suffitiente to answere, that by her Mats. 
permissione whole bands of Captains and Souldieres have been transported 
from hence into the Lowe Countryes and ther continued in service diver.s 
yeares, and greate sonnnes of money sente to those Contries by her Natie. 
in maintenaunce of his subiects againste him. But be It that there be 
greater cause on this side to induce her Matie. to deale in this 
enterprise. 
2. Then wee are to consider for the second point. whome her Matl •• 
. shall ayde, and that Is, sublects agalnste their King., commone poopl. 
and manye popular States without a heade. Fewe noblemen amongeste them, 
and yet those subiect to their dlrectione. The most of the nobillltie 
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of the Low Countryes some tymes patriots [1J but now not only disunited 
but also enemies to them. Small redinesse to contribute to the charges 
of the warre, and small assurance to performe that which they shall 
promise as in the governmente of the Prince of Orange did appeare, who 
although he was borne amongeste them, and spente his life for their 
safeties, coulde not procure them to paye that which was requisite, 
not withstandinge the necessetie of their cause, that of itselfe should 
have bene suffitiente to move them. The small curtesie which all 
straungers finde at their hands that come to ayde them as by their evell 
entertainmente of Duke Casamire and our English natione was evedently 
seene. The people also of those Countreyes, inconstante, lngratefull, 
and subiects to mutenies & corruption., wherunto ther is no doubte but 
they shalbe dailie solicited, neither are they so united in minde 
amongeste themselves but that ther be at this presente many and greate 
factiones in the verie bowelles of their Townes and Cittles. Dlscentlon. 
also that is like to follow for superioritie betweene the governores and 
captaines of that armie which her Matie. should send the there, and such 
heads as those contreyes now have. rln margin' Count Maurice, Count 
Hollock.] A thinge often happeninge amongeste men of warre, and veri. 
perilous yf it shall fallout soe. The unwillingnesse besides like to 
be in them to delivere into her Mats. possessione any of ther stronge 
places specially those which be maritime. A thing moste necessary both 
for the safegarde of her Mats. forces, and to make those people keepe 
promise with her, the yealdinge of which places of strength they will 
hardlie agree unto havinge denied that to the French Kinge: and the same 
(as it seemeth) being the speciall cause of the breache betweene them 
and him. A people moreover that have willinglle offered themselves to 
the French Kinge, without makinge suite to her Matie. for releefe, wherby 
it shalbe found howe coulde the Treatle betweene her Matie. and them ls 
like to be, specially her Matie. offeringe them succour and favoure 
before they seke it. 
3. Thirdlie this enterprise shalbe againste the King of Spaine, Lord 
of those Countreyes that seekethe to reduce his subiects to their former 
obedience. A thing that any prince would doe, & as her Matie. did upon 
the like occasione both in England and in Ierland wher In she could not 
have endured that any forreyne prince should have medled by maintaining. 
or ayding her people againste her. And to reduce the provinces yet 
remaininge he is verie like, havinge prevailed alredie so muche In the 
other, which were many in numbere, but are now brought to a fewe that 
hold out, so as this enterprise mighte then more titlle and more to 
purpose have bene taken in hande, when there were xvii whole provinces 
united in one minde and one strength, then nowe, when ther be not above 
two or three remaininge. What he is beside of himselfe, is knowne. A 
mightie and potente Kinge, Lord and soveralne over many large Dominions, 
and of great welth also, wherby he is like to prosecute the matter to 
the uttermoste, and not like to leave the quarrell by any reasonable 
compositlone, the rather beinge lifted up by his late victories over 
Portugall and the Easte Indeaes. 
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4. The laste pointe is to considere what is like to followe yf the 
matter goe forward. And that is: A presente warre with the Kinge of 
Spaine that will seeke to invade both England & Ierlande. Therby to 
diverte or revoke the Queenes forces out of the Lowe Contreyes. As 
Charles the Emperore, his late fathere, did (AnQ 1548) in sendlnge Duke 
Mauris into the Land of the Duke of Saxon, wherby he drave him to retire 
his forces thither for succour of his owne. And so both he and the 
Landesgrave beinge severed fell into the Emperores hands. And therfore 
how hard it shalbe for her Matte. to goe thorough with this Enterprise, 
and to defend her owne yf the Kinge of Spaine invade her, is meete to 
be thougt on. And therwith the greate and exceedlnge charges that muste 
needs growe by reason of this war re besides the perill of the successe. 
The charges also too great for her Matie. to be are without supporte of 
the Realme, whereunto it is hard to thinke that the people wilbe willinge 
to contribute, the moste of them like to take this for an unnecessarle 
warre, that being in peace we should provoke the Klnge of Spaine that 
in apparance maketh us no quarrell. The practises besides that he is 
like to use with forraine Princes, and evell subiects here, to trouble 
her Matie. and her state is not to be neglected. And further, of this 
muste needs followe a present stopp of all our Trafflque, not onelle with 
the Lowe Contreyes but also in Spaine, whereof will growe mutenies amongst 
the subiects for lacke of vente, and a greate decaye of the Queenes 
customes which is her beste revenewe. 
It shalbe also fitt in this parte to considere the end of this Enterprise. 
Her Matle. doth not meane to conquere those Contreyes nor to make herself. 
the soveraine Princesse therof, so as at length the matter muste growe 
to some end. And that wUbe: After she hath saved them from the present 
fury of the Enemy, or shalbe wearied with the trouble and charge of the 
warre; eyther to leave those Countryes to the people of the same, to be 
governed by themselves; who shall not be able to maintaine and continewe 
their State in that good sorte which her Hatie. may leave them In; or 
else by agreement, yf any be is greatly to be doubted, but being once 
In quiet possess lone, find occasione enough to breake it. For how those 
things hold is evidente by paciflcaclones made both in the Lowe Contreles 
and In Fraunce In these late civill warres; they laste no longer but 
untill advauntage may be taken. Which fallinge out soe, as It Is likely, 
then the case of those people noe better, but worse then before, and her 
Mats. peril! no lesse than nowe, but rather more, to revenge so great an 
iniurle, as he will take it. Uppon all which matteres thus remembered 
It shalbe meete to considere whether it wear not better to advise her 
Matie. to forbeare this enterprise, accompanied with so many difficultl.s 
& daungers, and rather to proceed with effecte in the treatle with King. 
and realme of Scotland, for a certaine & firme peace, and a perpetual1 
League betweene her Hatie. and them, wi th a perfecte establishment of 
the cause of religeon in both the Realmes. The assurance of which contrt. 
to this ought to be accompted of more vallue to us then the amitte etther 
of Fraunce or Spaine, both because the Scotts dwell with us upon one 
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maine or continent land, and so most redie to offend us; and because 
also they have caste off the yoke of Rome, & doe professe the same 
Rellgeon of the GospeU that wee doe. A greater band then which cannot 
be betweene any people and nations in the world. This done and her 
t-1atie. puttinge her owne realmes in that order and strength which she 
may and is able to doe, ther wilbe little cause to doubte any perrill 
from the K1nge of Spaine though he should possesse all the Lowe 
Contreyes quietly; no more then ther was at such time as the Duke of 
Alva, hIs lieutenante in those parts, and having all there in peaceable 
possession, commaunded what he listed. 
And yet the Kinge of Spaine can nevere so keepe those Countries, but he 
shall have neede of the amitie of England, considering the longe 
dlstance of his other dominions from thence, and the doubte he shall 
continually be in of mutinies and newe revoltes that may happen ther; 
together with the necessetie of the English traffique thether, without 
the which he shall have small revenew thence. 
And finall1e whether it weare not better for her Matie. to shunne this 
unnecessary warre; and to keep her Treasure for her owne defence in time 
of neede then consuminge it this way, to lacke when she shoulde have 
cause to use it, which together with the necessary preparation of all 
things here, wherof care is to be had, will deliver her from any perrill 
that may come by any forra1ne attempte or by sedition at home. 
Counsallors present at this Consultacion: 
The Lo •. Chauncelor 
The Lo. Treasurer 
The E. of Shrewesbury 
The E. of Leycester 
The E. of Bedforde 
The Lo. Howard; Lo. Chamberlayne 
The Lo. of Hunsdon 
The Lo. Presldent of Wales 
Sr. Chr. Hatton, Vice-Chamberlan 
~~. Secretarl Walsingham 
Sr. Walter Mildmay, Chauncellor 
of the Exchequer. 
II 
LORD BURGHLEY'S ADVICE REGARDING ntE APPOINTNENT 
OF AN ENGLISH NOBLE~~ 
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In Burghley's hand. Endd.: July l3, 1585. 
BM, Cotton Mss., Galba C VIII, fos. 89-90. 
Upon the request of the States hir Maty. may with honour 
assent to the same request as follows. 
They do consider that ther is no prynce nor Contrey of whom 
they have more reason to require ayde and to be defended ageynst the 
tyranny of the Spaniard than of the Q. of England and of hir Contrey, 
for that ther hath bene allweis an entercourse of marchandes betwixt 
these Contreys and thers, and that in such sort so necessary for both, 
as the one by experience cannot well live without friendship of the 
other. And for that purpose when the princes of these Contryes have 
made leages of friendshipp for ther own persons, allweis It was provyded 
that the towns and noblemen war also bound on to the other to mayntain 
amyty and entercourse. And in that respect the towns and people of 
these Contryes, fynding the tyranny of the Spaniards such as if they 
may have ther wills, they will styrr up a warr betwixt these Contryes 
and the realm of England, whereby shall insew a great desolation to 
both the Contryes, for avoydyng whereof the contryes now afflicted by 
the Spaniards and in danger to be subdued by them, do require only to 
be ayded and defended ageynst this intended tyranny for the benefit of 
both the Contryes, that they may enioye the most auncient entercourse 
with the crown and people of England as they have done. 
And hopyng that hir Maty. will not reiect this ther so just and 
resonable a demand tendyng to the benefyt of both the Contryes and 
people, they do also require hir Maty., that for the more spedy relief 
of them ageynst this tyranny intended, and the avoydyng of such confUSion 
as hath happened amongst them, consisting of multitudes of towns and 
dyversityes of provynces, being in a manner an equalltie, and no one 
gyvyng place to another in order and direction for ther defences, whereby 
though ther mynds be all unyted to defend themselves ageynst this 
tyranny, yet havyng no persons amongst them that have power because ther 
strengths ar not unyted by any good ordre for lack of good counsel1 and 
direction that might unyte them all into one societie, therefore they 
do all offer to be advised and directed 1n all thyngs that may tend to 
strengthening of themselves, ther towns and people, ageynst the intended 
tyranny, as well for ther contributions of money and victells for mayntenance 
of ther army as for the defence of ther towns and places with garrisons, 
It 
:l 
1 
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by such noble person of English blood as her Maty. shall name and send 
unto them, who shall have power with the principall governors of the 
provynces and the Councillors for the States of those Contryes to 
direct good orders for the unyting of ther forces together for ther just 
defence. 
To these requests hir Maty. may well assent, and name and send 
to them for principal nobleman accompanyed with some persons as 
Councillors with hyrn, and the governors of the contryes and towns with 
all other the States of the Contrye may promise to observe and fulfill 
all such directions and advices as shall be made and gyven by the 
Councillors of the Contrey with the advice of such noble person of 
England as so shall be appointed, so as nothyng be deterrnyned ageynst 
the auncient liberties of the Contryes. [Which person may well be 
accepted as a defender of their auncient libertyes ageynst the tyrannyes 
of ther enemyes.]* 
*Thls final sentence was deleted in the draft. 
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III 
PROUNINCK ON POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 
BM, Stowe Hss. 163, fos. 10, 11. 
The following paragraphs are taken from a paper drawn up 
by Prounlnck and entitled "Apostilles responsives sur 
l'exposltion de la lettre due 4 de fevrier 1587". 
En toute regime libre, princlpallement ou la monarchie est 
regne democratiquement, lauetorite des Estatz est neeessaire, laquelle 
Son Exce. veult et entend faire maintenir, mais aussy que les Estatz 
cognoissent les bomes de leur debvoir. Primum ence quilz se dlsent 
souverains - deinde souverains en contrepoix de lauthorite de leur 
Gouverneur general. Quant au premier, quilz voyent 51 leur estat a 
faulte du prince est aristocratique ou democratlque. SI aristocratlque 
il ny a quog membre de leur estat, asscavolr les nobles ou Optimates, 
et alors est impertinent de dire les Estatz, au lieu qu'on debvrolt 
dire 1 'Estat. Hals se trouvant entre les estatz plus dung membre, 
asscavoir en telle province deulx, les nobles et les vllles, en telle 
troix, Clerge, nobles et villes, lestat du pays est democratique. Cest 
doncques le peuple ad quem, Prineipe repudiato, summum imperlum videtur 
rediisse, eulus populi pars est nobilitas, pars Item plebs. Comme a 
Rome, ou Senatus n'estolt pas Souverain (quemadmodum nec senatus 
ordinurn nostrorum) sed administrator duntaxat summi imperil cogere 
classes populi rogare populum legem datam exegit (nee enim alterius 
quam populi erat legem dare, id est eonclure des grandes affaires de 
l'estat). Hec eorum adminlstratlonls summa fult. 
Le mesme sont noz Estatz adminlstrateurs et exploicteurs des 
polnets de Souverainete, dont llz ont interrogue et receu commission du 
peuple. Auquel ilz ferolent tord silz se portolent aultras et s'assumolent 
jurisdiction ou authorite plusgrande. 
Or, daultant qullz ont au nom du p~uple et sulvant la teneur du 
serment tanquam lllorum deputati transferre ladmlnlstration de la 
Souverainete a Son Exce. es poinctz non reservez, on ne peult cODprendre 
pourquoy ilz se portent Souveralns es poinctz transferrez, quy ne le 
sont pas encolres es polnctz non transferrez. 
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IV 
PROFESSOR SARAVIA.'S APOLOGY 
BM, Cotton Mss., G.lba DIll, tos. 227-229. 
October 6, 1588 
Les causes pourquoy certalns du magi.trat de Leid. ont 
conceu mauvaise opinion de moy et tait que i'ay est' tenu 
suspect des Estats de Hollande. 
11 est ainsi que Son [xce. estant au camp devant Sutphen, 
envoya vers moy un gentilhomme nomm' Malstre Corndlche avec un. lettr. 
de credence, pour cognoitre ce qu'on luy avoit rapport', que i'auroye 
ouy dire de Paulus Buys, qu'il ne se aeroit point port' fidelement en 
certain affaire que Son Exce. luy avoit commis, mals auroit fait mauvais 
office, de quoy i'estoye du tout ignorant et n'en avoye rlen entendu. 
Mai. fort bien, que peu de iours auparavant certain propos seditieux 
avoyent est' tenus par un certain Pieter Mack minister, fond' sur 1. 
conseil et advertissament que ledlt Mack dlsolt que Paul Buys avoit 
donnl au Maglstrat de Lelde, de se donner guarde des desseins de Son 
Exce. et que le troc ne leur fut lett' par dessus la teste devant 
qu'lls s'en apperceusent, et aultres plusleurs aemblables propoa s.dltleux, 
tent contre la religion que la police. Dequoy ceux du conalstoir. (a qUI 
tels propos desplalsoyent) estant fort esmervelll., coucherent lesdlts 
propos par escrit et furent d'advls de rappeller ledlt Pleter Mack, pour 
ouir s'll le. voudrolt malntenlr ou blen confesser d'avoir temerairement 
parl1. Car se disolent-il., nous ne pouvons crolre que e. que you. avel 
dit de Paulu. Buys et d'autres notables personnes soyt vray. Lequel 
persistant en ses premiers propos et qu'll n'avolt rlen dit que la 
verit', qu'au besoin 11 trouveroit blen sea auteurs. Et ainal il fut 
resolu d'en advertir les Magistrats, lequel n'en fit point de eaa. Atln 
de n'y rlen adlouter du mien le fis tlrer une cople de tout ce que 
estoi t enacd au llvre du consistolre, et I' envoyal a Son Exee, l_que1 
estant de retour du camp la bdUa au procureur fiscal du consell 
provincial de la Haye pour en prendre plus ample cognoi •• ance et pour 
proposer le fait au consell. Ce qui a est~ empeschl par le Magi.trat 
de Leide, lesquels prlndrent cela de fort mauvals. part. et voulurent 
savoir comment et par ~ul Son Exce. venolt a avolr 1. cople de ce qui 
s'estoit pass', tent au consistoire que pardevant eux. Quant a moy en 
.stant Interrogu' ne pouvoye et ne debvoye point nler mon falct cognu 
a ceux qul m'avoyent livr' la copie. Et deoela coneeurent un mervellleux 
grand desplalsir contre moy les Burgmalstres, dl.ant que 1. leur avoy. 
fait grant tort. 
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Puis apres environ un demy an on commenca a parler de la 
souverainet', et ce pour amoindrir l'autorit~ de Son Exce. et la faire 
moindre et inferieure a celle des Estats, comme 5'11 n'eut est' que 
1eur lieutenant, et eux les souveralns. Dequoy un jour parlant 
famlllerement avec un Burgmaistre je luy dis ce qu'il m'en semblolt 
comme i'en juge en ma conscience et suis certain estre la verlt'. 
Premierement que ceux qu'on appelle les Estats n'avoyent iamals est' 
souverains, qu'ils ne l'estoient point, et ne le pouvoyent estre. La 
ratIon est toute evidente, un souverain ne recognolt que Dieu par dessus 
soy, au lieux ou 11 est souverain, et n'est point accontable de ses 
actions a autre qu'. Dleu; que les Estats avoyent pour maistres les 
corps des villes, desquelles ils n'estoyent que procureurs et commissaires, 
et avoyent leurs instructions auquelles leur puissance estoit limit'e, 
estant tenus de faire rapport de leur actions et en rend re conte. Aussi 
leur titre d'estat representatif demonstroit assez qu'lls n'estoient 
point les vra!s Estats, mais seulement leur commis,durant le temps de 
l'assemblfe et pour les affaires seulement desquelles lis ont speclale 
charge, lesquels points sont du tout contraire a la nature de 
8Ouverainet~; concluant par la que le Gouverneur general du pays n'estoit 
point lieutenant des Estats representatifs, mais de la Cont' mesme de 
Hollande, qui est le vray estat compos' de toutes les vllles ensemble 
avec la noblesse, et ce non point pour un lour d'as8embl'. mais iusques 
a ce que la charge de Gouverneur soit rappellee par le commandement 
special detoutes les villes et de la noblesse; et quill n'estolt en 
la puissance des Estats de luy oster sa puissance ne de la Ilmiter ny 
interpreter sans speclale charge et commandement de leur malstres, 
desquels le gouverneur tient son autorite et non point d'eux. Et que 
le serment de Son Exce. estoit fait a la Cont' de Hollande et au corpl 
des autres provinces et non point aux Estats representatlfl qui .ont 
auiourdhuy en autoritf et touchant certain cas particuller et demaln 
ne sont plus rien: maia le corps de la Cont' demeure touliour en Ion 
autorite, ne se pert point sinon apress quelle est rellgnee et mls. en 
la main et disposition d'un seul Conte et Seigneur. 
Au reste que quant a l'autorite souveralne le mien rapportoye 
• ce qui en pouvoit estre l mais que le Roy Phellppe nlaucun de s •• 
predecesseura n'avolt onques estf Seigneur souveraln de Hollande, 
Geldre, Frlse, Brabant, etc. except' l'Empereur Charles en qua11t' 
d'Empereur. Vrai est que de Flandres et Artois 11 est Prince .ouveraln 
par ce que l'Ernpereur en a aqula la souverainet' par l'.spee. et que le 
Roy Francois et son succe8seur le Roy Henry y ont renonc' par plulieurl 
traites de paix, et ainsy est non leulement Cont. de Flandre. et Artoi. 
mais Prince souverain et vrayement Roy, encore quIll ft'en porte point 
le titre, ne recognoissant autre que Dieu pour .uperleur, duquel 
fmmediatement 11 tient lesdites Cont'es. Mal. quant au Ducel de Brabant, 
Gueldre, Holland_, Fri.e, il dolt homage et lervlce a l'empire et e.t 
homme 1ige de l'Empereur, qui est le vrai Prince souverain de.dlt •• 
Dueees et Contees. Et combien que le Roy Phelippe .It forfalt le droit 
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et titre de Conte de Hollande, qu'll ne peut avolr forfalt la 
souverainet', laquelle 11 n'avoit onques eu, et qu'll y pouvoit blen 
.voir de l'abus quand on conloindoit l'autorlt' de l'lmpereur Charles 
avee celle de son filz le Roy Phelippe, laquelle est fort differente. 
Car eelle de l'lmpereur avoit double respect, cest a aavoir d'Empereur 
et de Conte, et ainsi il estoit souverain non point en quallt' de Conte 
mais d'Empereur. lt que combien que le Roy Phelippe alt succed. a son 
Pere, il ne luy a sueeede qu'en qualit' de Conte: tellement que 
l'Empereur Charles en se deportant de l'Empire et de toutes ses 
Selgneurles a eu deux suecesseurs, l'un a est~ Ferdlnant son frere qui 
a succede a l'Empire et a la souverainete de toutes les terres et 
Seigneuries tenues de l'Emplre, et le Roy Phelippe a l'Espalgne et au 
terres et Selgneuries du Pais Bas, a chacune d'icelles selon leur 
quallt' et condition, qui sont dlverses les unes aux autre.. Que si 
la souverainete a est' quitt'e au Roy Phellppe de par l'Empire ca que 
j'ignore, ou bien ei el1e est pour le iourdhuy neglig'e de l'Empereur 
et de l'Empire et abandonn'e comme il semble quelle est, si long temps 
que les villes de Hollande demeurent unies ensemble comme elles estolent 
auparavant, la souverainetl est tomb'e en touts les corps des villes 
ensemble et en nulles delles en particulier, d'autant qu'elles ne font 
qu'un corps, une republique ou Cont'. Toutesfois et quantes qu'un 
estat se dissout par la mort du souverain sans successeur ou autrement, 
la puissance et autorit' souveraine ou autre tombe es mains et disposition 
de toute la republique n'est qu'ordre soit prins et estably auparavant 
pour durant le temps de l'Interregne se gouverner, comme on volt en 
l'Emplre Romain et au Royaulmes electlfs. Apre. que les Rois furent 
deschas' de Rome les Consuls avec le Senat pensoyent que l'autorlt' 
souveralne leur estolt escheue mais le peuple ne l'entendit point ainsi; 
quand i1 s'appercent que le Senat s'attribuoit toute le. Royaute. et 
souveraine puissance que les Rois avoyent eus auparavant, il. virent 
bien qu'on les avoit tromp' leur faisant entendre qu'en deseha.sant 1es 
Rots ils seroyent un peuple libre; mals se trouvants bien eslolgnes d. 
leur conte quand pour un Roy il en voyoient deux cents. lis •• revolterent 
du Senat tant que l'estat tut estably populalre, auquel combien que le 
Senat tenoit le premier rang et degr' d'honneur et puis apres l.s 
chevaliers, le peuple toutefois retenoit la principall. autorite en ce 
qui coneemoit la souveraine puissance. Quant a Holland. l'.stat n. 
poeut estre que populaire, car les gentilhommes n'ont nulle prerogative 
de suffraige ne d'autorit' en ce qui concerne l'estat, car touts ensemble 
n'ont qu'une volx non plus que le molndre corps de ville de Holland •• 
Part.nt je ne me puis assez esmerveiller de voz Jurisconsultes qui 
doibvent cognoitre cecy et vous faire entendre quel est vostr. estate 
Car si long temps que ce point est ignor' vous ne pouvez proeeder en vos 
affaires legitimement comme 11 appartient mais taut que commetlea 
beaueoup de fautes et absurditez en matiere d'estat lequel voua ~anie •• 
Or, ses propos cy n'aiant est' tenu de moy qua deux ou trois 
ie ne seal ,'ill on est' rapportez a Messieurs des lstats. Tant y a 
que depuis ce temps la i1s m'ont eu suspect et pense de moy que le 
faisoye entendre a Son Exce. beaucoup de choses au preiudice de leur 
autorite et du pais. Toutefois iamais ne 1uy ait tenu propos aucun de 
l'Estat du pays n'y en general n'y en particu1ier, aeulement quand il 
s'est plaind des traverses que les Estats luy donnoyent ie l'ai prie 
que pour l'amour de Dieu et de Son Eg1ise il luy pleut d'avoir un petit 
de patience et que finalement les Estats deux mesmes s'accomoderoyent 
• toute raison. Et que feu de haute memoire I. Prince d'Aurenge les 
avoit gaignez par tels moyens et amen' si avant qu'ils ne faisoyent 
rien sans son cong' et consell, auquel lis estoyent resoluz un petit 
devant sa mort de mettre entre ses mains tout l'estat du pays et le 
faire Conte de Hollande. 
Voll. le plre conseil que j'ay donn' a son Exce. 11 y a un 
tiers point dequoy Messieurs ont este fort offensez, c'est qu'un Synode 
a est' tenu par le commandement de son Exce. et comme 11. pensent par 
mon conseil, en quoy aussl lIs .'abusent, imputant cela plus a may 
qu'aux autres mlnistres, lesquels me prierent de leur ten1r compagn1e 
pour requerir Son Exce. de vouloir faire establir et autoriser quelque 
ordre certain pour le gouvernement de l'Eg1ise. 
